•  256
    Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory
    with Josef Parnas
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6): 687-705. 1998.
    Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we crit…Read more
  •  212
    ... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...
  •  521
    Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness
    In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader, Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180. 2003.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind…Read more
  •  207
    Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3): 453-471. 2007.
    In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat o…Read more
  •  184
    Time and consciousness in the bernau manuscripts
    Husserl Studies 20 (2): 99-118. 2004.
    Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse” – but he also takes care to distinguish between several …Read more
  •  495
    Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism
    Synthese 160 (3): 355-374. 2008.
    The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements i…Read more
  •  34
    Openness versus interdependence: A reply to Kyselo
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (7): 1066-1067. 2016.
  •  744
    Beyond empathy: Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7): 151-167. 2001.
    Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler's criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a 'solution' to the 'traditional' problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn…Read more
  •  196
    Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Body
    Études Phénoménologiques 10 (19): 63-84. 1994.
  •  257
    Naturalized phenomenology
    In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Springer. 2009.
    It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe 20th century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, i.e., for their criticism of psychologism), the si…Read more
  •  182
    Subjectivity and the First-Person Perspective
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 66-84. 2007.
    Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like rather straightforward int…Read more
  •  77
    __Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity __analyzes the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity was a _conditio sine qua non_ for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts, Dan Zahavi examines Husserl's reasons for t…Read more
  •  97
    Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self
    In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self, Oxford University Press. pp. 316-338. 2011.
    This article argues in defence of the minimal self and discusses the phenomenological objection to the Buddhist no-self view. It considers the distinction made by Miri Albahari between two forms of the sense of body ownership: personal ownership and perspectival ownership. It suggests that there is an important contrast between this Buddhist conception and the phenomenological conception of nonegological consciousness as found by Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre.
  • Introduction
    with Mark Siderits and Evan Thompson
    In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  95
    Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated