Dan Zahavi

Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to one of the dominant philosophical movements of the 20th century. This lively and lucid book provides an introduction to the essential phenomenological concepts that are crucial for understanding great thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi examines and explains key questions such as: - What is a phenomenological analysis? - What are the methodological foundations of phenomenology? - What does phenomenology have to say about embodiment and intersubjectivity? - How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? - How do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in psychology and qualitative research? With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology.

A point made repeatedly over the last few years is that the Locked-in Syndrome offers unique real-life material for revisiting and challenging certain ingrained philosophical assumptions about the nature of personhood and personal identity. Indeed, the claim has been made that a closer study of LIS will call into question some of the traditional conceptions of personhood that primarily highlight the significance of consciousness, self-consciousness and autonomy and suggest the need for a more interpersonal account of the person. I am skeptical about these claims and will in the following argue that the theoretical relevance of LIS for an understanding of selfhood and personhood has been exaggerated.

It is difficult to give a nice succinct précis of The Phenomenological Mind since it is composed of a set of chapters each of which addresses a different topic. The topics are linked in numerous ways. There is one way, however, in which all of the chapters are bound together to constitute a unified whole, and this might be considered something like a framework proposition. Phenomenology, understood as the philosophical approach taken up by Husserl and a number of people who loosely follow his lead, has something important to contribute to philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. The proof of this claim is to be found in the details of the various chapters. In some cases it consists of showing that a phenomenological approach provides a genuine alternative to the standard or current approaches to be found in these areas. In other cases, phenomenological methods may provide insights about certain key concepts; or insights that are suggestive for experimental work. To do any of this requires that we take an interdisciplinary approach and recognize that these various investigations do not move on a one-way track.

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology.

This article engages critically with Margaret Gilbert’s proposal that joint commitments are necessary for collective emotions. After introducing Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment (Section 2), and the joint commitment account of collective emotions (Section 3), we argue in Section 4 that research from developmental psychology challenges the necessity of joint commitments for collective emotions. In that section, we also raise a more principled objection to Gilbert’s account, independently of developmental considerations. Section 5 develops a complementary line of argument, focused on the notion of mutual recognition. While we agree with Gilbert that mutual recognition has an important role to play in an account of collective emotions, we take issue with her attempt to analyse face-to-face based mutual recognition in terms of the concept of joint commitment. We conclude by sketching an alternative analysis of collective emotions that highlights the role of interpersonal identification and socially mediated self-consciousness.

[Phenomenology and the project of naturalization] In recent years more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciliating phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? In their long introduction to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology published by Stanford University Press in 1999, the four co-editors, Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy set out to delineate what might be seen as a kind of manifesto for this new approach. An examination of this introduction is consequently a good starting point for a discussion of the issue.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology, and offers a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the state of phenomenology today. The essays explore a diverse range of topics, including intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought.

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

ABSTRACTIn my discussion of Ganeri's [2018] article, I first examine the sense of ownership: Is it post-hoc, backwards directed, and past-oriented? I then consider whether episodic memory, understood as a form of past-directed attention, has to be supplemented by another cognitive mechanism to allow for a sense of ownership, or whether attention in and of itself exemplifies a type of I-consciousness. In the final and most extensive part of my commentary, I discuss whether Ganeri is right in suggesting that a reflexivist account of the subjectivity of experience commits one to a form of solipsism.

The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight and self-disorders in schizophrenia, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind

In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at describing the experiential structures in their pretheoretical immediacy. But every description involves the use of language, involves the use of generalizing and subsuming concepts. For the very same reason, every description and expression involves a mediation and objectification that necessarily estranges us from subjectivity itself.In his early lecture course Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem of 1919 Heidegger responds to Natorp's challenge and attempts to show that the criticism is based on some questionable assumptions. More specifically, Heidegger argues that Natorp's criticism might be pertinent when it comes to a phenomenology based on a reflective methodology, i.e. when it comes to a Husserlian phenomenology, but it is wide of the mark when it comes to Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.In this paper I wish to present both Natorp's criticism and Heidegger's response in detail. One of the aims will be to articulate the criticism that Heidegger himself—via his discussion with Natorp—directs against a reflective phenomenology. In the final part of the paper I will then evaluate the pertinence of this criticism. Is it at all justified?

Many accounts of collective intentionality target rather sophisticated types of cooperative activities, i.e., activities with complex goals that require prior planning and various coordinating and organizing roles. But although joint action is of obvious importance, an investigation of collective intentionality should not merely focus on the question of how we can share agentive intentions. We can act and do things together, but it is not obvious that the awe felt and shared by a group of Egyptologists when they gain entry to a newly discovered pharaonic tomb can or should be analyzed in the same way as, say, a heist that a group of criminals carefully plan and execute together. The aim of the article is to better understand the kind of emotional sharing that can occur between two individuals who are perceptually co-present. Does the sharing involve a kind of phenomenal fusion? Is it a matter of sharing one and the same token experience? It will be argued that both of these recent suggestions must be rejected as misleading in favor of an account that sees emotional sharing as a form of emotional integration that involves constitutively interdependent processes of empathy, second-personal address, and identification.

Betrachtet man die gegenwärtigen philosophischen Arbeiten über die Natur und den Status von kollektiver Intentionalität und Wir-Intentionen, fällt auf, wie viel Aufwand betrieben wird, um die Struktur gemeinsamer Handlungen zu analysieren und um nachzuweisen, ob die Intention, beispielsweise einen gemeinsamen Spaziergang zu unternehmen oder das Haus gemeinsam zu streichen, auf irgendeine Form der Ich-Intentionalität reduziert werden kann oder nicht. Viel weniger Arbeiten haben sich der Analyse geteilter Stimmungen und Emotionen gewidmet. Dies ist nicht nur deshalb bedauerlich, weil das Teilen von Emotionen in der Entwicklung aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach gemeinsamen Handlungen vorangeht und logisch betrachtet grundlegender ist, sondern auch, weil es eine Art des Zusammenseins mit Anderen konstituiert, die wir untersuchen müssen, wenn wir die Natur des Wir verstehen wollen. Mein vorrangiges Ziel in diesem Beitrag ist es, eine Antwort auf die folgende Frage zu geben: Setzt die Wir-Erfahrung, die Erfahrung, Teil eines Wir zu sein, die Differenzierung von Selbsterfahrung und Fremderfahrung voraus, geht sie ihr voraus, erhält sie sie aufrecht, oder hebt sie sie auf? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich das Teilen von Emotionen näher betrachten und Quellen heranziehen, die in der gegenwärtigen Sozialontologie zu häufig ignoriert werden, nämlich Einsichten, die sich in der klassischen Phänomenologie und in der gegenwärtigen Forschung zu sozialer Kognition finden lassen.

In this article, we describe the history and impact of the Center for Subjectivity Research since its inception in 2002 and until 2020. From its very beginning, cfs was structured to facilitate and carry out interdisciplinary research on human subjectivity, taking phenomenology as an important source of inspiration. We cover some of the most important research areas in which cfs has had a national and international impact. These include developing the field of existential hermeneutics, opening a dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, creating a multi-dimensional account of the self, exploring the interrelations between I, you and we, and conceptualizing and assessing self-disorders in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Over the years, research at cfs has demonstrated the vitality of the phenomenological tradition, and shown how phenomenology can contribute to contemporary theoretical and scientific debates.

RESUMEN Esta entrevista tiene como objetivo mostrar los aportes de la fenomenología de Dan Zahavi a algunas temáticas fundamentales de filosofía de la mente. El filósofo danés expresa su interés en vincular la fenomenología con otras disciplinas y comenta su último proyecto, dedicado al vínculo intersubjetivo. Además, explica su posición con respecto a la naturalización de la fenomenología, la importancia de desarrollar una filosofía de la mente desde la perspectiva de primera persona, y la cuestión del idealismo husserliano y su vínculo con Putnam. Por otro lado, se refiere a cómo el estudio de los trastornos psiquiátricos aporta a la filosofía, presenta la propuesta de la tradición fenomenológica para evitar los problemas del debate internalismo-externalismo y explica la manera en que su concepto del yo ilumina la clásica discusión sobre la mente y el cerebro. Finalmente, Zahavi comenta sobre la posibilidad de vincular filosofía, ciencia y religión. ABSTRACT The aim of this interview is to show the contributions of Dan Zahavi's phenomenology to some fundamental issues in philosophy of mind. The Danish philosopher expresses his interest to link phenomenology to other disciplines and talks about his latest project, dedicated to the intersubjective relation. He also explains his position with respect to the naturalization of phenomenology, the importance of developing a philosophy of mind from a first-person perspective, and the question of Husserlian idealism and his link with Putnam. On the other hand, he refers to how the study of psychiatric disorders contributes to philosophy, presents the proposal of the pheno-menological tradition to sidestep the problems of internalism-externalism debate, and explains how his concept of self illuminates the classic discussion on mind and brain. Finally, Zahavi comments on the possibility oflinking philosophy, science and religion.