•  84
    The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2): 136-56. 1999.
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
  •  64
    Anonymous assertions
    Episteme 10 (2): 135-151. 2013.
    This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertion…Read more
  •  29
    Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1): 128-130. 2002.
    Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe. But Hanna shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means o…Read more
  •  122
    The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1): 135-48. 2005.
    Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompati…Read more
  •  1
    Semantic externalism and epistemic illusions
    In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 235--252. 2007.
  •  111
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist…Read more
  •  112
    This volume will acquaint novice philosophers with one of the most important debates in twentieth-century philosophy, and will provide seasoned readers with a ...
  •  101
    Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability1
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3): 301-314. 2006.
    In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhap…Read more
  • Putnam on Brains in Vats (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
  •  59
    The very idea of computer self-knowledge and self-deception
    Minds and Machines 7 (4): 515-529. 1997.
      Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some of these constraints. This s…Read more
  •  100
    Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and…Read more
  •  127
    Metaphysical Realism and Thought
    American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2). 2008.
    In this paper I argue that the implications of semantic externalism (SE) are even more far-reaching than has heretofore been acknowledged. If SE is true, then it is possible that a thinker's mental reality has joints that cannot in principle be discerned by the thinker herself.
  •  185
    Testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony
    Analysis 65 (4): 302-311. 2005.
    In this paper I argue that there can be cases of testimonial knowledge acquired through the acceptance of testimony which itself is unsafe. This has implications both for the epistemology of testimony and for the social nature of knowledge more generally.
  •  67
    Testimony as Evidence
    Philosophica 78. 2006.
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
  •  33
    Epistemic Justification Revisited
    Journal of Philosophical Research 41 1-16. 2016.
    In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy. In this paper I argue that none of his arguments taken singly, nor the collection as a group, gives us a reason to abandon the traditional idea that there is a property of epistemic justification. I conclude by suggesting how Alston’s proposal to investigate th…Read more
  •  21
    Assertion, Testimony, and the Epistemic Significance of Speech
    Logos and Episteme 1 (1): 59-65. 2010.
    Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony, it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in theepistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such.
  •  97
    Elsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of scenario, there is a clash betw…Read more
  •  36
    The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1): 118-138. 2005.
    Many people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant—the total truth-conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony —as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer’s cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from an …Read more
  •  30
    Anti-individualism and knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2). 2007.
  •  6
    The Epistemology of Silence
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 243--261. 2010.
  •  90
    How lucky can you get?
    Synthese 158 (3): 315-327. 2007.
    In this paper, I apply Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology to the case of knowledge through testimony. I claim that Pritchard’s distinction between veritic and reflective luck provides a nice taxonomy of testimony cases, that the taxonomic categories that emerge can be used to suggest precisely what epistemic statuses are transmissible through testimony, and that the resulting picture can make clear how testimony can actually be knowledge-generating
  •  342
    Should have known
    Synthese 194 (8): 2863-2894. 2017.
    In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that S knows that p, and S fails to…Read more
  •  65
    Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2): 168-186. 2013.
    The process of education, and in particular that involving very young children, often involves students' taking their teachers' word on a good many things. At the same time, good education at every level ought to inculcate, develop, and support students' ability to think for themselves. While these two features of education need not be regarded as contradictory, it is not clear how they relate to one another, nor is it clear how (when taken together) these features ought to bear on educational p…Read more