•  57
    Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position ?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1): 157-170. 2017.
    In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this possibility may go some distance towards explaining several aspects of our group life as epistemic subjec…Read more
  • Mark Sainsbury, ed., Thought and Ontology (review)
    Philosophy in Review 19 60-62. 1999.
  •  59
    The metasemantics of memory
    Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 95-107. 2011.
  •  81
    Interpersonal epistemic entitlements
    Philosophical Issues 24 (1): 159-183. 2014.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-…Read more
  •  5
    The Brain in a Vat (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse rang…Read more
  •  81
    Experts, semantic and epistemic
    Noûs 43 (4): 581-598. 2009.
    In this paper I argue that the tendency to defer in matters semantic is rationalized by our reliance on the say-so of others for much of what we know about the world. The result, I contend, is a new and distinctly epistemic source of support for the doctrine of attitude anti-individualism.
  •  52
  •  94
    Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world.
  •  79
    The problem of the many minds
    Minds and Machines 16 (4): 463-470. 2006.
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum-many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particle-stuff persist through time.
  •  6
    Sanford C. Goldberg presents a novel account of the speech act of assertion. He argues that this type of speech act is answerable to an epistemic, context-sensitive norm. On this basis he shows the philosophical importance of assertion for key debates in philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, and ethics
  •  1
    Paul Horwich, Meaning Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 20 (5): 350-353. 2000.
  • The semantics of interlocution
    Communication and Cognition. Monographies 33 (3-4): 249-286. 2000.
  •  63
    An anti-individualistic semantics for 'empty' natural kind terms
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1): 147-168. 2006.
    Several authors (Boghossian 1998; Segal 2000) allege that 'empty' would-be natural kind terms are a problem for anti-individualistic semantics. In this paper I rebut the charge by providing an anti-individualistic semantics for such terms.
  •  51
    Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?
    Erkenntnis 69 (2): 165-187. 2008.
    Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q(as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true,…Read more
  •  1
    The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial Knowledge
    In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.
  • Introduction
    In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Clarendon Press. 2007.
  •  106
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
  •  82
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argu…Read more
  •  207
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretati…Read more
  •  140
    Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice
    Episteme 7 (2): 138-150. 2010.
    Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony…Read more
  •  1
    Reductionism and the distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge
    In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford University Press. pp. 127--44. 2006.
  •  1
    Work: The Case of Testimony
    In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 175. 2011.
  •  64
    Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge commun…Read more
  •  76
    Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement
    Synthese 190 (7): 1189-1207. 2013.
    This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this w…Read more
  •  90
    Testimonially based knowledge from false testimony
    Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205): 512-526. 2001.
    Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).