•  7
    Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the p…Read more
  •  14
    Reported Speech and the Epistemology of Testimony
    ProtoSociology 17 59-77. 2002.
    Speech reports of the form ‘A said that p’ are sometimes used by a speaker S as a reason in support of S’s own claim to know that p – in particular, when S’s claim to know is made on the basis of A’s testimony. In this paper I appeal to intuitions regarding the epistemology of testimony to argue that such ‘testimonial’ uses of speech reports ought to be ascribed their strict de dicto truth conditions. This result is then used as the basis for the claim that, no matter how they are used, all spee…Read more
  • Department of Philosophy 1427 Paterson Office Tower University of Kentucky Lexington, KY 40506-0027
    Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 33 (3/4): 249-286. 2000.
  • Paul Horwich, Meaning (review)
    Philosophy in Review 20 350-353. 2000.
  •  76
    In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
  •  6
    Mentalistic explanation and mental causation
    Manuscrito 25 (3): 199-216. 2002.
    In this paper I present an internal difficulty for the hypothesis that mentalistic explanation is causal explanation. My thesis is that intuitively acceptable mentalistic explanations appear to violate constraints imposed by the mental causation hypothesis
  •  65
    The social virtues: Two accounts (review)
    Acta Analytica 24 (4): 237-248. 2009.
    Social (epistemic) virtues are the virtues bound up with those forms of inquiry involved in social routes to knowledge. A thoroughly individualistic account of the social virtues endorses two claims: (1) we can fully characterize the nature of the social virtues independent of the social factors that are typically in play when these virtues are exemplified, and (2) even when a subject’s route to knowledge is social, the only epistemic virtues that are relevant to her acquisition of knowledge are…Read more
  •  97
    Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism
    Philosophical Studies 116 (1): 53-78. 2003.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squ…Read more
  •  78
    Testimonial knowledge in early childhood, revisited
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1). 2008.
    Many epistemologists agree that even very young children sometimes acquire knowledge through testimony. In this paper I address two challenges facing this view. The first (building on a point made in Lackey (2005)) is the defeater challenge, which is to square the hypothesis that very young children acquire testimonial knowledge with the fact that children (whose cognitive immaturity prevents them from having or appreciating reasons) cannot be said to satisfy the No-Defeaters condition on knowle…Read more
  •  111
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents eleven specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and ...
  •  10
    Searle vs. Searle on language, speech, and thought
    with Guiming Yang
    Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3): 352-372. 2014.
    Searle’s account of the communicative intentions in speech acts purports to be an advance over that of Grice, in acknowledging the ineliminable role of the linguistic rules in enabling the hearer to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. In this paper we argue that, given some plausible assumptions about ordinary speech exchanges, Searle’s insight on this score is incompatible with his commitment to internalism in the philosophy of mind. As a result, Searle cannot have it both ways: e…Read more
  •  34
    Epistemic Justification Revisited in advance
    Journal of Philosophical Research. forthcoming.
  •  168
    Reliabilism in philosophy
    Philosophical Studies 142 (1). 2009.
    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predi…Read more
  •  25
    Comments on Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 41 183-191. 2016.