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3Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative ForceIn Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 215-244. 2014.
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1Demystifying sensibilities: sentimental values and the instability of affectIn Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford University Press. pp. 585--613. 2010.
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Envy in the Philosophical TraditionIn Richard Kim (ed.), Envy, Theory and Research, Oxford University Press. pp. 39-59. 2008.
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Sentimentalism and scientismIn Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2014.
Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Philosophy of Mind |