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154Why Don't Concepts Constitute a Natural Kind?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3). 2010.Machery argues that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. We argue that this is a mistake. When appropriately construed, his discussion in fact bolsters the claim that concepts are a natural kind
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434Rationality and psychologyIn Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 279-300. 2004.Samuels and Stich explore the debate over the extent to which ordinary human reasoning and decision making is rational. One prominent cluster of views, often associated with the heuristics and biases tradition in psychology, maintains that human reasoning is, in important respects, normatively problematic or irrational. Samuels and Stich start by sketching some key experimental findings from this tradition and describe a range of pessimistic claims about the rationality of ordinary people that t…Read more
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171Introduction: Philosophy and Cognitive ScienceIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. pp. 3-18. 2012.This chapter offers a high-level overview of the philosophy of cognitive science and an introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The philosophy of cognitive science emerged out of a set of common and overlapping interests among philosophers and scientists who study the mind. We identify five categories of issues that illustrate the best work in this broad field: (1) traditional philosophical issues about the mind that have been invigorated by research in cognitive …Read more
Columbus, Ohio, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |