•  276
    This chapter surveys some of the issues that arise in policy making when the wellbeing of future generations must be taken into account. It analyses the discounting of future wellbeing, and considers whether it is permissible. It argues that the effects of policy on the number of future people should not be ignored, and it considers what is an appropriate basis for setting a value on these effects. It considers the implications of the non-identity effect for intergenerational justice and for the…Read more
  •  269
    Instrumental reasoning
    In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules and Structure, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 195-207. 2000.
    Like all reasoning, practical reasoning is a process that takes a person from some of her existing mental states to a new mental state. Theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief; practical reasoning in an intention. This paper concentrates on instrumental reasoning, a species of practical reasoning in general. It argues that instrumental reasoning is correct if the content of the reasoning is a valid derivation, just as theoretical reasoning is correct if its content is a valid derivation. It …Read more
  •  267
    Structured and Unstructured Valuation
    Analyse & Kritik 16 (2): 121-132. 1994.
    Economists can value things for cost-benefit analysis using either a structured or an unstructured approach. The first imposes some theoretical structure on the valuation; the second does not. This paper explains the difference between the approaches and examines the relative merits of each. Cost-benefit analysis may be aimed at finding what would be the best action, or alternatively at finding which action should be done in a democracy. The paper explains the difference, and argues that the app…Read more
  •  251
    Rationality Through Reasoning (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2013.
    Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning …Read more
  •  251
    Should We Value Population?
    Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (4): 399-413. 2005.
  •  250
    Normative practical reasoning: John Broome
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1). 2001.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious example is norm…Read more
  •  244
    Reasoning with preferences?
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 183-208. 2006.
    Rationality requires certain things of you. It requires you not to have contradictory beliefs or intentions, not to intend something you believe to be impossible, to believe what obviously follows from something you believe, and so on. Its requirements can be expressed using schemata such as
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    Williams on Ought
    In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press, Usa. 2012.
    In 2002, Bernard Williams delivered a lecture that revisited the arguments of his article 'Ought and moral obligation', published in his Moral Luck. The lecture attributed to the earlier article the thesis that there are no ‘personal’ or (as I put it) ‘owned’ oughts. It also rejected this thesis. This paper explains the idea of an owned ought, and supports Williams’s lecture in asserting that there are owned oughts. It also examines the question of how accurately Williams’s later lecture interpr…Read more
  •  218
    The most important thing about climate change
    In Jonathan Boston, Andrew Bradstock & David Eng (eds.), Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters, Anu E Press. pp. 101-16. 2010.
    This book chapter is not available in ORA, but you may download, display, print and reproduce this chapter in unaltered form only for your personal, non-commercial use or use within your organization from the ANU E Press website.
  •  201
    Utilitarianism and expected utility
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (8): 405-422. 1987.
  •  198
  •  177
    Reason versus ought
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 80-97. 2015.
  •  173
    Weighing lives
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives of the future people who will b…Read more
  •  165
    Equality versus priority: A useful distinction
    Economics and Philosophy 31 (2): 219-228. 2015.
    :Both egalitarianism and prioritarianism give value to equality. Prioritarianism has an additively separable value function whereas egalitarianism does not. I show that in some cases prioritarianism and egalitarianism necessarily have different implications: I describe two alternatives G and H such that egalitarianism necessarily implies G is better than H whereas prioritarianism necessarily implies G and H are equally good. I also raise a doubt about the intelligibility of prioritarianism.
  •  158
    More pain or less?
    Analysis 56 (2): 116-118. 1996.
  •  145
    Normativity in Reasoning
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4): 622-633. 2014.
    Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a rule is to m…Read more
  •  137
    Indefiniteness in Identity
    Analysis 44 (1). 1984.
  •  136
    Practical reasoning
    In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 85--111. 2002.
  •  135
    The value of living longer
    In Sudhir Anand, Fabienne Peter & Amartya Sen (eds.), Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, Oxford University Press. pp. 243--260. 2004.
  •  129
    Normative Practical Reasoning
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1). 2001.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious example is norm…Read more
  •  127
    Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values
    In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, Cambridge University Press. pp. 98--120. 2001.
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    Enkrasia
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4): 425-436. 2013.
  •  107
    Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity
  •  96
    Kamm on Fairness (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 955. 1998.
  •  95
    Good, Fairness and QALYs
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 23 (1): 57-73. 1988.
    Counting QALYs (quality adjusted life years) has been proposed as a way of deciding how resources should be distributed in the health service: put resources where they will produce the most QALYs. This proposal has encountered strong opposition. There has been a disagreement between some economists favouring QALYs and some philosophers opposing them. But the argument has, I think, mostly been at cross-purposes. Those in favour of QALYs point out what they can do, and those against point out what…Read more