-
20.1 Arguments for Wide ContentIn Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 351. 2009.
-
50The moon illusionPhilosophy of Science 65 (4): 604-23. 1998.Ever since Berkeley discussed the problem at length in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, theorists of vision have attempted to explain why the moon appears larger on the horizon than it does at the zenith. Prevailing opinion has it that the contemporary perceptual psychologists Kaufman and Rock have finally explained the illusion. This paper argues that Kaufman and Rock have not refuted a Berkeleyan account of the illusion, and have over-interpreted their own experimental results. The moo…Read more
-
61Milkowski, Marcin., Explaining the Computational Mind (review)Review of Metaphysics 67 (2): 436-438. 2013.
-
189Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third waySynthese 153 (3): 377-391. 2006.The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aim…Read more
-
883Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let's Not Let the Tail Wag the DogJournal of Cognitive Science 13 39-49. 2012.
-
24Pragmatic Aspects of Content DeterminationIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 217--228. 1999.
-
72Aworld withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “naturalism and intentionality”Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3). 1994.
New Brunswick, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |