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16How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic SkepticismIn Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94. 2003.
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59SkepticismIn P. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2002.In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute t…Read more
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14Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's TrilemmaIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford University Press. 2008.This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides…Read more
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Knowledge is True, Non-defeated Justified BeliefIn Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge, :ongman. 2003.
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99The private language argument and the sense-datum theoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3): 325-343. 1969.This Article does not have an abstract
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Contemporary ScepticismIn Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion ti Epistemology, Blackwell. 1992, 2010.
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44Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic SkepticismPhilosophical Issues 10 (1): 108-116. 2000.
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20What makes knowledge the most highly prized form of true belief?In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, . 2012.This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons …Read more
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1InfinitismIn Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 245-256. 2011.
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9El contextualismo y la verdadera naturaleza del escepticismo académicoTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 127-140. 2000.
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295Why Not Infinitism?Epistemology 5 199-208. 2000.As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Furthe…Read more
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1On Behalf of the SkepticIn Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Rowman & Littlefield. 1987.
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135The Virtues of InconsistencyThe Monist 68 (1): 105-135. 1985.I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets
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229Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress ProblemIn Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge, De Gruyter. pp. 487-508. 2011.
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111, two basic forms of philosophical skepticismIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 336. 2002.
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ClosureIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
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509Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoningPhilosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are …Read more
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Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and DefeasibilityIn Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |