•  26
    Evidentialism about knowledge
    In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. pp. 167. 2011.
  •  26
    Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function
    International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1): 109-112. 1995.
  •  25
    A Realist Conception of Truth (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (3): 313-317. 1998.
  •  24
    This chapter contains section titled: The Generality Problem and the Meta‐incoherence Problem The Psychological Plausibility Objection Renewed Preserving Virtue while Losing Perspective.
  •  24
    John Greco’s Putting Skeptics in Their Place is an important book. Greco persuasively argues that the best skeptical arguments cannot be easily dismissed and should not be ignored. These arguments cannot be easily dismissed because they defend important conclusions and make no obvious mistake. The arguments should not be ignored because their proper analysis reveals much about central philosophical notions such as knowledge and evidence. While defending these conclusions Greco offers sophisticat…Read more
  •  21
    Skepticism and the Modern Ontology
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 73 217-228. 1999.
  •  20
    Scepticism and Epistemic Kinds
    Philosophical Issues 10 (1): 366-376. 2000.
  •  20
    Reply to critics
    Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 53 (3): 83-91. 2017.
    The author addresses his replies to the issues raised in the comments by Professors Berestov, Butakov, Gaginsky and Maslov. This includes some general points about methodology for skeptical arguments, and a related point about the scope of John Greco's project. Some more specific issues raised by my commentators are then considered.
  •  18
    The second major thesis of the book follows closely on the first: that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central role in the methodology of philosophy, and especially in the methodology of epistemology. A close analysis of skeptical arguments highlights our pre-theoretically plausible, but ultimately mistaken, assumptions about the nature of knowledge and evidence. Skeptical arguments are powerful just because their assumptio…Read more
  •  18
    Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge
    Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3): 335-351. 2007.
  •  16
    Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting Testimony
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83 61-76. 2009.
    An adequate account of testimonial knowledge in general explains how religious knowledge can be grounded in testimony, and even in the context of conflicting testimonial traditions. Three emerging trends in epistemology help to make that case. The first is to make a distinction between two projects of epistemology: “the project of explanation” and “the project of vindication.” The second is to emphasize a distinction between knowledge and understanding. The third is to ask what role the concept …Read more
  •  16
    Epistemologia Pós-Gettier
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 421-437. 2015.
    Neste ensaio, argumenta-se que as diferenças entre a epistemologia da era Gettier e a epistemologia pós-Gettier podem ser amplamente reduzidas a diferenças em metodologia. Faremos uma “reconstrução racional” do modo como fazíamos as coisas então, do modo como fazemos agora e de quais considerações nos levaram a fazer as coisas de modo diferente. Em resumo, durante a era Gettier a metodologia da epistemologia era basicamente o que Chisholm chamou de “particularismo” e Rawls chamou de “o método do…Read more
  •  15
    Pritchard’s Case for Veritism
    Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (4): 46-53. 2021.
    In his “In Defense of Veritism”, Duncan Pritchard reconsiders the case for epistemic value truth monism, or the thesis that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic good. I begin by clarifying Pritchard’s thesis, and then turn to an evaluation of Pritchard’s defense. By way of clarification, Pritchard understands “fundamental” value to be non-instrumental value. Accordingly, Pritchard’s veritism turns out to be the thesis that truth is the sole epistemic good with non-instrumental epistemic value…Read more
  •  13
    Evidence and Inquiry (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2): 231-234. 1996.
  •  13
    Plantinga, Foundationalism, and the Charge of Self-referential Incoherence
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 187-193. 1988.
    Alvin Plantinga charges classical foundationalism with self-referential incoherence, meaning that that doctrine employs criteria for rationally acceptable propositions which exclude the criteria themselves. More specifically, the charge is that the criteria are neither properly basic nor supported by properly basic propositions. In section 1 the doctrine of classical foundationalism is briefly explained. In section 2, a defense against Plantinga's objection is provided showing how the foundation…Read more
  •  13
    A Virtue Epistemology (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3): 399-401. 2010.
  •  12
    Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the thesis that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge. Interest relativism about knowledge attributions is the thesis that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical contexts. This paper argues that anti-reductionism implies interest relativism. The notion of “implies” here is a fairly strong one: anti-reductionism, together with plausible assumptio…Read more
  •  12
    The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge
    Philosophical Issues 17 (1): 57-69. 2007.
  •  11
    Post-Gettier Epistemology
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3): 421-437. 2015.
    In this paper, it is argued that the differences between Gettier-era epistemology and post-Gettier epistemology can be largely traced to differences in methodology. We will give a “rational reconstruction” of how we did things then, what we do now, and what considerations moved us to do things differently. In summary form, during the Gettier era the methodology of epistemology was roughly what Chisholm called “particularism” and Rawls called “the method of reflective equilibrium.” Various develo…Read more
  •  11
    Introduction: The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation
    In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28. 2015.
    This introductory chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section characterizes the general approach to epistemology around which the volume revolves—purposeful epistemology—and examines the general motivation for that approach. The guiding idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. The second section explores the approach by characterizing some important v…Read more
  •  10
    Introduction
    Res Philosophica 93 (3): 507-507. 2016.
  •  10
    Escepticismo y géneros epistémicos: comentarios sobre Christopher Hookway
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 183-193. 2000.
  •  8
    The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2023.
    The first handbook on the topic of religious epistemology introduces and discusses topics fundamental to the epistemology of religious belief.
  •  8
    Religious Belief and Evidence from Testimony
    In Dariusz Łukasiewicz & Roger Pouivet (eds.), The Right to Believe: Perspectives in Religious Epistemology, De Gruyter. pp. 27-46. 2011.
  •  7
    The Value Problem
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 313--22. 2009.
  •  7
    Reformed Epistemology
    In P. Copan & C. Meister (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Routledge. pp. 629--639. 2007.
  •  7
    Speaking of a Personal God (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 12 (1): 148-153. 1995.
  •  5
    Perception as Interpretation
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 72 229-237. 1998.
  •  4
    Virtue epistemology
    with John Turri
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.
    This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary Virtue epistemology (hereafter 'VE') research program. These include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and whic…Read more