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71Necessarily Incompatible Consistent WantsActa Analytica 32 (4): 489-490. 2017.This paper argues that the wants or desires of a person can be consistent with each other and still necessarily incompatible with each other and for interesting reasons. It is argued here that this problem is not rare and that there is no solution in sight.
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70I Know. Modal Epistemology and ScepticismPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (257): 640-644. 2014.Review of Freitag, "I know".
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69Epistemic Contextualism: A DefenseOxford University Press UK. 2016.Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. It begins by dealing with the argument from cases and ordinary usage, and then addresses "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the …Read more
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60Can reliabilists believe in subjective probability?Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191): 199-200. 1998.According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowledge is extremely implausible and since reliabilism…Read more
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56Knowledge, Assertion, and InferenceActa Analytica 29 (4): 487-490. 2014.This paper argues that three plausible principles are mutually inconsistent: One ought to assert only what one knows; If it is proper to assert some proposition q, then it is, barring special and not very common circumstances, proper to assert any proposition p from which q has been competently inferred; and Some propositions are both properly assertible and known by competent inference from propositions which one does not know. Each pair of two principles constitutes an argument against the rem…Read more
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53Mind and World, John McdowellPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (1): 135-144. 1998.A critical discussion of: Mind and World, John Mcdowell
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48Sorry if! On Conditional ApologiesEthical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (5): 1079-1090. 2021.Usually, apologies are made by using non-conditional utterances: “I apologize for ruining your evening!” Very little, if any, attention has been given so far to conditional apologies which typically use utterances such as “If I have ruined your evening, I apologize!” This paper argues that such conditional utterances can constitute genuine apologies and play important moral roles in situations of uncertainty. It also proposes a closer analysis of such conditional apologies and contrasts them wit…Read more
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47Is Everything Revisable?Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4. 2017.Over the decades, the claim that everything is revisable (defended by Quine and others) has played an important role in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Some time ago, Katz (1988) argued that this claim is paradoxical. This paper does not discuss this objection but rather argues that the claim of universal revisability allows for two different readings but in each case leads to a contradiction and is false.
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46Ist der Begriff des Wissens inkohärent?Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (4). 2001.This is a response to Ansgar Beckermann's argument to the effect that the concept of knowledge is incoherent and should thus be given up.
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45On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism: A Reply to MagnusJournal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (1): 73-77. 2004.In this paper I respond to P.D. Magnus’ critique of an earlier paper of mine on Thomas Reid’s theory of common sense. In the earlier paper (The Scottish Pragmatist? The Dilemma of Common Sense and the Pragmatist Way Out, Reid Studies 2, 1999, 47-57) I argued that Reid faces a dilemma between dogmatism and scepticism but that there are also hints in his work towards a pragmatist way out of the problem. P.D. Magnus, in a response to this paper (Reid’s Dilemma and the Uses of Pragmatism, Journal of…Read more
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41Davidson on Sharing a Language and Correct Language-UseGrazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1): 137-160. 1996.Donald Davidson has argued against a thesis that is widely shared in the philosophy of language, e.g., by Wittgenstein, Dummett and Kripke: the thesis that successful communication requires that speaker and hearer share a common language. Davidson's arguments, however, are not convincing. Moreover, Davidson's own positive account of communication poses a serious problem: it cannot offer criteria for the correct use of a language, especially in the case of a language that only one speaker speaks.…Read more
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41Influencing the Will of Another PersonSocial Philosophy Today 12 25-40. 1996.Social power does not just consist in an actor's ability to use sticks or carrots (negative or positive sanctions) in order to influence other persons. There is also a much more subtle and less "visible" form of power which consists in the ability to influence the underlying preferences and goals of a person. The main task of this paper is to analyze this important and hidden form of social power.
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38Enlightenment as perfection, perfection as enlightenment? Kant on thinking for oneself and perfecting oneselfJournal of Philosophy of Education 56 (2): 281-289. 2022.Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 281-289, April 2022.
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34Gerhard Ernst: Das problem Des wissens, paderborn: Mentis 2002Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1): 221-223. 2005.Review of Ernst, "Das Problem des Wissens".
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33The Wittgenstein ArchivePhilosophy Now 58 26-27. 2006.Something in the way of a parody of iconography...
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29Contextual Causal Dependence and Causal ContrastivismAxiomathes 32 (3): 671-684. 2022.This work presents a defense of causal contrastivism based on causal contexualism. As argued, our proposal on causal contextualism is compatible with both causal contrastivism and causal binarism, including explanations of why and in which sense secondary counterfactuals are relevant.
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29Thomas Reid, Common Sense, and PragmatismInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (1): 54-67. 2023.Thomas Reid’s conception of common sense is important and interesting for many reasons – also because of the questions and issues it raises. I am going to focus on what one could call ‘Reid’s dilem...
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27Begrenzte Erkenntnisse?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (3): 483-489. 2010.This is a crtiical discussion of Gabriel's "An den Grenzen der Erkenntnistheorie".
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26Checking out CheckingActa Analytica 38 (1): 15-26. 2022.Guido Melchior’s important and rich book (Melchior _Knowing and Checking. __An Epistemological Investigation_ 2019 ) draws our attention to the much neglected topic of checking. There are many new leads to follow. Here, I will pick a few that seem to me to allow the most room for discussion and disagreement: the alleged modal profile of checking (Sect. 1), the contrastive aspects of checking (Sect. 2), and the relation of checking to closure (Sect. 3). I will end with two smaller points worth br…Read more
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25Defending the One Percent?The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21 106-112. 2014.This paper discusses and criticizes Greg Mankiw's recent defense of "the one percent".
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23¿ Se puede saber lo que se quiere?Ideas Y Valores 44 (96-97): 3-22. 1995.Can one come to know what one wants? In some very simple cases, the answer has to be positive but in some other cases the answer is not so clear. The answer depends on what kind of self-knowledge one is taking about. This article also aims at elucidating the notion of knowledge of one's own desires.
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23Review of McDowell, John. Mind and World (review)Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (1): 135-144. 1998.Review of McDowell, John. Mind and World.
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21Coercion and the Varieties of Free ActionIdeas Y Valores 52 (122): 31-49. 2003.Are we free? What does "freedom" mean here? In the following, I shall only focus with freedom of action. My main thesis is that there is not just one basic type of free action but more. Philosophers, however, tend to assume that there is just one way to act freely. Hence, a more detailed analysis of free action is being called for. I will distinguish between different kinds of free action and discuss the relations between them. The analysis of different types of coercion will lead to a different…Read more
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21If You Believe, You BelieveLogos and Episteme 8 (4): 389-416. 2017.Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.
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20Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, by Simon EvnineMind 118 (471): 823-827. 2009.Review of Evnine, "Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood".
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19What's a(t) stake? On stakes, encroachers, knowledgeTheoria 90 (1): 109-121. 2024.According to subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI), whether S knows that p depends not only on the subject's epistemic position (the presence of a true belief, sufficient warrant, etc.) but also on non‐epistemic factors present in the subject's situation; such factors are seen as “encroaching” on the subject's epistemic standing. Not the only such non‐epistemic factor but the most prominent one consists in the subject's practical stakes. Stakes‐based SSI holds that two subjects can be in the same…Read more
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18Power, Soft or Deep? An Attempt at Constructive CriticismLas Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (10): 177-214. 2017.This paper discusses and criticizes Joseph Nye’s account of soft power. First, we set the stage and make some general remarks about the notion of social power. In the main part of this paper we offer a detailed critical discussion of Nye’s conception of soft power. We conclude that it is too unclear and confused to be of much analytical use. However, despite this failure, Nye is aiming at explaining an important but also neglected form of social power: the power to influence the will and not jus…Read more
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |