•  9
    Free riding
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 2220-227. 2013.
    “Free riding,” used as a descriptive term, refers to taking a jointly produced benefit without contributing towards its production. Used as a term of criticism, it refers to the wrongful failure to contribute towards the joint production of benefits that one receives. On either usage, the central interest of moral philosophy in free riding is the same: to specify the conditions under which not contributing towards the joint production of benefits that one receives is wrong, and to explain why.
  •  9
    Conflicts of interest in divisions of general practice
    with N. Palmer, A. Braunack-Mayer, W. Rogers, and C. Provis
    Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (12): 715-717. 2006.
    Community-based healthcare organisations manage competing, and often conflicting, priorities. These conflicts can arise from the multiple roles these organisations take up, and from the diverse range of stakeholders to whom they must be responsive. Often such conflicts may be titled conflicts of interest; however, what precisely constitutes such conflicts and what should be done about them is not always clear. Clarity about the duties owed by organisations and the roles they assume can help iden…Read more
  •  8
    Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1-15. forthcoming.
    For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper argues that three prin…Read more
  •  7
    Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 37-62. 2004.
    According to “the argument from discernment”, sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation-because the only morally non-arbitrary one-involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. Th…Read more
  •  6
    Aid, Ethics of
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 178-184. 2013.
    Aid, in the sense of coordinated, voluntary material assistance provided by well‐off groups to address the needs of the less well off, can be divided into two broad categories.
  •  5
    I—Garrett Cullity: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
  •  5
    Agency and policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3): 315-325. 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  •  5
    The Moral Demands of Affluence
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (3): 598-600. 2005.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  4
    Review: Pyrrhic Pyrrhonism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233). 2008.
  •  4
    Impartiality
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 2560-2566. 2013.
    Impartiality is primarily a feature of normative or evaluative deliberation – deliberation about what ought to be done or about something's goodness or badness. An initial description is this: such deliberation is impartial when it is not unduly influenced by the deliberator's own interests, preferences, or loyalties. Derivatively, impartiality can be attributed to actions that are guided by deliberation with this feature, or persons who characteristically deliberate or act in this way.
  •  4
    Thinking How to Live
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227): 308-311. 2007.
  •  3
    Charity
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 738-744. 2013.
    In the tradition of Western ethical thought, “charity” refers to two ideas. Although now distinguishable, they are historically connected. The first is an attitude: the attitude of selfless love which is treated in the Christian tradition as the most fundamental of the virtues. The second is a kind of action: the action of rendering material assistance to those who need it. Derivative from this second idea is the current use of “a charity” to refer to an organization through which such assistanc…Read more
  •  3
    The Limits of Kindness, by Caspar Hare: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xi + 229, £25.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 791-794. 2014.
  •  2
    Practical Theory
    In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 101--24. 1997.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  2
    Williams, B.-Making Sense of Humanity
    Philosophical Books 39 91-104. 1998.
    This critical notice discusses five main themes of Williams's collection: (1) The “morality system” and blame: our ethical thought both misconceives and overemphasizes the practice of blaming. (2) The theorist’s predicament: how can a theorist of human practice coherently relate her theory to her own practice? (3) Psychological realism: a central constraint on a defensible ethical outlook is that it takes account of us as we are. (4) Culture and explanation: there is no culturally neutral fo…Read more
  •  2
    Suppose you perform two actions. The first imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive; but the second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form a set of actions that is risk-neutral, can you thereby make your overall course of conduct permissible? This question is theoretically interesting, because the answer is apparently: sometimes Yes, sometimes No. It is also practically important, because it bears on the moral status of …Read more
  • Ethics and Practical Reason
    with Berys Gaut
    Mind 108 (431): 570-575. 1999.
  • Agency and Policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1): 317-327. 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  • Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
  • Book ReviewsElijah Millgram
    Ethics 119 (3): 581-585. 2009.
  • The Iteration Problem'
    with Moral Character
    Utilitas 7 (2). 1995.