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172Public goods and fairnessAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1). 2008.To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a…Read more
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5Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard WilliamsPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (256): 520-523. 2014.
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281Decisions, Reasons and RationalityEthics 119 (1): 57-95. 2008.What difference do our decisions make to our reasons for action and the rationality of our actions? There are two questions here, and good grounds for answering them differently. However, it still makes sense to discuss them together. By thinking about the relationships that reasons and rationality bear to decisions, we may be able to cast light on the relationship that reasons and rationality bear to each other.
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161Virtue ethics, theory, and warrantEthical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3): 277-294. 1999.Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a …Read more
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23As you were?Philosophical Explorations 9 (1): 117-132. 2006.What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral episte…Read more
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36Agency and policyProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3). 2004.The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
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23Review of Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.Garrett Cullity
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180Particularism and presumptive reasonsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 169-90. 2002.The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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16I—Garrett Cullity: Particularism and Presumptive ReasonsAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
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20Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James GriffinAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 538-540. 2002.Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
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334Bernard WilliamsIn Brown Stuart (ed.), Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, Vol. 2, Thoemmes Continuum. pp. 1132-8. 2005.Garrett Cullity.
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149The Moral Demands of AffluenceOxford University Press on Demand. 2004.Given that there is a forceful case for thinking that the affluent are morally required to devote a substantial proportion of what they have to helping the poor, Garrett Cullity examines, refines and defends an argument of this form. He then identifies its limits.
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455Asking Too MuchThe Monist 86 (3). 2003.Most of us think that it can be wrong not to help someone in chronic need — someone whose life you could easily save, say. And many of us find it hard to see how the remoteness of needy people, either physical, social or psychological, should make a difference to this. Maybe it makes a difference to how wrong it is not to help, but it is hard to see how it can make a difference to whether not helping is wrong.
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56Sympathy, discernment, and reasonsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1). 2004.According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally non-arbitrary one--involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. …Read more
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376Acts, Omissions, EmissionsIn Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice, Cambridge University Press. pp. 148-64. 2015.What requirements does morality impose on us in relation to climate change? This question can be asked of individuals, of the entire global population, and of groups of various sizes in between. Given the case for accepting that we all collectively ought to be causing less climate-affecting pollution than we do, what follows from that about the moral status of the actions of members of the larger group? I examine two main ways in which moral requirements on group members can derive from requirem…Read more
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102Pyrrhic pyrrhonism (review)Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 720-731. 2008.Journal compilation © 20098 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
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174Moral Free RidingPhilosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1): 3-34. 1995.This paper presents a moral philosophical account of free riding, specifying the conditions under which failing to pay for nonrival goods is unfair. These conditions do not include the voluntary acceptance of the goods: this controversial claim is supported on the strength of a characterization of the kind of unfairness displayed in paradigm cases of free riding. Thus a "Principle of Fairness" can potentially serve as a foundation for political obligations. The paper also discusses the relatio…Read more
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178Equality and globalizationIn Keith Horton and Haig Patapan (eds), Reconceiving Equality in a More Global World, Routledge. pp. 6-22. 2007.Garrett Cullity.
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4052BeneficenceIn Richard Ashcroft Angus Dawson & Heather Draper John McMillan (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics, Wiley. pp. 19-26. 2007.Garrett Cullity.
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9Agency and policyProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3): 315-325. 2004.The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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269Pooled beneficenceIn Michael Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits, Kluwer. pp. 9-42. 2000.There can be situations in which, if I contribute to a pool of resources for helping a large number of people, the difference that my contribution makes to any of the people helped from the pool will be imperceptible at best, and maybe even non-existent. And this can be the case where it is also true that giving the same amount directly to one of the intended beneficiaries of the pool would have made a very large difference to her. Can non-contribution to the pool be morally justified on this gr…Read more
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15Conflicts of interest in divisions of general practiceJournal of Medical Ethics 32 (12): 715-717. 2006.Community-based healthcare organisations manage competing, and often conflicting, priorities. These conflicts can arise from the multiple roles these organisations take up, and from the diverse range of stakeholders to whom they must be responsive. Often such conflicts may be titled conflicts of interest; however, what precisely constitutes such conflicts and what should be done about them is not always clear. Clarity about the duties owed by organisations and the roles they assume can help iden…Read more
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16The Moral Demands of AffluenceTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (3): 598-600. 2005.Garrett Cullity.
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41A theory of virtue: Excellence in being for the goodAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4). 2008.© 2008 Informa plc