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3Tracking Aristotle's noûsIn Michael Durrant & Aristotle (eds.), Aristotle's de Anima in Focus, Routledge. 1993.
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112Negation and Quantification in AristotleHistory and Philosophy of Logic 11 (2): 131-150. 1990.Two main claims are defended. The first is that negative categorical statements are not to be accorded existential import insofar as they figure in the square of opposition. Against Kneale and others, it is argued that Aristotle formulates his o statements, for example, precisely to avoid existential commitment. This frees Aristotle's square from a recent charge of inconsistency. The second claim is that the logic proper provides much thinner evidence than has been supposed for what appears to b…Read more
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Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Essays Presented to Marjorie Grene on the Occasion of Her Seventy-Fifth BirthdayBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 89 3-381. 1986.
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210Aristotle on the Firmness of the Principle of Non-ContradictionPhronesis 49 (3): 225-265. 2004.In "Metaphysics" Gamma 3 Aristotle declares that the philosopher investigates things that are qua things that are and that he therefore should be able to state the firmest principles of everything. The firmest principle of all is identified as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The main focus of Gamma 3 is Aristotle's proof for this identification. This paper begins with remarks about Aristotle's notion of the firmness of a principle and then offers an analysis of the firmness proof for P…Read more
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5On the use and abuse of non-contradiction: Aristotle's critique of Protagoras and Heraclitus in Metaphysics gamma 5Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 213-239. 2004.
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103A curious turn in metaphysics gamma: Protagoras and strong denial of the principle of non-contradictionArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2): 107-130. 2003.
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Singular Statements and Essentialism in AristotleCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 10 (n/a): 67. 1984.
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43Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of TruthOxford University Press. 2014.Michael V. Wedin presents a rigorous reconstruction of the deductions in Parmenides' Way of Truth: the most important philosophical treatise before Plato and Aristotle. He answers criticisms which claim that Parmenides' arguments are shot through with logical fallacies, and argues against natural explanations of Parmenides in the Ionian tradition
Davis, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |