•  54
    How not to argue for incompatibilism
    Erkenntnis 60 (1): 1-26. 2004.
      Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be…Read more
  •  93
    The argument of "on denoting"
    Philosophical Review 103 (2): 249-297. 1994.
  •  88
    Review of Gottlob Frege, Dale Jacquette (tr.), The Foundations of Arithmetic (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1). 2008.
    Last spring, as I was beginning a graduate seminar on Frege, I received a complimentary copy of this new translation of his masterwork, The Foundations of Arithmetic . I had ordered Austin's famous translation, well-loved for the beauty of its English and the clarity with which it presents Frege's overall argument, but known to be less than literal, and to sometimes supplement translation with interpretation. I was intrigued by Dale Jacquette's promise "to combine literal accuracy and readabilit…Read more
  •  254
    Logic and Language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (review)
    Philosophical Review 111 (2): 327-330. 2002.
    This short book comprises “four largely self-contained studies … unified by a common interpretive approach”, the “investigation of the historical development of … Wittgenstein’s early philosophy”. Proops applies this historical approach to Wittgenstein’s conception of logic, his critique of “logical assertion,” his “picture theory” of language, and his discussion of the justification of deduction. He endeavors to “bring out how Wittgenstein develops his views … as foils to the positions develope…Read more
  •  11
    Mathematics and Meaning in Tractatus
    Philosophical Investigations 25 (3): 272-303. 2002.
  •  36
    A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge
    European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4). 2016.
    Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so-called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get t…Read more
  •  48
    Soames on Russell’s logic: a reply
    Philosophical Studies 139 (2): 209-212. 2008.
    In "What is History For?," Scott Soames responds to criticisms of his treatment of Russell's logic in volume 1 of his "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century." This note rebuts two of Soames's replies, showing that a first-order presentation of Russell's logic does not fit the argument of the "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy," and that Soames's contextual definition of classes does not match Russell's contextual definition of classes. In consequence, Soames's presentation of Rus…Read more
  •  51
  •  30
    I. Russell's merit—the obvious interpretation
    In Jl Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 195. 2012.
  •  15
    Wilson on Kripke’s Wittgenstein
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 571-584. 2000.
    George Wilson has recently defended Kripke’s well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein against the criticisms of John McDowell. Wilson claims that these criticisms rest on misunderstandings of Kripke and that, when correctly understood, Kripke’s interpretation stands up to them well. In particular, Wilson defends Kripke’s Wittgenstein against the charge of “non-factualism” about meaning. However, Wilson has not appreciated the full significance of McDowell’s criticism. I use a brief exploration …Read more
  •  17
    Logicist Responses to Kant
    Philosophical Topics 34 (1-2): 163-188. 2006.
  •  70
    A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 25-46. 2017.
    Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so-called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get t…Read more
  •  76
    Some supervaluation-based consequence relations
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3): 225-244. 2003.
    In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties. For our main consequence relation, we show that natural versions of the following fail: upwards and downwards Lowenheim-Skolem, axiomatizability, and compactness. We also consider an alternate version for supervaluation semantics, and show both axiomatizability and compactness for the resulting consequence relation
  • Russell's merit
    In José L. Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2012.
  •  176
    Judgment and truth in Frege
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (4): 549-581. 2000.
    Thomas Ricketts has developed a powerful interpretation of Frege on judgment, truth and logic. Recently, Ricketts has modified his reading, holding that judgment is an act of knowledge-acquisition; this rules out incorrect judgment. I argue that Ricketts goes too far here. I criticize the textual basis for Ricketts's new view, and show that the interpretive problems which led him to this change can be met without such extreme measures. Thus, I defend Ricketts' earlier view against his own later …Read more
  •  122
    Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 571-584. 2000.
    George Wilson has recently defended Kripke's well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein against the criticisms of John McDowell. Wilson claims that these criticisms rest on misunderstandings of Kripke and that, when correctly understood, Kripke's interpretation stands up to them well. In particular, Wilson defends Kripke's Wittgenstein against the charge of "non-factualism" about meaning. However, Wilson has not appreciated the full significance of McDowell's criticism. I use a brief exploration …Read more