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148Naturalizing IntentionalityThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9 83-90. 2000.“Intentionality,” as introduced to modern philosophy by Brentano, denotes the property that distinguishes the mental from all other things. As such, intentionality has been related to purposiveness. I suggest, however, that there are many kinds of purposes that are not mental nor derived from anything mental, such as the purpose of one’s stomach to digest food or the purpose of one’s protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand. These purposes help us to understand intentionality in a natura…Read more
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147Words, concepts, and entities: With enemies like these, I don't need friendsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 89-100. 1998.A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation…Read more
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144Representations, targets and attitudesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 103-111. 2000.
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138Teleological Theories of mental contentIn L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan. 2002.
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136Teleosemantics and the frogsMind and Language 39 (1): 52-60. 2024.Some have thought that the plausibility of teleosemantics requires that it yield a determinate answer to the question of what the semantic “content” is of the “representation” triggered in the optic nerve of a frog that spots a fly. An outsize literature has resulted in which, unfortunately, a number of serious confusions and omissions that concern the way teleosemantics would have to work have appeared and been passed on uncorrected leaving a distorted and simplistic picture of the teleosemanti…Read more
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135Reading mother nature's mindIn Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Mit Press. 2000.I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a reason, is that int…Read more
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133Styles of RationalityIn Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.By whatever general principles and mechanisms animal behavior is governed, human behavior control rides piggyback on top of the same or very similar mechanisms. We have reflexes. We can be conditioned. The movements that make up our smaller actions are mostly caught up in perception-action cycles following perceived Gibsonian affordances. Still, without doubt there are levels of behavior control that are peculiar to humans. Following Aristotle, tradition has it that what is added in humans is ra…Read more
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116Are there mental indexicals and demonstratives?Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1): 217-234. 2012.
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110Troubles with Plantinga’s Reading of MillikanPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 454-456. 2012.
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96Purposes and Cross-PurposesThe Monist 84 (3): 392-416. 2001.§1. Both the human capacity for language and individual languages have evolved, in part, by natural selection. This paper considers certain aspects and consequences of this, concerning, among other things, the semanticspragmatics distinction.
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89On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and The Others If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable of fully grasping t…Read more
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89The language-thought partnership: A Bird's eye viewLanguage and Communication 21 (2): 157-166. 2001.I sketch in miniature the whole of my work on the relation between language and thought. Previously I have offered closeups of this terrain in various papers and books, and I reference them freely. But my main purpose here is to explain the relations among the parts, hoping this can serve as a short introduction to my work on language and thought for some, and for others as a clarification of the larger plan
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79Useless contentIn Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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79Comment on Artiga’s “Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”Erkenntnis 88 (1): 1-9. 2021.“Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations” (call it “TP-PR,” this journal 2014 79.3, 545–566) argues that core teleosemantics, particularly as defined in Millikan (Language, thought and other biological categories, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1984, J Philos 86(6):281–297, 1989, White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, Philosophical perspectives, Ridgeview Publishing, Alascadero, 1996, Varieties of meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2004–2008), seems to imply t…Read more
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76Some reflections on the theory theory - simulation theory discussionIn Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II, Mit Press. 2005.
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74It is likely misbelief never has a functionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6): 529-530. 2009.I highlight and amplify three central points that McKay & Dennett (M&D) make about the origin of failures to perform biologically proper functions. I question whether even positive illusions meet criteria for evolved misbelief
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73On sympathies with J. J. Gibson and on focusing referenceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4): 732-733. 1999.Something of the relation of my work on substance concepts to Gibsonian theories of perception–action is discussed. What historical relations tie a particular substance concept to a particular substance is discussed.
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73Many students of pragmatics and child language have come to believe that in order to learn a language a child must first have a 'theory of mind,' a grasp that speakers mentally represent the content they would convey when they speak. This view is reinforced by the Gricean theory of communication, according to which speakers intend their words to cause hearers to believe or to do certain things and hearers must recognize these intentions if they are to comply. The view rests on an underlying assu…Read more
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72Ruth Garrett Millikan, Review of Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature by Peter Godfrey-Smith (review)Philosophy of Science 65 (2): 375-377. 1998.
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70Self‐signs and intensional contextsMind and Language 38 (4): 962-980. 2022.Paradigm intensional contexts result from the unmarked use of referential expressions as “self‐signs”, signs that refer to themselves as tokens, types, or members of Sellarsian “dot‐quoted” kinds. Self‐signing (but unquoted) linguistic expressions are more difficult to recognize than non‐linguistic self‐signs such as the color of a felt pen's casing that represents the color of ink inside. I will discuss non‐linguistic self‐signing, then examine self‐signing in quotation, in “said that …” contex…Read more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |