Gerald Lang

In his Rights Forfeiture and Punishment, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that his preferred ‘strong’ version of rights forfeiture theory makes the moral rights of due process and a fair trial null and void for guilty offenders. They may still possess legal rights to due process, but these are not strong pre-institutional moral rights. I explain here why I disagree with Wellman. I also suggest that he is not entitled, by his own lights, to affirm strong forfeiture theory, at least in our social world.

Defence cases with an escalatory structure, in which the levels of violence between aggressor and defender start out as minor and then become major, even lethal, raise sharp problems for defence theory, and for our understanding of the conditions of defence: proportionality, necessity, and imminence. It is argued here that defenders are not morally required to withdraw from participation in these cases, and that defensive escalations do not offend against any of the conditions of defence, on an adequate understanding of them. No plausible interpretation of proportionality or necessity excludes defensive permissions in escalatory cases. Moreover, the structure of escalatory defensive cases also sheds useful light on permissible responses to conditional deadly threats. This is because we can analyse conditional deadly threats as disguised cases of escalation. Because defensive resistance is permissible in escalatory cases, it is also permissible in cases involving conditional deadly threats.

Jonathan Quong argues for the “moral status” account of defensive liability. According to the moral status account, what makes it the case that assailants lack rights against the imposition of defensive violence on them is that they are treating defenders as if those defenders lack rights against the imposition of aggressive violence on them. This “as if” condition can be met in some situations in which one person, A, commands very good but factually inaccurate evidence that another person, B, poses a lethal danger to her. In this “Mistaken Attacker” case, A will be entirely blameless. Nonetheless, A is defensively liable, because A assumes that B is defensively liable despite the fact that B is not defensively liable. In other cases, A may threaten B, who is innocent and hence defensively non-liable, without treating B as if B lacks rights. For example, in the “Conscientious Driver” case, A may have lost control of her car, having taken all due precautions, and be posing a lethal threat to an innocent pedestrian, B, but A is not treating B as if B lacks rights because B’s interests have already been taken fully into account in arriving at the verdict that careful driving is morally permissible. In this paper, I explore and criticize Quong’s account. I argue that the distinctions Quong draws between Conscientious Driver and Mistaken Attacker cannot be sustained in ways that uphold the moral status account, and I suggest that the moral status account’s focus on the “as if” condition is morally undermotivated. The drift of my argument is that we should take much more minimal accounts of defensive liability more seriously than we typically do.

Strokes of Luck provides a detailed and wide-ranging examination of the role of luck in moral and political philosophy. The first part tackles debates in moral luck, which are concerned with the assignment of blameworthiness to individuals who are separated only by lucky differences. ‘Anti-luckists’ think that an agent who, for example, attempts and succeeds in an assassination and an agent who attempts and fails are equally blameworthy. This book defends an ‘anti-anti-luckist’ argument, according to which the successful assassin is more blameworthy than the unsuccessful one. Moreover, the successful assassin is, all things equal, a worse person than the unsuccessful one. The worldly outcomes of our acts can make an all-important difference, not only to how bad our acts can be deemed, but to how bad we are. The second part enters into debates about distributive justice. It is argued that the attempt to neutralize luck in the distribution of advantages among individuals does not deserve its prominence in political philosophy: the ‘luck egalitarian’ programme is flawed. A better way forward is to re-invest in John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness, which demonstrates a superior way of taming the bad effects of luck and unchosen disadvantage.

In _War By Agreement_, Yitzhak Benbaji and Daniel Statman argue that the morality of war can be governed by a freely accepted agreement over the principles that apply to it. This war contract supersedes the application of the principles of everyday morality to war, thus defying ‘revisionist’ approaches to war, and it upholds a recognizable version of traditional just war theory. This article argues for three claims. First, the contractarian apparatus Benbaji and Statman deploy is actually inconsistent with the deep reasoning they advance on its behalf, since, unsatisfactorily, the contract is supposed to retain normative force even when it is breached by aggressors. Second, the underlying character of their theory makes it something closer to a consequentialist account. Third, this new understanding of their account renders it less distinct from certain articulations of revisionism than they think.

Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs renews and amplifies his earlier attacks on metaethics. This article reviews the main lineaments of Dworkin’s anti-metaethical arguments and discusses, in detail, a number of issues which arise from them. First, it is suggested that Dworkin’s ap- praisal of what is doing most of the explanatory work in his account is largely askew. Second, it is claimed that Dworkin’s allegation that expressivism is self-defeating is wide of the mark, but that another charge in the same vicinity might be more effective. Third, it is argued that Dworkin’s incuriosity about moral metaphysics is misplaced. What his ar- guments actually support is an opposition to leaving metaphysical hostages to fortune, rather than an opposition to pursuing greater clarification about moral metaphysics. In this connection, it is tentatively suggested that Dworkin might be tempted by a certain version of naturalism.Resumen:En su trabajo Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin renueva y amplía sus primeras críticas a la metaética. En este artículo se estudian los principales rasgos de los argumentos antimetaéticos que elabora Dworkin, y se analiza con detalle un número de problemas que surgen de esos argumentos. En primer lugar, se sugiere que la apreciación de Dworkin, con respecto a lo que se está haciendo en buena parte de los trabajos de carácter explicativo, está tergiversada. En segundo lugar, se sostiene que la acusación de Dworkin de que el expresivismo es auto-derrotable es inofensiva, aunque otra acusación en las mismas cercanías podría ser más efectiva. En tercer lugar, se afirma que la falta de interés de Dworkin acerca de la metafísica moral está mal orientada. Lo que realmente apoyan sus argumentos es una oposición a dejar los rehenes metafísicos a la fortuna, y no una oposición a perseguir una mayor clarificación de la metafísica moral. En esta conexión se sugiere tentativamente que Dworkin podría ser seducido por una versión particular del naturalismo.

Uwe Steinhoff’s The Ethics of War and the Force of Law contains an extended critique of ‘moral fundamentalism’, or the project of uncovering an individualist ‘deep morality’ of war governed by the same moral principles and rules that govern ordinary moral life, as well as a more positive account of war that depicts it as a social practice. Much of Steinhoff’s account is indebted to a series of claims involving the standing to blame, reciprocity, and the necessity and proportionality conditions on self-defence. On all these claims, Steinhoff is open to challenge. First, he is arguably over-dependent on ‘standing to blame’ considerations. Second, his commitment to reciprocity is under-explained. Third, the necessity condition does not clearly explain how conventional elements explain the formation of defensive standards. Fourth, there are problems in explaining how the distinct defensive conventions adopted by distinct communities can actually be made to get on to the same page when these communities go to war with each other.

Williams’s attack on the ‘morality system’ in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy was preceded by his famous but misunderstood essay ‘Moral Luck’. This essay pursues two principal aims. First and foremost, I take a fresh look at Williams’s argument in ‘Moral Luck’, to assess its defensibility. Second, I investigate how Williams’s treatment of moral luck shapes and informs the wider assault on the ‘morality system’ which reached its fullest expression in the later work. We can learn something about both of Williams’s projects—his defence of moral luck, and his attack on the morality system—by seeing how each of these projects contributes to the other. Drawing on Williams’s discussion of Gauguin’s desertion of his family for a life of artistic endeavour in Tahiti, six interpretations of Williams’s argument are suggested. While some of these are better than others, none is completely satisfying or convincing. It is suggested, in conclusion, that the attack on anti-luckism does not make an indispensable contribution to Williams’s attack on the morality system.