•  1
    Functionalism and the Emotions
    In A. O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions, Univ of California Pr. pp. 21. 1980.
  •  34
    Digging Deeper for the A Priori
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 649-656. 2001.
    For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
  •  17
    Quinity, isotropy, and Wagnerian rapture
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1): 27-28. 1985.
  •  18
    Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigation
    with Michael Tetzlafir
    In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 72. 2009.
  •  45
    Shoemaker (1996) presented a priori arguments against the possibility of ‘self-blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not …Read more
  •  3
    A question about consciousness
    In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1986.
  • Intentional content and a chomskian linguistics
    In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 140--186. 2003.
  •  12
    Sanity surrounded by madness
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 48-50. 1988.
  •  53
  •  54
    Review of Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.
  •  138
  •  420
    What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese room‘
    Philosophical Studies 50 (September): 169-85. 1986.
  •  29
    Better to study human than world psychology
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 110-116. 2006.
    Commentary on Galen Strawson's 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism'.
  •  7
    Language of thought
    In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.
  •  57
    The Unavailability of What We Mean
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 61-101. 1993.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about thei…Read more
  •  96
    A Naturalistic A Priori
    Philosophical Studies 92 (1/2). 1998.
  •  105
    Toward a projectivist account of conscious experience
    In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42. 1995.
  •  11
    Transcending paradigms
    Metaphilosophy 21 (4): 447-455. 1990.
  •  84
    Fodor's ingratitude and change of heart?
    Mind and Language 19 (1): 70-84. 2004.
    One would have thought that Fodor's justly famous computational views about the mind and his covariation approaches to content owed a lot to the twentieth century that he now reviles. On the other hand, a number of lines he pursues in the target article make one wonder whether he hasn’t perhaps changed his mind about those famous views. Specifically, I argue that his own theory of content is open to the very same objections he raises against ‘sorting’ theories, and that the supposed circularity …Read more
  •  48
    Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology
    Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2): 259-89. 1994.
  •  83
    Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to Devitt
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 549-569. 2006.
    Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: …Read more
  •  77
    Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 389-415. 2005.
    The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what…Read more