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87Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to DevittCroatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 549-569. 2006.Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: …Read more
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81Mind, Intentionality and InexistenceCroatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 389-415. 2005.The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what…Read more
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Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualiaIn Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993), Holder-pichler-tempsky. 1994.
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121A reason for doubting the existence of consciousnessIn Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Plenum. pp. 1--39. 1982.
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60The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and EmpiricismCanadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1): 227-258. 2004.
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2Metacognition and consciousness [Special issue]Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2 pt 1): 2000-0433. 2000.
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8I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating conside…Read more
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73Concepts versus conceptions (again)Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 221-222. 2010.Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation
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91Why Wittgenstein ought to have been a computationalist (and what a computationalist can gain from Wittgenstein)Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9): 231-264. 2003.Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process …Read more
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77A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thoughtPhilosophical Perspectives 9 201-22. 1995.
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1294InnatenessIn Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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18Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AIIn John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225. 2003.
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5Externalism and inexistence in early contentIn Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 503-530. 2012.
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48Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments"Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2): 224-230. 2000.
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42Chomsky, Intentionality, and a CRTTIn Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Chomsky's Commitment to CRTT Prospects and Problems of CRTT Technical Notions? Does Chomsky Need Intentionality? Chomsky's Dilemma.
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22Ontology and ideology of behaviorism and mentalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4): 640. 1984.
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29Block's philosophical anosognosiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 266-267. 1995.Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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50In Defense of FolieismCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2): 177-202. 2008.According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying err…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
20th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |