-
26Epistemology in Excess? A Response to WilliamsJournal of Philosophy of Education 51 (1): 193-213. 2017.Emma Williams’ ‘In Excess of Epistemology’ admirably endeavours to open the way to an account of critical thinking that goes beyond the one I have defended ad nauseum in recent decades by developing, via the work of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger, ‘a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks’, one that ‘does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.’ In this response I hope to show that much of Williams’ alternative approach is co…Read more
-
19Dangerous Dualisms or Murky Monism? A Reply to Jim GarrisonJournal of Philosophy of Education 35 (4): 577-595. 2001.Jim Garrison’s recent criticisms of what he refers to as ‘dangerous dualisms’ in my theory of critical thinking are unsuccessful. They fail, in large part, because of misinterpretations of my view, but also because of Garrison’s systematic reliance on problematic aspects of Dewey’s terminology and philosophy.
-
Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological RelativismBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3): 419-427. 1989.
-
16
-
3Is It Irrational to be Immoral? A Response to FreemanEducational Philosophy and Theory 10 (2): 51-61. 1978.
-
9Rationality, Morality, and Rational Moral Education: Further Response to FreemanEducational Philosophy and Theory 12 (1): 37-47. 1980.
-
19Justification by BalancePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 27-46. 1992.A critique of reflective equilibrium as an account of epistemic justification
-
17Epistemology in Excess? A Response to WilliamsJournal of Philosophy of Education 50 (4). 2016.Emma Williams’ ‘In Excess of Epistemology’ admirably endeavours to open the way to an account of critical thinking that goes beyond the one I have defended ad nauseum in recent decades by developing, via the work of Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger, ‘a radically different conception of thinking and the human being who thinks’, one that ‘does more justice to receptive and responsible conditions of human thought.’ In this response I hope to show that much of Williams’ alternative approach is co…Read more
-
94Argument Quality and Cultural DifferenceArgumentation 13 (2): 183-201. 1999.Central to argumentation theory is a concern with normativity. Argumentation theorists are concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are good (or at least better than others) in the sense that a given argument provides reasons for embracing its conclusion which are such that a fair- minded appraisal of the argument yields the judgment that the conclusion ought to be accepted -- is worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise it
-
154Relativism, truth, and incoherenceSynthese 68 (2): 225-259. 1986.There are many contemporary sources and defenders of epistemological relativism which have not been considered thus far. I have, for example, barely touched on the voluminous literature regarding frameworks, conceptual schemes, and Wittgensteinian forms of life. Davidson's challenge to the scheme/content distinction and thereby to conceptual relativism, Rorty's acceptance of the Davidsonian argument and his use of it to defend a relativistic position, Winchian and other sociological and anthropo…Read more
-
19Knowledge and Truth54In Richard Bailey (ed.), The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education, Sage Publication. pp. 283. 2010.
-
17Rescher on the Justification of RationalityInformal Logic 14 (1). 1992.In his recent book Rationality, Nicholas Rescher offers a provocative attempt to justify rationality. In this paper I critically assess that attempt. After clarifying the philosophical problem at issue, I examine Rescher's effort to solve it. I argue that Rescher's justification succeeds, but that he mistakenly characterizes it as pragmatic. It succeeds only if it is understood non-pragmatically. Consequently, Rescher must give up either his justificatory argument, or his commitment to a pragmat…Read more
-
12Review of Nel Noddings, Philosophy of Education (review)Educational Studies 28 (1): 55-88. 1997.
-
247What is the question concerning the rationality of science?Philosophy of Science 52 (4): 517-537. 1985.The traditional views of science as the possessor of a special method, and as the epitome or apex of rationality, have come under severe challenges for a variety of historical, psychological, sociological, political, and philosophical reasons. As a result, many philosophers are either denying science its claim to rationality, or else casting about for a new account of its rationality. In this paper a defense of the traditional view is offered. It is argued that contemporary philosophical discuss…Read more
-
93Is 'Education' a Thick Epistemic Concept?Philosophical Papers 37 (3): 455-469. 2008.Is 'education' a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends, of course, on the viability of the 'thick/thin' distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I will concentrate mainly on the latter, and will argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it; and that, insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education's epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarif…Read more
-
38Open-mindedness, Critical Thinking, and Indoctrination: Homage to William HarePaideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 18 (1): 26-34. 2009.William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work on open-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). I argue that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.
-
54The pragma-dialectician’s dilemma: Reply to Garssen and van LaarInformal Logic 30 (4): 457-480. 2010.Garssen and van Laar in effect concede our main criticism of the pragma-dialectical approach. The criticism is that the conclusions of arguments can be ‘P-D reasonable’ yet patently unreasonable, epistemically speaking. The concession consists in the claim that the theory “remains restricted to the investigation of standpoints in the light of particular sets of starting points” which are “up to individual disputants to create” and the admission that all the relevant terms of normative appraisal …Read more
-
81Farewell to FeyerabendInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (3). 1989.It is with some trepidation that I offer this critical review of Feyerabend's new book. I do not relish the prospect of getting involved in one of the nasty little fights Feyerabend picks with those who criticize his work. Nevertheless, Feyerabend's work cries out for critical attention. Of particular interest is the degree to which this new work deepens or enhances Feyerabend's earlier castigations of Reason. Fans of Feyerabend will be disappointed to learn that Feyerabend's philosophy is not d…Read more
Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Religion |
Other Academic Areas |