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247What is the question concerning the rationality of science?Philosophy of Science 52 (4): 517-537. 1985.The traditional views of science as the possessor of a special method, and as the epitome or apex of rationality, have come under severe challenges for a variety of historical, psychological, sociological, political, and philosophical reasons. As a result, many philosophers are either denying science its claim to rationality, or else casting about for a new account of its rationality. In this paper a defense of the traditional view is offered. It is argued that contemporary philosophical discuss…Read more
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93Is 'Education' a Thick Epistemic Concept?Philosophical Papers 37 (3): 455-469. 2008.Is 'education' a thick epistemic concept? The answer depends, of course, on the viability of the 'thick/thin' distinction, as well as the degree to which education is an epistemic concept at all. I will concentrate mainly on the latter, and will argue that epistemological matters are central to education and our philosophical thinking about it; and that, insofar, education is indeed rightly thought of as an epistemic concept. In laying out education's epistemological dimensions, I hope to clarif…Read more
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38Open-mindedness, Critical Thinking, and Indoctrination: Homage to William HarePaideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 18 (1): 26-34. 2009.William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work on open-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). I argue that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.
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54The pragma-dialectician’s dilemma: Reply to Garssen and van LaarInformal Logic 30 (4): 457-480. 2010.Garssen and van Laar in effect concede our main criticism of the pragma-dialectical approach. The criticism is that the conclusions of arguments can be ‘P-D reasonable’ yet patently unreasonable, epistemically speaking. The concession consists in the claim that the theory “remains restricted to the investigation of standpoints in the light of particular sets of starting points” which are “up to individual disputants to create” and the admission that all the relevant terms of normative appraisal …Read more
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81Farewell to FeyerabendInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (3). 1989.It is with some trepidation that I offer this critical review of Feyerabend's new book. I do not relish the prospect of getting involved in one of the nasty little fights Feyerabend picks with those who criticize his work. Nevertheless, Feyerabend's work cries out for critical attention. Of particular interest is the degree to which this new work deepens or enhances Feyerabend's earlier castigations of Reason. Fans of Feyerabend will be disappointed to learn that Feyerabend's philosophy is not d…Read more
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473Multiculturalism, universalism, and science education: In search of common groundScience Education 86 (6): 803-820. 2002.
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101Penelope MaddySecond Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4): 897-903. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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20Epistemology, critical thinking, and critical thinking pedagogyArgumentation 3 (2): 127-140. 1989.
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58Rationality, Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical View (review)Argumentation 22 (2): 191-203. 2008.A major virtue of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation is its commitment to reasonableness and rationality as central criteria of argumentative quality. However, the account of these key notions offered by the originators of this theory, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, seems to us problematic in several respects. In what follows we criticize that account and suggest an alternative, offered elsewhere, that seems to us to be both independently preferable and more in keeping with …Read more
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35Brown on epistemology and the new philosophy of scienceSynthese 56 (1). 1983.For over two decades, something akin to a scientific revolution in philosophy of science has been taking place. So, at any rate, claims Harold I. Brown, in his book Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science, in which he chronicles and defends the demise of logical empiricism and offers a new philosophy of science in its stead. The new philosophy of science, drawing on the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, Hanson, Lakatos, Polanyi, and others, but effectively structured, enhanced, and…Read more
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7Justifying Conceptual Development Claims: response to van HaaftenJournal of Philosophy of Education 27 (1): 79-86. 1993.This paper is a response to van Haaften’s attempt to build ‘a natural bridge from “is” to “ought”’ and in doing so to provide a general account of how, in developmental theory, a claim that ‘a later stage in conceptual development is somehow better or more adequate than preceding ones’ can itself be justified. The account by van Haaften violates the ‘seems justified/is justified’ distinction and embroils him in a problematic form of relativism. This paper offers an alternative account of such cl…Read more
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28Rationality, morality, and rational moral education: Further response to FreemanEducational Philosophy and Theory 12 (1). 1980.
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272Instrumental rationality and naturalized philosophy of sciencePhilosophy of Science 63 (3): 124. 1996.In two recent papers, I criticized Ronald N. Giere's and Larry Laudan's arguments for 'naturalizing' the philosophy of science (Siegel 1989, 1990). Both Giere and Laudan replied to my criticisms (Giere 1989, Laudan 1990b). The key issue arising in both interchanges is these naturalists' embrace of instrumental conceptions of rationality, and their concomitant rejection of non-instrumental conceptions of that key normative notion. In this reply I argue that their accounts of science's rationality…Read more
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11Consideraciones en torno a la pragma-dialécticaLogos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 24 (2): 193-201. 2015.El presente trabajo complemenJa las referencias a la lengua aut6ctona de los día guitas chilenos, en la encrucijada histórica de la conquista hispana en el siglo Xlll , cuya primera parte se publicó en WGOS N 2 l.En este número conJrastamos las hipó tesis de don Ricardo Latcham con la crftica de don Jorge /ribarren; se ofrece, aderruís, un suscinJo panorama de la situación lingüística en el noroeste argenJino, y las anota ciones espedficamenJe lingüísticas sobre el "cacán" de Antonio Tovar, C…Read more
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172Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and EducationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 345-366. 2007.In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over‐emphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental en…Read more
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40Naturalism, Instrumental Rationality and the Normativity of EpistemologyProtoSociology 8 97-110. 1996.Advocates of naturalized epistemology who wish to secure epistemology’s normativity want that normativity to be restricted to instrumental concerns, because these can be understood naturalistically. But epistemic normativity cannot be so limited; a ‘categorical’ sort of normativity must be acknowledged. Naturalism can neither account for nor do away with this sort of normativity. Hence naturalism is at best a seriously incomplete and therefore inadequate meta-epistemological position.
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43. the incoherence argument and the notion of relative truthIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 446. 2003.
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95Empirical psychology, naturalized epistemology, and first philosophyPhilosophy of Science 51 (4): 667-676. 1984.In his 1983 article, Paul A. Roth defends the Quinean project of naturalized epistemology from the criticism presented in my 1980 article. In this note I would like to respond to Roth's effort. I will argue that, while helpful in advancing and clarifying the issues, Roth's defense of naturalized epistemology does not succeed. The primary topic to be clarified is Quine's "no first philosophy" doctrine; but I will address myself to other points as well
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84Multiculturalism and the possibility of transcultural educational and philosophical idealsPhilosophy 74 (3): 387-409. 1999.How should we think about the interrelationships that obtain among Philosophy, Education, and Culture? In this paper I explore the contours of one such interrelationship: namely, the way in which educational and (other) philosophical ideals transcend individual cultures. I do so by considering the contemporary educational and philosophical commitment to multiculturalism. Consideration of multiculturalism, I argue, reveals important aspects of the character of both educational and philosophical i…Read more
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39'Radical' pedagogy requires 'conservative' epistemologyJournal of Philosophy of Education 29 (1). 1995.Many defences of multiculturalist educational initiatives conjoin a‘liberal’ or ‘radical’ moral/political view—that education should endeavour to treat students with respect, and that respecting non-dominant,‘marginalised’ students requires protecting them from the hegemonic domination of the dominant culture—with what appears to be an equally radical epistemological view, according to which respecting minority students and cultures requires respecting their culturally specific epistemologies, w…Read more
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166Autonomy, critical thinking and the Wittgensteinian legacy: Reflections on Christopher Winch, education, autonomy and critical thinkingJournal of Philosophy of Education 42 (1): 165-184. 2008.In this review of Christopher Winch's new book, Education, Autonomy and Critical Thinking (2006), I discuss its main theses, supporting some and criticising others. In particular, I take issue with several of Winch's claims and arguments concerning critical thinking and rationality, and deplore his reliance on what I suggest are problematic strains of the later Wittgenstein. But these criticisms are not such as to upend Winch's powerful critique of antiperfectionism and 'strong autonomy' or his …Read more
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83Israel Scheffler’s “Moral Education and the Democratic Ideal”Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 16 (3): 25-26. 1997.
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23RelativismIn M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 747--780. 2004.
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33Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason:Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (review)Ethics 109 (4): 917-919. 1999.
Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Religion |
Other Academic Areas |