Duncan Pritchard

I want to suggest a way of approaching On Certainty that treats what Wittgenstein is doing in the notebooks that make up this work as manifesting a kind philosophical practice that is broadly Pyrrhonian, at least on one reading of what this involves. Such a reading fits with the general philosophical quietism found in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in his later writings, and is also supported by independent textual evidence that he was profoundly influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Crucially, however, it also helps to clarify the sense in which the Pyrrhonian sceptical techniques, and hence the kind of philosophical quietism that goes along with them, can have an essentially disquieting effect on the subject.

One of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition, whereby features of a subject's cognitive environment can in certain conditions become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea.... The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume examines the applications of extended epistemology and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include its ethical ramifications, its import to the epistemology of education and emerging digital technologies, and how this idea might dovetail with certain themes in Chinese philosophy.

This advanced textbook, now in its second edition, provides an accessible overview of some of the main issues in contemporary epistemology. Written by an expert in the field, it covers such key topics as virtue epistemology, anti-luck epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, epistemic value, understanding, radical scepticism, and contextualism. This book is ideal as a set text for an advanced undergraduate or postgraduate course in epistemology, and will also be of general interest to researchers in philosophy.

Social Epistemology: 5 Questions is a collection of interviews with some of the world's most influential scholars working on social epistemology from a range of disciplinary perspectives. We hear their views on social epistemology; its aim, scope, use, broader intellectual environment, future direction, and how the work of the interviewees fits in these respects. Interviews with David Bloor, Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Bradley, Lorraine Code, Hans van Ditmarsch, Miranda Fricker, Steve Fuller, Sanford Goldberg, Alvin Goldman, Philip Kitcher, Martin Kusch, Jennifer Lackey, Helen E. Longino, Philip Petit, Erik Olsson, Frederick Schmitt.

Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone brings together these great truth-seeking disciplines, and seeks to understand the ways in which they challenge and inform each other. Key topics and their areas of focus include: - Foundational Issues - why should anyone care about the science-and-religion debate? How do scientific claims relate to the truth? Is evolution compatible with design? - Faith and Rationality - can faith ever be rational? Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Is God hidden or does God simply not exist? - Faith and Science - what provides a better explanation for the origin of the universe-science or religion? Faith and physics: can they be reconciled? Does contemporary neuroscience debunk religious belief? Creationism and evolutionary biology - what constitutes science and what constitutes pseudo-science? - Practical Implications - is fundamentalism just a problem for religious people? What are the ethical implications of the science-and-religion debate? Do logic and religion mix? This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free 'Philosophy, Science and Religion' MOOC (massive open online course) created by the University of Edinburgh, and hosted by the Coursera platform (www.coursera.org). This book is also highly recommended for anyone looking for a concise overview of this fascinating discipline.

The previous chapter offers a distinctive virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, which the chapter describes as dispositional robust virtue epistemology. It is argued that this view is ultimately untenable because it cannot accommodate what we refer to as the epistemic dependence of knowledge. This point is motivated by employing what we call an epistemic Twin Earth argument, and also by appealing to some familiar claims in the epistemology of testimony. In addition, it is claimed that there is an alternative proposal available, which we refer to as anti-luck virtue epistemology, that can accommodate epistemic dependence and which can thus offer a more satisfactory account of knowledge.

The general topic of skepticism crops up in Wittgenstein's work, from his remarks on solipsism in the Tractactus, to the potentially skepticism‐inducing claims about rule‐following in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein's radical new conception of the structure of rational evaluation blocks even this route to radical skepticism, since it excludes the possibility that the radical skeptic's wholesale rational evaluations could constitute a purified version of our everyday local rational evaluations. According to epistemic externalism, knowledge can be sometimes 'brute', at least from a rational point of view. Given the problems facing the externalist and entitlement proposals, one might be tempted to adopt a more radical proposal, one that is arguably closer in spirit to what Wittgenstein himself intended. According to this proposal, we need to take very seriously how Wittgenstein talks of these commitments as being utterly visceral in nature and conclude on this basis that such commitments simply are not in the market for knowledge.

Donald Davidson famously argued, contra radical skepticism, that belief is in its nature veridical. In assessing whether Davidson was successful in this regard, it is first necessary to establish the exact philosophical basis Davidson was adducing for this claim, which is far from clear. In particular, a lot of the critical focus on Davidson's approach to radical skepticism has tended to focus on his appeal to an omniscient interpreter, and yet a closer evaluation of Davidson's antiskepticism reveals that this notion is almost certainly dialectically inessential. Following some introductory remarks, in Section 2, I outline how the project of radical interpretation, and the associated principle of charity, are key parts of the philosophical background to Davidson's argument against radical skepticism. In Section 3, I critically evaluate Davidson's appeal to an omniscient interpreter. In Section 4, I demonstrate the role that Davidson's specific brand of content externalism plays in his antiskepticism, in particular in virtue of his notion of triangulation. Finally, in Section 5 I consider, and defend, an interpretation of Davidson's view that treats it as a kind of transcendental argument against skepticism.

This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work (e.g., Pritchard ). In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck (and risk) ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions over competing proposals, such as the lack of control account.

One of Alvin Goldman's most distinctive contributions to epistemology, and there are many, concerns his development of a thorough‐going reliabilism in the theory of knowledge. This chapter explores reasons for being sceptical about Goldman's treatment of the swamping problem. It argues that when the swamping problem is properly understood, then there is a very straightforward response available to Goldman. The chapter sets out the swamping problem and argues that it does not pose a challenge which is specific to reliabilism, but rather presents a challenge to a certain conception of epistemic value (known as veritism) which Goldman also endorses. It critically evaluates the first of Goldman's two responses to this problem, whereby he appeals to the greater future value of reliably formed true belief over mere true belief. The chapter also evaluates Goldman's second response to the swamping problem, which makes use of a process that he calls value autonomization.