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242Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to workPhilosophical Studies 142 (1): 55-66. 2009.We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chanc…Read more
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183Temporal partsPhilosophy Compass 2 (5). 2007.This article discusses recent work in metaphysics on temporal parts. After a short introduction introducing the notion of a temporal part, we examine several well‐known arguments for the view that ordinary material objects such as tables, trees, and persons have temporal parts: (1) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve puzzles of coincidence (e.g., the statue/lump puzzle); (2) positing temporal parts makes it possible to solve the problem of intrinsic change over time; and (3) the e…Read more
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124Quasi-realism and the Humean defense of normative non-factualismPhilosophical Studies 90 (2): 113-127. 1998.
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473Memory and epistemic conservatismSynthese 157 (1): 1-24. 2007.Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim,…Read more
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158Deflationism and the normativity of truthPhilosophical Studies 112 (1). 2003.This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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183What the deflationist may say about truthmakingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3). 2003.The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions
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163Epistemology: A Contemporary IntroductionOxford University Press. 2014.Epistemology has long mesmerized its practitioners with numerous puzzles. What can we know, and how can we know it? In Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, Alvin Goldman, one of the most noted contemporary epistemologists, and Matthew McGrath, known for his work on a wide range of topics in the field, have joined forces to delve into these puzzles.
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292Siegel and the impact for epistemological internalismPhilosophical Studies 162 (3): 723-732. 2013.
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189Contextualism and Subject‐SensitivityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 693-702. 2012.Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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102Review of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8). 2004.
Brown University
PhD
St. Louis, Missouri, United States
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Meta-Ethics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Epistemology |