•  365
    Looks and Perceptual Justification
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1): 110-133. 2018.
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification …Read more
  •  73
    Cohen on ‘Epistemic’
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 889-905. 2016.
    Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficul…Read more
  •  10
    Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley. 2008.
    New and thoroughly updated, Epistemology: An Anthology continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimon…Read more
  •  251
    Weak deflationism
    Mind 106 (421): 69-98. 1997.
    Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of …Read more
  •  396
    On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3): 558-589. 2007.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by …Read more
  •  234
    Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work
    Philosophical Studies 142 (1): 55-66. 2009.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chanc…Read more
  •  159
    Temporal parts
    Philosophy Compass 2 (5). 2007.
  •  331
    Memory and epistemic conservatism
    Synthese 157 (1): 1-24. 2007.
    Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim,…Read more
  •  153
    Deflationism and the normativity of truth
    Philosophical Studies 112 (1). 2003.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
  •  177
    What the deflationist may say about truthmaking
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3). 2003.
    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions
  •  107
    Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Epistemology has long mesmerized its practitioners with numerous puzzles. What can we know, and how can we know it? In Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, Alvin Goldman, one of the most noted contemporary epistemologists, and Matthew McGrath, known for his work on a wide range of topics in the field, have joined forces to delve into these puzzles.
  •  127
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  182
    Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 693-702. 2012.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
  •  78
    Truth without objectivity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 491-494. 2005.
  • Matthew McGrath
    Philosophy 74 587-610. 1998.
  •  127
    Defeating pragmatic encroachment?
    Synthese 195 (7). 2018.
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways to allow kno…Read more
  •  93
    McGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence
  •  465
    Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.
    This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
  •  130
    Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
    Philosophical Studies 173 (4): 897-905. 2016.
    According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental…Read more