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89Küenne on Conceptions of Truth (review)Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1): 179-191. 2006.The review focuses on Küenne's account of truthmaking and on his minimalist approach to truth.
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86Theories of TruthIn I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 331--414. 2004.
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8FrontmatterIn Marian David & Mauro Antonelli (eds.), Existence, Fiction, Assumption: Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy, De Gruyter. 2016.
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70Truth as One and Many (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4): 743-746. 2011.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011
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11A Substitutional Theory of Truth?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 182-189. 2006.University of Notre Dame.
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38Signifier and Signified. Linguistico-Philosophical Enquiries into the Problem of Reference (review)Philosophy and History 21 (1): 31-34. 1988.
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Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies, vol. VI (edited book)de Gruyter. 2016.
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6On the Roles of Trustworthiness and AcceptanceGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 93-107. 1991.Our tmst in our own trustworthiness as evaluators of tmth plays a uniquely important role in Lehrer's recent work in epistemology. Lehrer has claimed that a person who trusts in her own trustworthiness has a reason for accepting everything she accepts, including that she is trustworthy. This claim is too bold, trust in our trustworthiness cannot play the epistemic role Lehrer assigns to it. Neither does a suitably revised version of the claim succeed in assigning any important epistemic role to …Read more
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19Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 229-232. 1993.
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108Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working HypothesisIn Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition), Wiley-blackwell. pp. 363-377. 2013.
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161Kim's functionalismPhilosophical Perspectives 11 133-48. 1997.In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two gener…Read more
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28Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common SenseGrazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 3-16. 1986.Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage n…Read more
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8Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift Für Analytische Philosophie (edited book)Brill | Rodopi. 2002.Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles Massimiliano Vignolo: Why Non-Factualists Should Love Conceptual Role Semantics Jeffrey Goodman: Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts Alberto Voltolini: Against Against Fictional Realism Roderick Batchelor: Grounds and Consequences Timm Lampert and Michael Baumgartner: The Problem of Validity Proofs Ish Haji: On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility Matthias Neuber: Philosophie der modernen Physik …Read more
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85Quine's ladder: Two and a half pages from the philosophy of logicMidwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 274-312. 2008.I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth
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4Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove that We Are Not Brains in a VatPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4): 891-896. 1991.
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40Lynch's functionalist theory of truthIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 42. 2012.
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37Review Essay: Working Without a Net (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 943-952. 1996.
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Horwich's WorldIn Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism, Clarendon Press. 2006.
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8Truth as the Epistemic GoalIn M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169. 2001.
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8Some t-biconditionalsIn B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court. pp. 382--419. 2005.The T-biconditionals, also known as T-sentences or T-equivalences, play a very prominent role in contemporary work on truth. It is widely held that they are so central to our understanding of truth that conformance with them is indispensable to any account of truth that aspires to be adequate. Even “deflationists” and “inflationists” tend to agree on this point; their debate turns largely on just how central a role these biconditionals can play in a theory of truth. In the present paper, I want …Read more
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32Logical, Ontological, and Historical Contributions on the Philosophy of Alexius Meinong (edited book)De Gruyter. 2014.
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12PropositionenGrazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1): 37-58. 1985.Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im …Read more
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51Non-Existence and Reid's Conception of ConceivingGrazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 585-599. 1985.Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve…Read more
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5Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common SenseGrazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 3-16. 1986.Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage n…Read more
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24Truth and IdentityIn J. K. Campbell & M. O'Rourke (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics., . 2002.According to a classical correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true iff it corresponds to a fact. The approach has its competitors. One of them, the identity theory of truth, pushes for a surprising simplification. It says that true propositions do not correspond to facts, they are facts. Some find this view too bizarre to be taken seriously. Some are attracted to it because they worry that the correspondence theory opens a gap between our thoughts and reality--a gap that, once opened…Read more
Graz, Styria, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |