Andrew Light

I examine a puzzle concerning the role of humans in the appreciation of place that arises in Christoph Rehmann-Sutter's paper in this volume, specifically the problem of the irreplaceability of place. If places are designated as valuable in part because they are irreplaceable, and if any human can appreciate any place, then how can humans ever be part of a place if they are ultimately substitutable as agents who appreciate places? After identifying the puzzle I briefly discuss two possible ways to answer this problem though the literature on bioregionalism. Two kinds of bioregionalism, liberal bioregionalism (LB) and communitarian bioregionalism (CB) are identified and distinguished. A brief appeal is made to embrace LB for now (which entails avoiding the irreplaceability problem by jettisoning the need to focus on the special qualities of a particular place) and to hold off on CB as a goal down the road which would re-establish the importance of specificity in the value of place.

Philosophers and geographers have converged on the topic of public space, fascinated and in many ways alarmed by fundamental changes in the way post-industrial societies produce space for public use, and in the way citizens of these same societies perceive and constitute themselves as a public. This volume advances this inquiry, making extensive use of political and social theory, while drawing intimate connections between political principles, social processes, and the commonplaces of our everyday environments.

The collection of papers that comprise this thesis explore three sets of questions important to environmental philosophy, broadly construed. All three topics are explored through the theoretical device of environmental pragmatism, the argument that philosophical disagreements on environmental questions can sometimes be set aside in order to achieve compatible strategies to work toward improving environmental conditions. As part of this strategy, pragmatists also call for the abandonment of the existing prejudices of environmental philosophy, in particular nonanthropocentrism and commitments to moral monism. Part I of the thesis looks at two sets of debates in environmental philosophy: the social ecology-deep ecology divide in political ecology, and the debate between monists and pluralists in environmental ethics. Both debates are used as a vehicle to advance the pragmatist position, as well as demonstrate the connection between this thesis and other attempts to articulate a workable form of pluralism in environmental philosophy. Next, the first half of Part II uses the pragmatist premise to launch applied investigations of two environmental questions: the privatization of environmental regulations, and the political appropriation of restoration ecology. The second half of Part II explores questions concerning urban space and political identity, which come to the center of environmental philosophy following a pragmatist assault on its existing prejudices. Finally, Part III continues the themes of the last half of Part II to look at issues concerning technology and built space, topics which have traditionally been ignored by environmental philosophers. These final chapters present a set of issues concerning space and place which must be integral to an environmental philosophy which has been tempered by pragmatic concerns

It is an old wag among environmentalists that humans have become disconnected from nature. The culprits for this conundrum are various. If it is not our addiction to technological enticements then it is our life in big cities which alienate us from our “earthen elements.” The presumed result of this disconnection is that we do not respect the land anymore and turn a blind eye to the environmental consequences of our collective acts of consumption and pollution. Various bits of evidence are produced to prove this point – mostly anecdotal – such as the claim that many city-dwellers, when asked where their food comes from, will respond blankly, “from a grocery store.” What is the curative for this ailment? Surprisingly, it is not that we should send urbanites out to the factory farms, county-sized feed lots, or flavor factories in New Jersey, which actually put most of the food on the shelves of neighborhood markets. It is instead usually suggested that we should send people to wilderness areas, that we should become more connected with nature in the raw, as it were. E. O. Wilson’s “biophilia” hypothesis is a good case in point. Defending a sociobiological account of why humans are innately attracted to living things, Wilson suggests that this connection is best realized in the residual attachment of humans to wild nature. This grounds a claim that the most important task at hand is to focus on “the central questions of human origins in the wild environment” (Wilson 1992, 351). It is probably unfair to suggest that Wilson thinks that we should all go to the wilderness in order to be better connected with nature, and implicitly, to then..

Foremost in importance among these changes has been a transition in many governments' attitudes to fulfilling their role as caretaker of environmental quality. A question remains, however, concerning the propriety of managing a publicly provided good, such as the regulation of water and air quality, through market mechanisms such as optimal taxes and transferable quotas. There are a number of options open to us if we wish to object to the privatization of the regulation of environmental quality from an ethical perspective. This chapter suggests that the shift to privatization of environmental regulation can be challenged closer to its own economic ground, a move considered somewhat unusual by many environmental ethicists. It argues that inside the economic definition of a "pure public good" resources already exist for challenging the privatization of environmental regulation. Publicly provided goods are goods that may not be traded as commodities, as determined by a public policy.

Robert Elliot's 1982 “Faking Nature,” represents one of the strongest philosophical rejections of the ground of restoration ecology ever offered.1 Here, and in a succession of papers defending the original essay, Elliot argued that ecological restoration, the practice of restoring damaged ecosystems, was akin to art forgery. Just as a copied art work could not reproduce the value of the original, restored nature could not reproduce the value of original nature, conceived as a form of nonanthropocentric and intrinsic, as opposed to merely instrumental, value.2 Eric Katz's 1992 “The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature,” extended this claim by further arguing that whatever was produced in a restored landscape it certainly could not count as having the original value of nature, particularly wild nature, and necessarily represented a form of disvalue and domination of nature.3 Elliot has continued to press his argument forward since the original publication of “Faking Nature,” augmenting and some would say softening his critique of restoration, in a book also called Faking Nature.4 Perhaps because both Elliot and Katz rest their claims on the defense of a strong nature-culture distinction, the two arguments are often lumped together as the Elliot-Katz rejection of the value of ecological restoration. Nonetheless, Elliot has made it clear in his recent book that his view is distinct from and even at odds with Katz’s views. In previous papers I have criticized Elliot and Katz’s work as an unhelpful philosophical contribution to the literature on restoration ecology. To my mind, restorationists are ultimately up to more good than harm, and whatever the..

In Democracy and the Claims of Nature, the leading thinkers in the fields of environmental, political, and social theory come together to discuss the tensions and sympathies of democratic ideals and environmental values. The prominent contributors reflect upon where we stand in our understanding of the relationship between democracy and the claims of nature. Democracy and the Claims of Nature bridges the gap between the often competing ideals of the two fields, leading to a greater understanding of each for the other