•  50
    In Why we Talk, cognitive scientist Jean-Louis Dessalles presents an original, in-depth account of the nature and evolution of human language. Written in a clear and engaging manner, Why we Talk is an impressive achievement. Dessalles reviews and contributes to most controversies about human language. He compares human language to other systems of communication found in the animal world, arguing for the originality of the former; he clearly shows that language is a biological trait and that we s…Read more
  •  51
    Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz
    Mind and Language 25 (5): 634-646. 2010.
    In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo-empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of ‘concept’ because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long-term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts
  •  36
    La Philosophie Expérimentale (edited book)
    with Florian Cova, Julien Dutant, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, and Eddy Nahmias
    Vuibert. 2012.
    La philosophie expérimentale est un mouvement récent qui tente de faire progresser certains débats philosophiques grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes expérimentales. À la différence de la philosophie conventionnelle qui privilégie l'analyse conceptuelle ou la spéculation, la philosophie expérimentale préconise le recours aux études empiriques pour mieux comprendre les concepts philosophiques. Apparue il y a une dizaine d'années dans les pays anglo-saxons, cette approche constitue actuellement l'un…Read more
  • Comments and Response-A Better Philosophy for a Better Psychology
    Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31 (2): 90. 2011.
  •  298
    Two conceptions of subjective experience
    Philosophical Studies 151 (2): 299-327. 2010.
    Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is cl…Read more
  •  15
    Précis of Doing without Concepts
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 195-206. 2010.
  •  3
    100 years of psychology of concepts: The theoretical notion of concept and its operationalization
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1): 63-84. 2005.
  •  15
    Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century is a fine collection of essays edited by António Zilhão. Most of the essays are written by prominent philosophers of biology and psychology, while a roboticist, Inman Harvey, and a psychologist, Barbara Tversky, complete the list of contributors. Eight of the nine essays are original, although several of the essays are partly made up of material published elsewhere. Most of these articles belong to a growing …Read more
  •  85
    Race and racial cognition
    with Daniel Kelly and Ron Mallon
    In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    A core question of contemporary social morality concerns how we ought to handle racial categorization. By this we mean, for instance, classifying or thinking of a person as Black, Korean, Latino, White, etc.² While it is widely FN:2 agreed that racial categorization played a crucial role in past racial oppression, there remains disagreement among philosophers and social theorists about the ideal role for racial categorization in future endeavors. At one extreme of this disagreement are short-ter…Read more
  •  31
    The methods of experimental philosophy have been successfully used in many areas of philosophy, including epistemology, philosophy of language, ethics, action theory, and more recently aesthetics, but philosophy of science has remained by and large impervious to this new approach. In this chapter, I show that experimental philosophy has much to offer to philosophy of science by reviewing the existing experimental-philosophy work in the philosophy of science.
  •  227
    The bleak implications of moral psychology
    Neuroethics 3 (3): 223-231. 2010.
    In this article, I focus on two claims made by Appiah in Experiments in Ethics: Doris’s and Harman’s criticism of virtue ethics fails, and moral psychology can be used to identify erroneous moral intuitions. I argue that both claims are erroneous.
  •  12
    Culture and cognition
    with Daniel Mt Fessler
    In E. Margolis, R. Samuels & S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.
  •  59
    The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (edited book)
    with Markus Werning and Wolfram Hinzen
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    Leading linguists and philosophers report on all aspects of compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression can be derived from its parts. This book explores every dimension of this field, reporting critically on different lines of research, revealing connections between them, and highlighting current problems and opportunities.
  •  264
    Philosophical temperament
    with Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, and Richard Scheines
    Philosophical Psychology 23 (3): 313-330. 2010.
    Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is. Often they have looked for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do. Given the diversity of topics and methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach. In this article we consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: what are philosophers like? Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that philosophers are especially reflective: they are less l…Read more
  • Brief article
    with Wataru Sato, Sakiko Yoshikawa, Paul E. Dux, Irina M. Harris, Anthony P. Atkinson, Mary L. Tunstall, Winand H. Dittrich, Francesco Pavani, and Giovanni Galfano
    Cognition 104 (1). 2007.
  •  159
    A plea for human nature
    Philosophical Psychology 21 (3). 2008.
    Philosophers of biology, such as David Hull and Michael Ghiselin, have argued that the notion of human nature is incompatible with modern evolutionary biology and they have recommended rejecting this notion. In this article, I rebut this argument: I show that an important notion of human nature is compatible with modern evolutionary biology.
  •  67
    Power and Negative Results
    Philosophy of Science 79 (5): 808-820. 2012.
  •  34
    Baumard and colleagues put forward a new hypothesis about the nature and evolution of fairness. In this commentary, we discuss the relation between morality and their views about fairness
  •  129
    Editorial: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2): 157-160. 2010.
    Recent years have seen an explosion of new work at the intersection of philosophy and experimental psychology. This work takes the concerns with moral and conceptual issues that have so long been associated with philosophy and connects them with the use of systematic and well-controlled empirical investigations that one more typically finds in psychology. Work in this new field often goes under the name "experimental philosophy".
  •  59
    How to Split Concepts: A Reply to Piccinini and Scott
    Philosophy of Science 73 (4): 410-418. 2006.
    In “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind” (2005), I argued that the notion of concept in psychology and in neuropsychology fails to pick out a natural kind. Piccinini and Scott (2006, in this issue) have criticized the argument I used to support this conclusion. They also proposed two alternative arguments for a similar conclusion. In this reply, I rebut Piccinini and Scott’s main objection against the argument proposed in “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind.” Moreover, I show that the two alternative a…Read more
  •  157
    Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of intentional action canno…Read more
  •  19
    It is difficult to overestimate Paul Meehl's influence on judgment and decision-making research. His 'disturbing little book' Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence is known as an attack on human judgment and a call for replacing clinicians with actuarial methods. More than 40 years later, fast and frugal heuristics - proposed as models of human judgment - were formalized, tested, and found to be surprisingly accurate, often more so than the a…Read more
  •  5
    Editors' Introduction
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9. 2014.
    The relation between concepts and perception has been a central issue in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science for a few decades, and it has recently been rejuvenated by research on concept empiricism and on cognitive penetration. Research on the relation between concepts and perception in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences focuses on several distinct issues.
  •  52
    Replies to my critics (review)
    Philosophical Studies 149 (3). 2010.