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1898Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual ContentPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1): 173-196. 2006.I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars …Read more
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1398Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and NetaPhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 929-946. 2016.This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam …Read more
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1017Robert B. Brandom: Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Committment (review)Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51 (2): 187-195. 1998.
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640Experience and Evidence AbridgedIn Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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1609The epistemic force of perceptual experiencePhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 87-100. 2014.What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I…Read more
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4396Perceptual Content DefendedNoûs 45 (4). 2011.Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that expe…Read more
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1898The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual ExperienceIn B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content, Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219. 2014.
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890A Trilemma about Mental ContentIn Schear Joseph (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world, Routledge. pp. 272-282. 2013.Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses…Read more
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1060Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to ActIn N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 145. 2010.This paper develops and defends the capacity view, that is, the view that the ability to perceive the perspective-independent or intrinsic properties of objects depends on the perceiver’s capacity to act. More specifically, I argue that self-location and spatial know-how are jointly necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. Representing one’s location allows one to abstract from one’s particular vantage point to perceive the perspective-independent properties of objects.…Read more
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1034Externalism and the Gappy Content of HallucinationIn Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology, Mit Press. pp. 291. 2013.There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s envir…Read more
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2452Experience and EvidenceMind 122 (487): 699-747. 2013.I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of b…Read more
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