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53Qu'est-ce que le problème de la perception?Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 237-264. 2005.Qu’est-ce que le problème de la perception au sens strictement philosophique ? On affirme ici que c’est le conflit entre la nature de l’expérience perceptuelle telle qu’elle nous paraît intuitivement et certaines possibilités qui sont implicites justement dans l’idée d’expérience : les possibilités d’illusion et d’hallucination. L’expérience perceptuelle semble être un rapport à ses objets, une sorte d’«ouverture au monde» qui implique une conscience directe des objets existants et de leurs prop…Read more
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47The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist TheoryIn J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 199--223. 1998.
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29"Intentionality: Past and Future" edited by Gábor Forrai and George Kampis (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1). 2007.Recent years have seen significant changes in the study of intentionality and mental representation. Twenty years ago, there was a fairly well-established research agenda, set largely by the work of Jerry Fodor. Those working to this agenda tended to assume that the study of intentionality is distinct from the study of consciousness; that the study of intentionality is the study of the propositional attitudes; that the aim of an account of intentionality should be to give a physicalist theory of…Read more
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27Was Ist Das Problem der Wahrnehmung?Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 237-264. 2005.Was ist das distinktive philosophische Problem der Perzeption? Hier wird behauptet, dass es der Konflikt zwischen der Natur der perzeptuellen Erfahrung ist, wie sie uns intuitiv erscheint und gewisser Möglichkeiten, die der Idee der Erfahrung implizit innewohnen: der Möglichkeiten von Illusion und Halluzination. Die perzeptuelle Erfahrung kommt uns vor wie eine Einstellung zu den eigenen Objekten, eine Art „Weltoffenheit“, die ein direktes Bewusstsein von den bestehenden Objekten und ihren Eigen…Read more
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24El Problema de la Percepción en la Filosofía AnalíticaIn David P. Chico & Moisés Barroso Ramos (eds.), Pluralidad de la Filosofía Analítica, Plaza Y Valdés Editores. pp. 3--217. 2007.
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20U čemu je problem opažanja?Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 257-282. 2006.Što je distinktivno filozofski problem opažanja? Ovdje se tvrdi da je to konflikt između prirode opažajnog iskustva kakva nam se intuitivno čini, te stanovitih mogućnosti koje su implicitne upravo u ideji iskustva: mogućnosti iluzije i halucinacije. Opažajno iskustvo čini nam se kao odnos prema svojim objektima, vrsta »otvorenosti prema svijetu« koja uključuje izravnu svijest postojećih objekata i njihovih svojstava. Ali ako netko može imati iskustvo iste vrste a da objekt nije tamo – halucinaci…Read more
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18Philosophie, Logik, Naturwissenschaft, GeschichteDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (1): 3-19. 2013.Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philos…Read more
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17Replies to Gäb, Schmidt and ScottNeue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 65 (4): 458-463. 2023.This article replies to criticism of my article, “Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?” by Sebastian Gäb, Eva Schmidt and Michael Scott.
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16Dispositions: A DebateRoutledge. 1996.Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation
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10In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori JustificationMind 112 (447): 502-506. 2003.
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9Causation, Interpretation and Omniscience: A Note on Davidson's EpistemologyOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 11 (2): 117-127. 2004.In 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', Donald Davidson argues that it is not possible for us to be massively mistaken in our beliefs. The argument is based on the possibility of an omniscient interpreter who uses the method of radical interpretation to attribute beliefs, since an omniscient interpreter who uses this method will attribute largely true beliefs to those he is inteipreting. In this paper we investigate some of the assumptions behind this argument, and we argue that these as…Read more
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7Intentional ObjectsRatio 14 (4): 336-349. 2002.The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non‐existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kin…Read more
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6Philosophy, Logic, Science, HistoryIn Armen T. Marsoobian, Eric Cavallero & Alexis Papazoglou (eds.), The Pursuit of Philosophy, Wiley. 2012-08-29.This chapter contains sections titled: Philosophy Logic Science History Acknowledgments References.
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6Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?In Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), The Admissible Contents of Experience, Wiley. 2011.It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inac…Read more
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4Causes and Coincidences, by David Owen (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1): 146-148. 1996.
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1Brentano's concept of intentional inexistenceIn Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian contribution to analytic philosophy, Routledge. 2006.
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1The Emergence of ConsciousnessIn The Emergence of the Mind, Fondazione Carlo Erba. pp. 183-191. 2001.
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1"The Rediscovery of the Mind" by John Searle (review)International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 313. 1993.
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Consciousness, the Awareness of the World and the Essence of the MindIn Exploring Consciousness, Fondazione Carlo Erba. pp. 35-45. 2002.
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Analytic Theories of A Priori KnowledgeIn T. Childers (ed.), The Logica Yearbook, Czech Academy of Sciences. pp. 89-97. 1997.
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Against PhysicalismIn Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 479-484. 1995.
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |