•  108
    Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth (review) (review)
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2): 279-282. 2006.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of TruthCheryl MisakRobert B. Westbrook Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005. xvi + 246 pp.Robert Westbrook, who in my view is our best intellectual historian of pragmatism, has written what is sure to be a major contribution to the study of pragmatist political theory, a branch of political theory which has rec…Read more
  •  16
    Pragmatism and deflationism
    In New Pragmatists, Oxford University Press. pp. 68--90. 2007.
  •  13
    Judgement and Justification
    Philosophical Books 30 (2): 107-109. 1989.
  •  21
  •  10
    6 CS Peirce on Vital Matters1
    In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, Cambridge University Press. pp. 150. 2004.
  •  5
    Scientific realism, anti-realism, and empiricism
    In John R. Shook & Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism, Blackwell. 2006.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Pragmatism's Reputed Place in the Empiricist Tradition Peirce's Naturalist Account of Truth Pragmatism and Minimalism Experience: Physical, Mathematical, Metaphysical, and Moral.
  •  219
    Peirce, Levi, and the aims of inquiry
    Philosophy of Science 54 (2): 256-265. 1987.
    Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own "epistemological infallibilism". I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry
  •  24
    Narrative evidence and evidence‐based medicine
    Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2): 392-397. 2010.
  •  14
  •  66
    Cheryl Misak argues that truth ought to be reinstated to a central position in moral and political philosophy. She argues that the correct account of truth is one found in a certain kind of pragmatism: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve, a belief which would not be defeated by experience and argument. This account is not only an improvement on the views of central figures such as Rawls and Habermas, but it can also make sense of the idea that, despite conflict, pluralism, …Read more
  •  34
    Ramsey's Cognitivism: Truth, Ethics and the Meaning of Life
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78 251-263. 2016.
    Frank Ramsey is usually taken to be an emotivist or an expressivist about the good: he is usually taken to bifurcate inquiry into fact-stating and non-fact stating domains, ethics falling into the latter. In this paper I shall argue that whatever the very young Ramsey's view might have been, towards the end of his short life, he was coming to a through-going and objective pragmatism about all our beliefs, including those about the good, beauty, and even the meaning of life. Ethical beliefs are n…Read more
  •  56
    Klein on James on the Will to Believe
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1): 118-28. 2015.
    This commentary explores the disagreement between Alex Klein and Cheryl Misak about the core insights of American Pragmatism, against a background of agreement. Both take the history of early American pragmatism to be a vital part of the history of analytic philosophy, not a radical break with it. But Misak argues that James seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific belief can both be justified by a unitary set of evidentiary rules, and Klein argues that Jame…Read more
  • Frederick F. Schmitt, Truth: A Primer Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 15 (3): 209-211. 1995.
  •  20
    Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, a belief that works. The founders of pragmatism, Peirce and James, developed this idea in more and less objective ways. The standard story of the reception of American pragmatism in England is that Russell and Moore savaged James's theory, a…Read more
  •  41
    Truth and Objectivity (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3): 365-379. 1992.
  •  241
    The pragmatist view of politics is at its very heart epistemic, for it treats morals and politics as a kind of deliberation or inquiry, not terribly unlike other kinds of inquiry. With the exception of Richard Rorty, the pragmatists argue that morals and politics, like science, aim at the truth or at getting things right and that the best method for achieving this aim is a method they sometimes call the scientific method or the method of intelligence – what would now be termed deliberative democ…Read more
  •  163
    Pragmatism on solidarity, bullshit, and other deformities of truth
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 111-121. 2008.
    No Abstract
  • Pragmatism
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (3): 416-427. 2001.
  •  65
    Deflating Truth
    The Monist 81 (3): 407-425. 1998.
    It seems that no philosopher these days wants a theory of truth which can be accused of being metaphysical. But even if we agree that grandiose metaphysics is to be spurned, even if we agree that our theory of truth should be a deflated one, the controversy does not die down. A variety of deflationist options present themselves. Some, with Richard Rorty, take the notion of truth to be so wedded to metaphysics that we are advised to drop it altogether. Others, with Paul Horwich, take the disquota…Read more
  • C.F. Delaney, "Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce" (review)
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 29 (3): 457. 1993.
  •  35
    Review of T. L. short, Peirce's Theory of Signs (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7). 2007.
  •  52
    Pragmatism and Pluralism
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1). 2005.