University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  121
    Reply to Griffin, Raz, and wolf
    Utilitas 18 (4): 434-444. 2006.
    I am honored that Jim Griffin, Joseph Raz, and Susan Wolf, all of whose work I greatly admire, have thought my ideas on welfare and care worth engaging, and I am very grateful to them for doing so. Each has raised searching and difficult questions. Rather than attempting to respond to them seriatim, I propose to discuss the issues under three broad headings: questions about the concept of welfare, questions about care or sympathetic concern, and the question of whether welfare claims have agent-…Read more
  •  116
    Agent-centered restrictions from the inside out
    Philosophical Studies 50 (3). 1986.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  107
    Justice and Retaliation
    Philosophical Papers 39 (3): 315-341. 2010.
    Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized…Read more
  •  106
    Being With
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1). 2011.
    What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in one another's presence, where …Read more
  •  103
    Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2): 139-164. 1999.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http: //www.jstor.org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
  •  97
    Why Ethics is Part of Philosophy
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1 19-28. 1999.
    Ethics is frequently divided into three parts: metaethics, normative ethical theory, and the more specific normative ethics. However, only metaethics is explicitly philosophical insofar as it is concerned with fundamental questions about the content, objects, and status of ethical thought and discourse. During the heyday of conceptual analysis, philosophers were admonished to restrict themselves entirely to metaethics. Since, it was said, they lacked any special expertise as philosophers on norm…Read more
  •  91
    Self-Interest and Self-Concern
    Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1): 158. 1997.
    In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about her. First, however, a tale:…Read more
  •  86
    Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good
    Utilitas 12 (3): 291. 2000.
    Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational…Read more
  •  85
    Welfare and Rational Care
    Princeton University Press. 2002.
    What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people.Most philosophers have as…Read more
  •  84
    Eine Antwort auf Monika Betzier, Sebastian Rödl und Peter Schaber
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1): 173-179. 2009.
  •  83
    Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2): 213-238. 2012.
  •  78
    This book is a major work in the history of ethics, and provides the first study of early modern British philosophy in several decades. Professor Darwall discerns two distinct traditions feeding into the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the one hand, there is the empirical, naturalist tradition, comprising Hobbes, Locke, Cumberland, Hutcheson, and Hume, which argues that obligation is the practical force that empirical discoveries acquire in the process of deliber…Read more
  •  78
    Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (3): 296-325. 2012.
  •  77
    Motive and obligation in Hume's ethics
    Noûs 27 (4): 415-448. 1993.
    :Hume distinguishes natural obligation, the motive of self-interest, from moral obligation, the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. I argue that his discussion of justice makes use of a third notion, in addition to the other two: rule-obligation. For Hume, the just person regulates her conduct by mutually advantageous rules of justice. Rule-obligation is the notion she requires to express her acceptance of these rules in so regulating herself. I place these ideas in relation to Hume's o…Read more
  •  75
    Précis of Welfare and Rational Care
    Philosophical Studies 130 (3): 579-584. 2006.
  •  72
    The Development of Ethics
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1): 131-147. 2011.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  72
    Self-deception, autonomy, and moral constitution
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. pp. 407--430. 1988.
  •  72
    “Second-personal morality” and morality
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (5): 804-816. 2018.
  •  66
    Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1997.
    What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, …Read more
  •  62
    Hutcheson on Practical Reason
    Hume Studies 23 (1): 73-89. 1997.
    I describe the various ways in which Hume's critique of practical reason derives from Hutcheson and then consider a tension that arises between Hutcheson's (and Hume's) critique of noninstrumental reasons and his account of calm passions.
  •  52
    Rational agent, rational act
    Philosophical Topics 14 (2): 33-57. 1986.
  •  51
    Equal Freedom: selected Tanner lectures on human values
    University of Michigan Press. 1995.
    Issues at the major fault-line of political beliefs and debates.
  •  50
    Egoism and Morality
    In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, Oxford University Press. 2011.
    This article examines changes in the conception of morality and egoism in early modern Europe. It explains that the postulate that human beings were fractious, covetous, and endowed with a strong drive towards self-aggrandizement was associated with Thomas Hobbes, and his writings produced a strong counterflow in the form of assertions and demonstrations of altruism and benevolence as natural endowments of human beings. It suggests that the modern ethical thought has defined itself by its concer…Read more
  •  49
    Reply to Schapiro, smith/strabbing, and Yaffe (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 253-264. 2010.
  •  49
    Under Moore's Spell
    Utilitas 10 (3): 286. 1998.
    As David Wiggins points out, although Ross is best known for opposing Moore's consequentialism, Ross comes very close to capitulation to Moore when he accepts, as required by beneficence, a prima facie duty to maximize the good. I argue that what lies behind this is Ross's acceptance of Moore's doctrine of agent-neutral intrinsic value, a notion that is not required by, but is indeed is in tension with, beneficence as doing good to or for others