University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  47
    Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati (review)
    Philosophical Studies 130 (3). 2006.
  •  47
    Pleasure As Ultimate Good In Sidgwick’s Ethics
    The Monist 58 (3): 475-489. 1974.
    The notion of pleasure lies at the very heart of Sidgwick’s moral philosophy. For Sidgwick holds not merely that pleasure is a good, but that ultimately it is the only good. And hence it is the good of pleasure which grounds his utilitarianism.
  •  45
    Review of Skorupski's Ethical Explorations (review)
    Utilitas 14 (1): 113. 2002.
  •  44
    Valuing Activity
    Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1): 176. 1999.
    Call the proposition that the good life consists of excellent, distinctively human activity the Aristotelian Thesis. I think of a photograph I clipped from the New York Times as vividly depicting this claim. It shows a pianist, David Golub, accompanying two vocalists, Victoria Livengood and Erie Mills, at a tribute for Marilyn Home. All three artists are in fine form, exercising themselves at the height of their powers. The reason I saved the photo, however, is Mr. Golub's face. He is positively…Read more
  •  44
    How should ethics relate to (the rest of) philosophy? : Moore's legacy
    In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Southern Journal of Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-20. 2006.
  •  43
    Bi-polar obligation
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7 333. 2012.
  •  42
    The inventions of autonomy
    European Journal of Philosophy 7 (3). 1999.
    Book reviewed in this article:J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy
  •  41
    Desires, Reasons, and Causes
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 436-443. 2003.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
  •  39
    New model publishing
    with J. David Velleman
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 (14): 11-12. 2001.
  •  37
    On Schiffer’s Desires
    with Richard E. Grandy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 193-198. 1979.
  •  36
    Respect, Concern, and Membership
    In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 93-104. 2014.
  •  32
    The Social and the Sociable
    Philosophical Topics 42 (1): 201-217. 2014.
    Beginning from Kant’s famous idea that “unsociable sociability” stimulates human progress and civilization, the essay investigates Kant’s categories of the “unsociable” and the “sociable,” and argues that the fundamental difference between them is that the former presuppose a social perspective that is third personal, whereas the latter is always a second-personal affair, instantiated when people relate to one another in various ways, or manifest the disposition to do so. Kant’s “unsociable” att…Read more
  •  32
    Expressivist Relativism?Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 183-188. 1998.
  •  31
    Motive and Obligation in the British Moralists*: STEPHEN L. DARWALL
    Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1): 133-150. 1989.
    My aim in what follows is to sketch with a broad brush fundamental changes involving the concept of obligation in British ethics of the early modern period, as it developed in the direction of the view that obligatory force is a species of motivational force – an idea that deeply informs present thought. I shall also suggest, although I can hardly demonstrate it conclusively here, that one important source for this view was a doctrine which we associate with Kant, and which it may seem surprisin…Read more
  •  31
    On Sterba’s Argument from Rationality to Morality
    The Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 243-252. 2014.
    James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, …Read more
  •  31
    PLACE: PRESENCE AS SECOND-PERSONAL SPACE
    Journal of Ethical Reflections 1 (4): 7-16. 2021.
    The concept of place is ultimately a matter of ethical significance—of where something fits in a nexus or structure of meaning. Often this meaning is quite personal, involving a sense of presence we associate with a place. This essay investigates this connection through a study of Wordsworth’s poem, “Tintern Abbey.” It argues that the notion of a presence-infused place is ultimately that of a second-personal space. Presence is a matter of second-personal openness. Therefore, when presence i…Read more
  •  30
    Recognition, second-personal authority, and nonideal theory
    European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3): 562-574. 2021.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  30
    Morality and Principle
    In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 168. 2013.
  •  26
    Introduction
    Law and Philosophy 14 (1): 1-3. 1995.
  •  25
    Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
    Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 49-53. 2002.
  •  25
    Reply to Scheffler
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2). 1982.
  •  25
    Reply to Terzis
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1). 1988.
    George Terzis makes several objections to claims and arguments I advanced in Impartial Reason. I cannot take them all up, but I would like to respond to some, which I shall group into three: whether reasons depend on norms applying to all rational agents; how the unity of agency relates to such norms; and the self-support condition. Since the objections concerning cut most deeply against the central thesis of Impartial Reason, I shall begin with them. Before I do that, however, I should make som…Read more
  •  25
    The actor and the spectator
    Philosophia 7 (1): 197-203. 1977.
  •  25
    From Morality to Virtue and Back?From Morality to Virtue (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 695-701. 1994.
  •  25
    Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2). 1982.
    Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and conne…Read more