University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1972
CV
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  21
    Human Morality’s Authority
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4). 1995.
    A central theme of Samuel Scheffler’s impressive Human Morality is that “a considered view of the relation between morality and the individual” requires distinguishing frequently confused issues concerning morality’s content, scope, authority, and deliberative role, and appreciating interrelations among these. He suggests a nice example of the latter. Some are inclined to believe morality lacks the overriding authority others claim it to have because they assume that morality’s content is string…Read more
  •  57
    Pleasure as Ultimate Good in Sidgwick’s Ethics
    The Monist 58 (3): 475-489. 1974.
    The notion of pleasure lies at the very heart of Sidgwick’s moral philosophy. For Sidgwick holds not merely that pleasure is a good, but that ultimately it is the only good. And hence it is the good of pleasure which grounds his utilitarianism.
  •  5
    Responsibility within Relations
    In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  31
    From Morality to Virtue and Back? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 695-701. 1994.
  •  40
    On Schiffer’s Desires
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2): 193-198. 1979.
  •  48
    Desires, Reasons, and Causes
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 436-443. 2003.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, …Read more
  •  411
    Virtue Ethics (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2002.
    _ Virtue Ethics_ collects, for the first time, the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of virtue ethics approach to normative ethical theory. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative theory. Introduced by Stephen Darwall, this collection brings together classic and contemporary readings which define and advance the literature on virtue ethics. Includes six essays which respond to the classic sources. Inc…Read more
  •  43
    Morality and Principle
    In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 168. 2013.
  •  28
    Review: Smith's Moral Problem (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185). 1996.
  •  649
    Consequentialism (edited book)
    Blackwell. 2003.
    Consequentialism collects, for the first time, both the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of this important position. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
  •  28
    The Rejection of Consequentialism by Samuel Scheffler (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (4): 220-226. 1984.
  •  49
    Respect, Concern, and Membership
    In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 93-104. 2014.
  •  74
    The Development of Ethics
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1): 131-147. 2011.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  11
    How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy?: Moore's Legacy
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 1-20. 2003.
  •  21
    Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Action
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2). 1978.
    At least since Descartes's Meditations philosophers in the West have been concerned to defend the rationality of our beliefs from the threat of epistemological skepticism. The idea that there might be nothing which we know, or more radically, which we have even the slightest reason to believe, is one that many philosophers have thought to be deserving of serious attention. It seems somewhat odd, therefore, that there has not been similar attention given to what one might call practical skepticis…Read more
  •  178
    Abolishing morality
    Synthese 72 (1). 1987.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  45
    Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2). 1982.
    Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and conne…Read more
  •  26
    Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
    with Jean Hampton
    Philosophical Review 98 (3): 401. 1989.
  •  93
    Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good
    Utilitas 12 (3): 291. 2000.
    Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for his sake. I examine Sidgwick's defence of the axioms of rational…Read more
  •  2
    New model publishing
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 11-12. 2001.
  •  50
    Reply to Schapiro, smith/strabbing, and Yaffe (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 253-264. 2010.
  •  36
    Expressivist Relativism? (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 183-188. 1998.
  •  5
    This chapter contains sections titled: Kantian Practical Presupposition Arguments The Second‐Personal Aspect of Moral Obligation and Equal Dignity Kant's Argument for the Moral Law in Groundwork III Bibliography.
  •  161
  •  394
    The value of autonomy and autonomy of the will
    Ethics 116 (2): 263-284. 2006.
    It is a commonplace that ‘autonomy’ has several different senses in contemporary moral and political discussion. The term’s original meaning was political: a right assumed by states to administer their own affairs. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘autonomy’ came (in English) to refer also to the conduct of individuals, and even then there were, as now, different meanings.1 Odd as it may seem from our perspective, one that was in play from the beginning was Kant’s notion of “autonomy…Read more
  •  86
    Motive and obligation in Hume's ethics
    Noûs 27 (4): 415-448. 1993.
    :Hume distinguishes natural obligation, the motive of self-interest, from moral obligation, the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation. I argue that his discussion of justice makes use of a third notion, in addition to the other two: rule-obligation. For Hume, the just person regulates her conduct by mutually advantageous rules of justice. Rule-obligation is the notion she requires to express her acceptance of these rules in so regulating herself. I place these ideas in relation to Hume's o…Read more