•  2
    On Phenomenology as a Methodology of Philosophy
    In Wolfe Mays & Stuart C. Brown (eds.), Linguistic analysis and phenomenology, Bucknell University Press. pp. 241--255. 1972.
  •  216
    Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma
    Noûs 35 (s1): 268-299. 2001.
    Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend t…Read more
  •  14
    'A Definition of Physicalism ', Analysis, Vol. 53, 1993, pp. 213-23. 'A Problem for Expressivists ' (with Frank Jackson), Analysis, Vol. 58, 1998, pp. 239-51. 'A Sensible Perspectivism ' in Maria Baghramian and Attracta Ingram, eds., Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity , New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 60-82.
  • Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice
    with John Braithwaite
    Mind 100 (3): 379-381. 1991.
  •  496
    Group agency and supervenience
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1): 85-105. 2006.
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must “supervene” on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on th…Read more
  •  32
    The Paradox of Loyalty
    American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2). 1988.
  •  230
    A Republican Law of Peoples
    European Journal of Political Theory 9 (1): 70-94. 2010.
    Assuming that states will remain a permanent feature of our world, what is the ideal that we should hold out for the international order? An attractive proposal is that those peoples that are already organized under non-dominating, representative states should pursue a twin goal: first, arrange things so that they each enjoy the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in relation to one another and to other multi-national and international agencies; and second, do everything possible and p…Read more
  •  65
    He has an astonishing range, and in this book he expands it still further. More than a mere introduction, Made with Words offers a coherent and well-argued picture of most of the main components of Hobbes's wide-ranging philosophy.
  •  5
    Reply to Christman
    Philosophical Books 37 (2): 98-101. 1996.
  •  249
    Freedom in the market
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2): 131-149. 2006.
    The market is traditionally hailed as the very exemplar of a system under which people enjoy freedom, in particular the negative sort of freedom associated with liberal and libertarian thought: freedom as noninterference. But how does the market appear from the perspective of a rival conception of freedom (freedom as non-domination) that is linked with the Roman and neo-Roman tradition of republicanism? The republican conception of freedom argues for important normative constraints on property, …Read more
  • The doctrinal paradox
    Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. forthcoming.
  •  45
    Akrasia, collective and individual
    In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality, Oxford University Press. pp. 68--97. 2003.
    Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of agency. This image fits well wit…Read more
  •  210
    Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency
    Dialectica 61 (4): 495-519. 2007.
    The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation show that under a range o…Read more
  •  4
    Frontmatter
    In Philip Pettit & Christopher Hookway (eds.), Handlung Und Interpretation: Studien Zur Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften, De Gruyter. 1982.
  •  177
    The Cunning of Trust
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3): 202-225. 1995.
  •  177
    1 A New Departure 'No commanding work of political theory has appeared in the 20th century.' So said Isaiah Berlin, writing in 1962 . ...
  •  168
    Keeping Republican Freedom Simple
    Political Theory 30 (3): 339-356. 2002.
    There has recently been a good deal of interest in the republican tradition, particularly in the political conception of freedom maintained within that tradition. I look here at the characterisation of republican liberty in a recent work of Quentin Skinner1and argue on historical and conceptual grounds for a small amendment—a simplification—that would make it equivalent to the view that freedom in political contexts should be identified with nondomination.
  •  131
    Winch’s double-edged idea of a social science
    History of the Human Sciences 13 (1): 63-77. 2000.
    Peter Winch’s 1958 book The Idea of a Social Science contains two distinguishable sets of theses, one set bearing on the individual-level understanding of human beings, the other on the society-level understanding of the regularities and institutions to which human beings give rise. The first set of claims is persuasive and significant but the second is a mixed bunch: none is well established and only some are sound
  •  17
    Rights, constraints and trumps
    Analysis 46 (4): 8-14. 1986.
  •  53
    Preference, Deliberation and Satisfaction
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 131-154. 2006.
    In his famous lecture on ‘The Concept of Preference’ Amartya Sen (1982) opened up the topic of preference and preference-satisfaction to critical, philosophical debate. He pointed out that preference in the sense in which choice reveals one’s preference need not be preference in the sense in which people are personally better off for having their preferences satisfied. And on the basis of that observation he built a powerful critique of some common assumptions in welfare economics.
  •  47
    Two Sources of Morality
    Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 102. 2001.
    This essay emerges from consideration of a question in the epistemology of ethics or morality. This is not the common claim-centered question as to how moral claims are confirmed and whether their mode of confirmation gives us grounds to be confident about the prospects for ethical discourse. Instead, I am concerned with the less frequently posed concept-centered question of where in human experience moral terms or concepts are grounded — that is, where in experience the moral becomes salient to…Read more
  •  2
    Review (review)
    Theory and Decision 12 (2): 207-214. 1980.