•  51
    Defining and defending social holism
    Philosophical Explorations 1 (3). 1998.
    This paper offers a definition of social holism that makes the doctrine non-trivial but possibly true. According to that definition, the social holist maintains that people depend non-causally on interaction with one another for possession of the capacity to think; the thesis is meant to be a contingent truth but one, like physicalism, that is plausible in the light of some a priori argument and some plausible empirical assumptions. The paper also sketches an argument in support of social holism…Read more
  •  6
    Reviews (review)
    with Heinz Skala and John Ferejohn
    Theory and Decision 8 (4): 395-414. 1977.
  •  96
    Pettit presents a selection of essays touching upon metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and the theory of rational regulation. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behavior.
  •  25
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  •  99
    Two Construals of Scanlon’s Contractualism
    with T. M. Scanlon
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (3): 148-164. 2000.
  •  82
  •  42
    Corporate Responsibility Revisited
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 38 (2): 159-176. 2009.
    This paper responds to four commentaries on “Responsibility Incorporated”, restating, revising, and expanding on existing work. In particular, it looks again at a set of issues related primarily to responsibility at the individual level; it reconsiders responsibility at the corporate level; it examines the connection of this discussion to issues of responsibility in law and politics
  •  33
    What price fame? Tyler Cowen, Harvard university press, 2000, 248 pages (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 17 (2): 275-294. 2001.
  • Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice
    with John Braithwaite
    Law and Philosophy 10 (2): 221-234. 1991.
  •  76
    Rational choice, functional selection and empty black boxes
    Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1): 33-57. 2000.
    In order to vindicate rational-choice theory as a mode of explaining social patterns in general - social patterns beyond the narrow range of economic behaviour - we have to recognize the legitimacy of explaining the resilience of certain patterns of behaviour: that is, explaining, not necessarily why they emerged or have been sustained, but why they are robust and reliable. And once we allow the legitimacy of explaining resilience, then we can see how functionalist theory may also serve us well …Read more
  •  16
    Free Riding and Foul Dealing
    Journal of Philosophy 83 (7): 361. 1986.
  •  137
    The recent debates about the nature of social freedom, understood in a broadly negative way, have generated three main views of the topic: these represent freedom respectively as non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination. The participants in these debates often go different ways, however, because they address different topics under common names, not because they hold different intuitions on common topics. Social freedom is sometimes understood as option-freedom, sometimes as agency-fre…Read more
  •  68
    The basic liberties
    In Matthew H. Kramer (ed.), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    We have two ways of talking about liberty or freedom, one in the singular, the other in the plural. We concern ourselves in the singular mode with how far someone is free to do or not to do certain things, or with how far someone is a free person or not a free person. But, equally, we concern ourselves with the plural question as to how far the person enjoys the liberties that we take to be important or basic. What are those plural liberties, however? What does it take for something to count as …Read more
  •  43
    Terms, things and response-dependence
    European Review of Philosophy 3 55-66. 1998.
  •  29
    Mind 109 (435): 640-644. 2000.
    The long republican tradition is characterized by a conception of freedom as non‐domination, which offers an alternative, both to the negative view of freedom as non‐interference and to the positive view of freedom as self‐mastery. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of the conception, displays its many attractions and makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part of the book looks at the sorts of political and civil institution…Read more
  •  49
    Functional explanation and virtual selection
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2): 291-302. 1996.
    Invoking its social function can explain why we find a certain functional trait or institution only if we can identify a mechanism whereby the playing of the function connects with the explanandum. That is the main claim in the missing-mechanism critique of functionalism. Is it correct? Yes, if functional explanation is meant to make sense of the actual presence of the trait or institution. No, if it is meant to make sense of why the trait or institution is resilient: why we can rely on it to su…Read more
  •  140
    In a recent discussion of Amartya Sen's concept of the capabilities of people for functioning in their society – and the idea of targeting people's functioning capabilities in evaluating the society – G. A. Cohen accuses Sen of espousing an inappropriate, ‘athletic’ image of the person (Cohen, 1993, pp. 24–5). The idea is that if Sen's formulations are to be taken at face value, then life is valuable only so far as people actively choose most facets of their existence: if they fare well in the m…Read more
  •  1
    Judging Justice: An Introduction to Contemporary Political Philosophy
    Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125): 377-378. 1981.
  •  59
  •  31
    Trust, Reliance, and the Internet1
    In M. J. van den Joven & J. Weckert (eds.), Analyse & Kritik, Cambridge University Press. pp. 161. 2004.
    Trusting someone in an intuitive, rich sense of the term involves not just relying on that person, but manifesting reliance on them in the expectation that this manifestation of reliance will increase their reason and motive to prove reliable. Can trust between people be formed on the basis of Internet contact alone? Forming the required expectation in regard to another person, and so trusting them on some matter, may be due to believing that they are trustworthy; to believing that they seek est…Read more
  •  55
    Parmenides and Sartre
    Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 17 (n/a): 161-184. 1968.
    As the first ontologist, Parmenides has a special place in the history of philosophy, not only because of his originality, but also because of the greatness of his particular attempt in the philosophy of being. His stature is such that any later attempt in the inquiry into being must measure itself against his achievement. His famous philosophical poem, which we have in fragments, is a permanent challenge to later philosophers. Thus Plato could describe Parmenides as ‘a man to be respected and a…Read more
  •  3
    Prisons, Politicians and Democracy
    In Joseph Dunne, Attracta Ingram, Frank Litton & Fergal O'Connor (eds.), Questioning Ireland: Debates in Political Philosophy and Public Policy, Institute of Public Administration. pp. 155. 2000.
  • Democracia y evaluaciones compartidas
    Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 23 51-58. 2005.
  •  17
    Inference and information
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 727. 1987.
  •  38
    The Inescapability of Consequentialism
    In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 41. 2012.