•  137
    The Cunning of Trust
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3): 202-225. 1995.
  •  37
    Two Sources of Morality
    Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2): 102. 2001.
    This essay emerges from consideration of a question in the epistemology of ethics or morality. This is not the common claim-centered question as to how moral claims are confirmed and whether their mode of confirmation gives us grounds to be confident about the prospects for ethical discourse. Instead, I am concerned with the less frequently posed concept-centered question of where in human experience moral terms or concepts are grounded — that is, where in experience the moral becomes salient to…Read more
  • Review (review)
    Theory and Decision 12 (2): 207-214. 1980.
  •  121
    Non-consequentialism and universalizability
    Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199): 175-190. 2000.
    If non-consequentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance. Not only will they say, in familiar vein, that the premises adduced in moral argument may be only agent-relative in force, that is, may involve the use of an indexical – as in the consideration that this or that option would advance my commitments, discharge my duty, or benefit my children – and may provide reasons only for the indexically relevant agent,…Read more
  •  111
    Depoliticizing Democracy
    Ratio Juris 17 (1): 52-65. 2004.
    It is now widely accepted as an ideal that democracy should be as deliberative as possible. Democracy should not involve a tussle between different interest groups or lobbies in which the numbers matter more than the arguments. And it should not be a system in which the only arguments that matter are those that voters conduct in an attempt to determine where their private or sectional advantage lies. Democracy, it is said, should promote public deliberation among citizens and authorities as to w…Read more
  •  3
    Pettit, P.-The Common Mind
    with John Christman
    Philosophical Books 37 90-101. 1996.
  •  3
  •  212
    A Republican Law of Peoples
    European Journal of Political Theory 9 (1): 70-94. 2010.
    Assuming that states will remain a permanent feature of our world, what is the ideal that we should hold out for the international order? An attractive proposal is that those peoples that are already organized under non-dominating, representative states should pursue a twin goal: first, arrange things so that they each enjoy the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in relation to one another and to other multi-national and international agencies; and second, do everything possible and p…Read more
  • The power of a democratic public
    In Reiko Gotoh & Paul Dumouchel (eds.), Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
  •  54
    Political Liberalism by John Rawls (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 215-220. 1994.
  •  95
    If language is to serve the basic purpose of communicating our attitudes, we must be constructed so as to form beliefs in those propositions that we truthfully assert on the basis of careful assent. Thus, other things being equal, I can rely on believing those things to which I give my careful assent. And so my ability to assent or dissent amounts to an ability to make up my mind about what I believe. This capacity, in tandem with a similar capacity in respect of other attitudes, supports three …Read more
  •  75
    Construing Sen on commitment
    Economics and Philosophy 21 (1): 15-32. 2005.
    Why does Sen maintain that people are capable of putting their own goals offline and deliberating and acting out of sheer commitment to others? How can he endorse such a rejection of the belief-desire model of agency? The paper canvasses three explanations and favors one that ascribes an unusual position to Sen: the belief that so far as agents remain in the belief-desire mould, they cannot deliberate on the basis of reasons other than those that derive from standing goals that form an integrate…Read more
  •  20
    Esteem, Identifiability, and the Internet1
    In M. J. van den Joven & J. Weckert (eds.), Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 175. 2008.
  •  109
    Substantive moral theory
    Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 1-27. 2008.
    Philosophy can serve two roles in relation to moral thinking: first, to provide a meta-ethical commentary on the nature of moral thought, as the methodology or the philosophy of science provides a commentary on the nature of scientific thought; and second, to build on the common presumptions deployed in people's moral thinking about moral issues, looking for a substantive moral theory that they might support. The present essay addresses the nature of this second role; illustrates it with substan…Read more
  •  23
    Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal
    Social Research: An International Quarterly 64. 1997.
  •  33
    Akrasia, collective and individual
    In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 68--97. 2003.
    Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of agency. This image fits well wit…Read more
  •  142
    In Hobbes, freedom of choice requires nonfrustration: the option you prefer must be accessible. In Berlin, it requires noninterference: every option, preferred or unpreferred, must be accessible—every door must be open. But Berlin’s argument against Hobbes suggests a parallel argument that freedom requires something stronger still: that each option be accessible and that no one have the power to block access; the doors should be open, and there should be no powerful doorkeepers. This is freedom …Read more
  • Liberty and Liberties
    In Matthew Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn & Antony Hatzistavrou (eds.), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
  •  43
    I approach these questions in the step-by-step, unnuanced manner of the philosopher. In the first section, I characterise the republican tradition in its broad historical sweep, drawing on an earlier book on republicanism, and then, in the second section, I give an account of what the system of culture should be..
  •  5
    Review: Slote on Consequentialism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144). 1986.
  •  38
    The Determinacy of Republican Policy: A Reply to McMahon
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3): 275-283. 2006.
  •  26
    J. J. C. Smart AC
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4): 825-826. 2012.
  •  119
    Consequentialism and moral psychology
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1). 1994.
    Consequentialism ought not to make an impact, explicit or implicit, on every decision. All it ought generally to enjoy is what I describe as a virtual presence in the deliberation that produces decisions. [...] The argument that we have conducted suggests that the virtuous agent ought in general to remain faithful to his or her instincts and ingrained habits, only occasionally breaking with them in the name of promoting the best consequences.
  •  7
    Mind 100 (400): 622-626. 1991.
  • Robert Nozick, "Anarchy, State and Utopia" (review)
    Theory and Decision 8 (4): 399. 1977.
  • Embracing objectivity in ethics
    In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals, Cambridge University Press. pp. 234--86. 2001.