Philip Pettit

University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of consistency and rationality in adequate measure. The main discovery in the recent theory of group agency is that this result is not easily achieved; no regular voting procedure will ensure, for example, that a group of individually consistent agents will display consistency in group judgments. Key Words: groups • group agents • collective agents • joint action • joint intention.

We respond to Mark van Roojen's discussion of our 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', "Philosophical Quarterly", 45 (January, 1995): 20-40. There we assumed that ethical language makes claims about how things are and sought to make plausible under this assumption a view of moral language modelled on David Lewis's treatment of theoretical terms. Van Roojen finds the idea of treating ethical terms as theoretical terms attractive but doubts that we 'have succeeded in offering a reduction of evaluative properties to natural properties'. Our reply turns on what we learn from the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive

The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to Locke 1689 and beyond, and is best known to contemporary philosophers through the work of Grice 1957 and Lewis 1969. It is that we (usually implicitly) agreed, as a matter of contingent fact, to use ‘x is square’ as a way of conveying our taking it to be the case that x is square.

In his most recent book, Philip Pettit presents and defends a “republican” political philosophy that stems from a tradition that includes Cicero, Machiavelli, James Harrington, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Madison. The book provides an interpretation of what is distinctive about republicanism—namely, Pettit claims, its notion of freedom as nondomination. He sketches the history of this notion, and he argues that it entails a unique justification of certain political arrangements and the virtues of citizenship that would make those arrangements possible. Of historical and philosophical interest, he stresses, is the fundamental contrast between freedom as nondomination and slavery. Joseph Priestly, for instance, invoked this contrast in defending the cause of the American Revolution, and in 1769 declared, incredibly, that if the parliament of Great Britain continued to tax the American colonies, “the colonists will be reduced to a state of as complete servitude, as any people of which there is an account in history”. Those opposed to American independence, among them Jeremy Bentham, relied instead on a Hobbesian notion of freedom as noninterference, using it to argue that the colonists were no more interfered with by the British government than were citizens of Britain. Drawing out this contrast, Pettit aims to establish that a republican view of freedom better supports the institutions of a constitutional democracy than does liberalism. His account of the distinguishing characteristics and strengths of republicanism is, however, only partially successful. Neither his case that a republican notion of freedom provides for a more solid defense of democratic institutions and constitutional protections than is available within liberalism, nor his argument that republicanism can better address “private” injustices, is convincing.

Rationality, Symbolism and EvolutionThe Nature of Rationality By Robert Nozick Princeton University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 226. ISBN 0–691–07424–0. £19.95No Nonsense RightsThe Realm of Rights By Judith Jarvis Thomson Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. viii + 383. ISBN 0–674–74948–0. £27.95.In Search of the Common MindThe Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics By Philip Pettit Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. xvi + 365. ISBN 0–19–507818–7. £30.In elucidation of the common mind: a reply to Raimo TuomelaRealism, Pure and Simple? A Reply to Timothy Williamson.

Artykuł jest poświęcony trzem poglądom na temat demokracji, często przyjmowanym przez współczesnych decydentów, politologów i teoretyków polityki. Poglądy te, w mojej opinii, są błędne, ale błędne w sposób pouczający. Ukazują one bowiem poważne niezrozumienie natury i walorów demokracji. Jeśli uświadomimy sobie, dlaczego są one błędne, dostrzeżemy istnienie tych wymiarów demokracji, które zwykle łatwo umykają naszej uwadze. Do nazwania tych błędów używam nazwisk wybitnych myślicieli, którzy je popełnili. Pierwszy z nich określam błędem Berlina, odnajduję go bowiem w dorobku brytyjskiego myśliciela rosyjskiego pochodzenia, Isaiaha Berlina. Drugi z nich określam błędem Schumpetera, nazywając go na cześć amerykańskiego bankowca, ekonomisty i myśliciela politycznego austriackiego pochodzenia, Josepha Schumpetera. Trzeci określam mianem błędu Rikera, przypisując go Williamowi Rikerowi, amerykańskiemu politologowi, znanemu ze swojego rozróżnienia między liberalizmem a populizmem.

Having a self means being able think of myself under a certain profile that that is me: that is who I am, that is how I am. But if I raise the question as to who or how I am, there are three salient profiles in which I can cast myself, three selves with which we can identify. I can see myself just as an agent identified over time by the linkages between my experiences, my attitudes and my actions. I can see myself as the persona that I invite others to rely on and that, if sincere, I internalize. And I can see myself as the figure I cut in other people's eyes, whether or not I welcome that image. Such ambiguities help explain the complexity in philosophical discussion of the self as well as the conflict in everyday exhortations to be ourselves and know ourselves, yet also to forget ourselves and lose ourselves.