•  297
    The semantic stance of scientific entity realism
    Philosophia 24 (3-4): 405-415. 1995.
    The paper examines the role played by the notion of truth in the version of scientific realism known as scientific entity realism. Scientific entity realism is the thesis that the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories are real. As such, it is an ontological thesis about the existence of certain entities. By contrast, scientific realism is often characterised as a thesis primarily involving the truth of theories. Sometimes scientific realism is expressed as the thesis that theor…Read more
  •  294
    Lakatosian Particularism
    Logos and Episteme 9 (1): 49-59. 2018.
    This paper explores a particularist element in the theory of method of Imre Lakatos, who appealed to the value-judgements of élite scientists in the appraisal of competing theories of method. The role played by such value-judgements is strongly reminiscent of the epistemological particularism of Roderick Chisholm. Despite the existence of a clear parallel between the particularist approaches of both authors, it is argued that Lakatos’s approach is subject to a weakness that does not affect the…Read more
  •  289
    Incommensurability
    In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge. pp. 370-373. 2006.
    This is a short introductory discussion of the idea of incommensurability as it is used in the philosophy of science.
  •  285
    Scientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesis
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 196-202. 2009.
    This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to scientific realism by the semantic incommensurability thesis. A twofold distinction is drawn between methodological and semantic incommensurability, and between semantic incommensurability due to variation of sense and due to discontinuity of reference. Only the latter presents a challenge to scientific realism. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued in the author’s 1994 book, Th…Read more
  •  270
    Some Reflections on Experimental Incommensurability
    In Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (eds.), Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison, Springer. pp. 341-347. 2008.
    This is a comment on Lena Soler's 'The Incommensurability of Experimental Practices'
  •  266
    Paul Feyerabend: The tyranny of science (review)
    Metascience 21 (2): 471-476. 2011.
    This is an essay review of Paul Feyerabend's book, The Tyranny of Science.
  •  263
    Markus Seidel: Epistemic relativism: A constructive critique (review)
    Metascience 24 (2): 265-269. 2014.
    Traditional epistemology is haunted by the spectre of scepticism. Yet the more pressing concern in the contemporary intellectual scene must surely be relativism rather than scepticism. This has been the case in the history and philosophy of science since the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, to say nothing of the emergence of the sociology of scientific knowledge. In Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Markus Seidel comes firmly to grips with this modern spectre. Though Seidel …Read more
  •  260
    In defence of untranslatability
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1). 1990.
    This paper addresses criticisms of the concept of untranslatability which Davidson and Putnam have raised against the incommensurability thesis.
  •  253
    Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth? Reply to Mizrahi
    Logos and Episteme 10 (4): 445-447. 2019.
    This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.
  •  243
    The language of science: Meaning variance and theory comparison
    Language Sciences 22 (2): 117-136. 2000.
    The paper gives an overview of key themes of twentieth century philosophical treatment of the language of science, with special emphasis on the meaning variance of scientific terms and the comparison of alternative theories. These themes are dealt with via discussion of the topics of: (a) the logical positivist principle of verifiability and the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms, (b) the postpositivist thesis of semantic incommensurability, and (c) the scientific realist response to in…Read more
  •  242
    Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 182-190. 2012.
    This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of co…Read more
  •  237
    How Not To Know The Principle of Induction
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (3): 243-254. 2021.
    In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction”. Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since …Read more
  •  237
    The Scope and Multidimensionality of the Scientific Realism Debate
    with Dimitri Ginev
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2): 263-283. 2011.
    At stake in the classical realism-debate is the clash between realist and anti-realist positions. In recent years, the classical form of this debate has undergone a double transformation. On the one hand, the champions of realism began to pay more attention to the interpretative dimensions of scientific research. On the other hand, anti-realists of various sorts realized that the rejection of the hypostatization of a “reality out there” does not imply the denial of working out a philosophically …Read more
  •  227
    The semantic stance of scientific entity realism [Corrigenda]
    Philosophia 25 (3-4): 481-482. 1997.
    These are the footnotes for the article which was published in Philosophia Vol 24 1995, pp. 405-415
  •  213
    K. Brad Wray: Interpreting Kuhn: Critical Essays (review)
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 12 (1): 311-314. 2022.
    This is a book review of Brad Wray (ed.) Interpreting Kuhn: Critical Essays.
  •  212
    Induction and Natural Kinds
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (2): 239-254. 1997.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds o…Read more
  •  206
    The Twofold Objectivity of Truth
    Filozofia Nauki 31 (1): 1-9. 2023.
    Truth about matters of fact is objective. This is not just because truth is objective. It is also because facts are objective. An objective fact makes an assertion of that fact true. The objectivity of the fact adds a further element of objectivity to the objective truth of the assertion. True assertions of fact are true because truth is objective and because the facts that make them true are objective. True assertions of fact are objective twice over. Their objectivity is twofold. Or, a…Read more
  •  203
    Brian Ellis Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich Truth (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169): 496. 1992.
    Review of Brian Ellis's Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich's Truth.
  •  202
    Translation and languagehood
    Philosophia 21 (3-4): 335-337. 1992.
    According to one influential view, something which we might have reason to think is a language, is not proven to be such until it has been translated. I will try to show, to the contrary, that it is necessary to appeal to factors which are independent of translation in order to establish that it is indeed a language which has been translated in the first place. If this is right, it follows that proof of languagehood, so far from depending on translation, is in fact logically prior to translatio…Read more
  •  201
    Robert Nola as I remember him
    Metascience 32 (1): 3-5. 2023.
    The New Zealand philosopher, Robert Nola (1940-2022), has died. He was a kind man, a good friend, and a fine philosopher. Here is how I remember him.
  •  199
  •  196
    Incommensurability, translation and understanding
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 414-426. 1991.
    This paper addresses the issue of how it is possible to understand the language of an incommensurable theory. The aim is to defend the idea of translation failure against the objection that it incoherently precludes understanding.
  •  194
    Incommensurability: An Overview
    Divinatio 10 135-48. 1999.
    Opening remarks delivered at "Incommensurability (and related matters)" conference, Hanover, June 1999
  •  192
    James Franklin: What science knows and how it knows it (review)
    Metascience 19 (2): 289-292. 2010.
    This is a review of James Franklin's book, What Science Knows and How It Know It.
  •  191
    Scientific Realism And The Inevitability Of Science
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2): 259-264. 2008.
    This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate…Read more
  •  189
    Alan Musgrave is one of the foremost contemporary defenders of scientific realism. He is also one of the leading exponents of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist philosophy. In this paper, my main focus will be on Musgrave’s realism. However, I will emphasize epistemological aspects of realism. This will lead me to address aspects of his critical rationalism as well.
  •  189
    Scientific Realism and the God’s Eye Point of View
    Epistemologia 27 (2): 211-226. 2003.
    According to scientific realism, the aim of science is to discover the truth about both observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent, objective reality, which we inhabit. It has been objected by Putnam and others that such a metaphysically realist position presupposes a God’s Eye point of view, of which no coherent sense can be made. In this paper, I will argue for two claims. First, scientific realism does not require the adoption of a God’s Eye point of view. Instead, scientific…Read more
  •  184
    This is a book review of Vasso Kindi and Theodore Arabatzis (Eds.), Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited.
  •  183
    This is an essay review of W. J. Devlin and A. Bokulich (eds.) Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions 50 years on