•  1273
    Kuhn, Relativism and Realism
    In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, Routledge. pp. 72-83. 2018.
    The aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between Kuhn’s views about science and scientific realism. I present an overview of key features of Kuhn’s model of scientific change. The model suggests a relativistic approach to the methods of science. I bring out a conflict between this relativistic approach and a realist approach to the norms of method. I next consider the question of progress and truth. Kuhn’s model is a problem-solving model that proceeds by way of puzzles and an…Read more
  •  932
    Subject and Object in Scientific Realism
    In Paula Angelova, Jassen Andreev & Emil Lensky (eds.), Das Interpretative Universum, Konigshausen & Neumann. pp. 293-306. 2017.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between the subject and the object from the perspective of scientific realism. I first characterize the scientific realist position that I adopt. I then address the question of the nature of scientific knowledge from a realist point of view. Next I consider the question of how to locate the knowing subject within the context of scientific realism. After that I consider the place of mind in an objective world. I close with some general remarks on the…Read more
  •  43
    Over-Measurement
    with K. R. Sawyer and R. Lombardo
    Measurement 93 379-384. 2016.
    Measurement is a special type of evaluation that is more exact than either opinion or estimation. In the social sciences, in particular, most evaluations are not measures, but rather mixtures of opinion and estimation. Over-measurement represents anchoring to evaluations which are not measures. For an over-measured characteristic, single measures are used when instead a portfolio of possible measures should be used. There are three implications. First, measurements of characteristics which depen…Read more
  •  88
  •  634
    Ciencia, Sentido Comun Y Realidad
    Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (16): 41-58. 2010.
    ¿La ciencia otorga conocimiento de la realidad? En este artículo ofrezco una respuesta positiva a esta pregunta. Rechazo la pretensión anti-realista según la cual somos incapaces de adquirir conocimiento de la realidad; al contrario, apoyo la visión realista que afirma que la ciencia produce conocimiento del mundo externo. Pero: ¿cuál mundo es ese? Algunos sostienen que la ciencia conduce a la superación de nuestra visión del mundo dada por el sentido común. El sentido común es la “metafísica de…Read more
  •  311
    This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the…Read more
  •  145
    Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 223-232. 1991.
    In his early work Feyerabend argues that certain theories are incommensurable due to semantic variance. In this paper it is argued that Feyerabend relies on a description theory of reference in the course of his argument for incommensurability and in his analysis of the relevant kind of semantic variance. Against this it is objected that such reliance on the description theory eliminates ostensive reference determination and obscures the presence of theoretical conflict.
  •  202
    Translation and languagehood
    Philosophia 21 (3-4): 335-337. 1992.
    According to one influential view, something which we might have reason to think is a language, is not proven to be such until it has been translated. I will try to show, to the contrary, that it is necessary to appeal to factors which are independent of translation in order to establish that it is indeed a language which has been translated in the first place. If this is right, it follows that proof of languagehood, so far from depending on translation, is in fact logically prior to translatio…Read more
  •  89
    A Dialogue on Scientific Rationality
    Cogito 5 (3): 135-140. 1991.
  •  437
    Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism
    Social Epistemology 29 (4): 395-412. 2015.
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the …Read more
  •  15
    Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism (edited book)
    with Alexander Bird and Brian David Ellis
    Routledge. 2013.
    While the phrase "metaphysics of science" has been used from time to time, it has only recently begun to denote a specific research area where metaphysics meets philosophy of science—and the sciences themselves. The essays in this volume demonstrate that metaphysics of science is an innovative field of research in its own right. The principle areas covered are: The modal metaphysics of properties: What is the essential nature of natural properties? Are all properties essentially categorical? Are…Read more
  •  376
    Realism, method and truth
    In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism, Ashgate. pp. 64-81. 2002.
    What is the relation between method and truth? Are we justified in accepting a theory that satisfies the rules of scientific method as true? Such questions divide realism from anti-realism in the philosophy of science. Scientific realists take the methods of science to promote the realist aim of correspondence truth. Anti-realists either claim that the methods of science promote lesser epistemic goals than realist truth, or else they reject the realist conception of truth altogether. In this pap…Read more
  •  305
    This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory c…Read more
  •  143
  •  734
    Kuhn's changing concept of incommensurability
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4): 759-774. 1993.
    Since 1962 Kuhn's concept of incommensurability has undergone a process of transformation. His current account of incommensurability has little in common with his original account of it. Originally, incommensurability was a relation of methodological, observational and conceptual disparity between paradigms. Later Kuhn restricted the notion to the semantical sphere and assimilated it to the indeterminacy of translation. Recently he has developed an account of it as localized translation failure …Read more
  •  120
    How the epistemic relativist may use the sceptic’s strategy: A reply to Markus Seidel
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1): 140-144. 2013.
    This paper is a response to an objection that Markus Seidel has made to my analysis of epistemic relativism. Seidel argues that the epistemic relativist is unable to base a relativist account of justification on the sceptical problem of the criterion in the way that I have suggested in earlier work. In response to Seidel, I distinguish between weak and strong justification, and argue that all the relativist needs is weak justification. In addition, I explain my reasons for employing the idiom of…Read more
  •  1319
    The Incommensurability Thesis
    Taylor and Francis. 1994.
    This book presents a critical analysis of the semantic incommensurability thesis of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. In putting forward the thesis of incommensurability, Kuhn and Feyerabend drew attention to complex issues concerning the phenomenon of conceptual change in science. They raised serious problems about the semantic and logical relations between the content of theories which deploy unlike systems of concepts. Yet few of the more extreme claims associated with incommensurability st…Read more
  •  332
    Descartes's Language Test and Ape Language Research
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2): 111-123. 2010.
    Some philosophers (e.g. Descartes) argue that there is an evidential relationship between language and thought, such that presence of language is indicative of mind. Recent language acquisition research with apes such as chimpanzees and bonobos attempts to demonstrate the capacity of these primates to acquire at least rudimentary linguistic capacity. This paper presents a case study of the ape language research and explores the consequences of the research with respect to the argument that ani…Read more
  •  3574
    Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The bo…Read more
  •  917
    This book concentrates on three topics: the problem of the semantic incommensurability of theories; the non-algorithmic character of rational scientific theory choice and naturalised accounts of the rationality of methodological change. The underlying aim is to show how the phenomenon of extensive conceptual and methodological variation in science need not give rise to a thorough-going epistemic or conceptual relativism.
  •  266
    Paul Feyerabend: The tyranny of science (review)
    Metascience 21 (2): 471-476. 2011.
    This is an essay review of Paul Feyerabend's book, The Tyranny of Science.
  •  1101
    Reference, Success and Entity Realism
    Kairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 5 31-42. 2012.
    The paper discusses the version of entity realism presented by Ian Hacking in his book, Representing and Intervening. Hacking holds that an ontological form of scientific realism, entity realism, may be defended on the basis of experimental practices which involve the manipulation of unobservable entities. There is much to be said in favour of the entity realist position that Hacking defends, especially the pragmatist orientation of his approach to realism. But there are problems with the pos…Read more
  • Introduction
    with Paul Hoyningen-Huene
    In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2001.
  •  227
    The semantic stance of scientific entity realism [Corrigenda]
    Philosophia 25 (3-4): 481-482. 1997.
    These are the footnotes for the article which was published in Philosophia Vol 24 1995, pp. 405-415
  •  322
    Chisholm, scepticisme et relativisme
    Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 10 (6): 32-39. 2014.
    Cet article esquisse une réponse particulariste et naturaliste au relativisme épistémique. La réponse est basée sur une analyse spécifique de la source de relativisme épistémique. Selon cette analyse, le relativisme épistémique doit être considérée en lien proche avec le scepticisme pyrrhonien, car le relativisme est basée sur le problème du critère qui a été propose par les ces anciens sceptiques. L’article commence avec une caractérisation du relativisme épistémique. Puis il présente un arg…Read more
  •  202
    Brian Ellis Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich Truth (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169): 496. 1992.
    Review of Brian Ellis's Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich's Truth.
  •  192
    James Franklin: What science knows and how it knows it (review)
    Metascience 19 (2): 289-292. 2010.
    This is a review of James Franklin's book, What Science Knows and How It Know It.