Brown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Areas of Interest
  •  80
    Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement
    American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3): 237-252. 2012.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the de…Read more
  •  63
    Falsehood and Entailment
    Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 82-94. 2015.
  •  28
    Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.
  •  24
    Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 41-47. 2009.
  •  19
    Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 367-383. 2005.
    In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant.
  • The Ways of Reason
    Dissertation, Brown University. 2003.
    This dissertation is about rationality, both practical rationality , and theoretical rationality . I argue that there are interesting similarities as well as interesting differences between practical and theoretical rationality. One of the similarities is that both of them are essentially related to the explanation of actions and beliefs, and one of the differences is that whereas theoretical rationality has the hyper-external aim of truth, practical rationality has the non-hyper-external aim of…Read more
  • Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de Sosa
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1). 2009.
  • En defensa de un externalismo epistémico
    Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 28 (2): 173-200. 2002.
  • Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significado
    Análisis Filosófico 18 (2): 143-150. 1998.
    In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against “realist” semantic theories . In this paper I argue that Putnam´s argument is weaker than what is generally supposed as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I desagree, however, with Devitt´s latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an “Afterword” to that book
  • Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of Sosa
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 75-81. 2009.