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38Hintikka on "Prima Facie" ObligationsTheoria 40 (3): 163-165. 1974.In this note it is argued that professor jaakko hintikka's explication of the notion of a 'prima facie obligation' within the framework of deontic logic must be regarded as unsatisfactory. since our world is not morally (or 'deontically') perfect, hintikka's proposal seems to have the absurd consequence that everything is a prima facie obligation
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25A note on John R. Searle's derivation of 'ought' from 'is'Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8 (1-4): 309-314. 1965.
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17Interpersonal Utility ComparisonsGrazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1): 283-312. 1982.Utilitarianism, as well as many other political and moral doctrines, presupposes that the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons can be solved. Otto Neurath gave a comparatively early (1912) and explicit statement of this problem, and he suggested that it cannot be solved. This may still be the dominant view. It is argued that recent attempts to solve the problem (by e.g. Schick, Rescher, Harsanyi, Brandt, Jeffrey, Arrow, and Hare) are unsatisfactory, but that the oldest suggestion - i.e. …Read more
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16On the Value of Scientific KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1): 53-63. 1987.Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. Th…Read more
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16Quine, Empiricism, and TruthIn A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 63--79. 2000.
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15Outline for an Argument for Moral RealismGrazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1): 215-225. 1981.Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a good …Read more
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9Quine and the A PrioriIn Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.John P. Burgess: Quine's continuing struggles with epistemological and ontological problems about mathematics and logic are traced from his first rebellion against logicism, through his flirtation and subsequent disillusionment with nominalism, to his final endorsement of naturalism, with an eye throughout to tensions among different aspects of his overall philosophy.
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3QuineIn W. H. Newton‐Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell. 2017.Willard Van Orman Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. For many years he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University and is now emeritus. To some extent his views are connected with the American pragmatist tradition, but a more important influence comes from the empiricist tradition and, in particular, from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see logical positivism). Quine has always remained faithful to the spirit of empiricism, but he has also criticized and revised …Read more
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Reasons in ethicsIn Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary aspects of philosophy, Oriel Press. pp. 177. 1977.
Stockholm, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Normative Ethics |