Indiana University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1976
Detroit, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
  •  2156
    Understanding proper names
    Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4): 325-354. 2010.
    There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the question that I…Read more
  •  531
    The ambiguity of definite descriptions
    Theoria 45 (2): 78-89. 1979.
  •  1139
    Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3). 1978.
    In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view.
  •  237
    Critical Notice of Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (review)
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1): 169-178. 2005.
    In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult and important questions in the philosophy of language, and he does so with characteristic thoroughness, clarity, and rigor. The book's title is appropriate, since it does indeed go ‘beyond rigidity’ in many ways. Among other things, Soames does the following in the course of the book. He persuasively argues that the main thesis of Kripke's Naming and Necessity—that ordinary names are rigid designato…Read more
  •  462
    In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.<sup>1</sup> One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmi…Read more
  •  642
    Names and intentionality
    Philosophical Review 87 (2): 171-200. 1978.
  •  48
    Expressing mental states
    Philosophia 8 (4): 657-671. 1979.