University of Sydney
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1974
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Religion
  •  130
    God and the Best
    Faith and Philosophy 13 (3): 311-328. 1996.
    The paper reaches two main conclusions: Firstly, even if there are one or more possible worlds than which there are none better, God cannot actualise any of them. Secondly, if there are possible worlds which God can actualise, and than which God can actualise none better, then God must actualise one of them. The paper is neutral between compatibilist and libertarian views of creaturely freedom. The paper's main ideas have been used, with modifications, in my book "God, the Best, and Evil" (OUP 2…Read more
  • WATTS, G. S.: "The Revolution of Ideas" (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (n/a): 318. 1984.
  •  510
    Reply to Oppy on God, the Best and Evil
    Sophia 50 (1): 211-219. 2011.
    My reply corrects one misstatement in Oppy’s summary of my book, abandons a footnote in the light of one of Oppy’s criticisms, and argues that Oppy’s other criticisms do not succeed in showing either that my claims are mistaken or that the arguments by which I supported them are defective
  •  241
    Popper on induction and independence
    Philosophy of Science 44 (2): 326-331. 1977.
    Karl Popper, in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" Section *vii, argues that if you find that some objecta a,b, c ... have a specific property P, then this discovery by itself does not increase the probability that some other object also has P. He concludes that there can be no effective principle of induction. My paper disproves Popper's claim, using very elementary considerations..
  •  46
    Miracles and principles of relative likelihood
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3). 1985.
    I EXAMINE VARIOUS SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR WEIGHING TESTIMONY TO PAST EVENTS AND IDENTIFY ONE WHICH SEEMS TO BE BOTH TRUE AND ROUGHLY IN THE SPIRIT OF DAVID HUME’S ESSAY. I ARGUE THAT HUME FAILS TO PROVIDE GOOD REASONS FOR SAYING THAT THIS PRINCIPLE, WHEN APPLIED TO REPORTS OF MIRACLES PURPORTING TO SUPPORT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, WILL ALWAYS LEAD US TO REJECT THE OCCURRENCE OF THE MIRACLE
  •  230
    Wiggins' defence of essentialism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (4): 459-469. 1975.
    This paper is a critique of David Wiggins's treatment of essentialism in his book Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Blackwell 1967). I argue in detail that he has not provided an adequate account either of the concept of a sortal term or of the concept of a substance-concept, even though both concepts play important roles in his case for essentialism. I also discuss Wiggins's views on how substance-concepts are related to judgments of identity through time.
  •  10
    Guest Editor’s Introduction
    Business and Professional Ethics Journal 21 (3): 2-4. 2002.
  •  26
    Some internal theodicies and the objection from alternative goods
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (1). 1993.
  •  379
    Identity and spatio-temporal continuity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2): 184-189. 1972.
    This article considers recent arguments against the proposition that one and the same object cannot go out of existence and then come into existence again (so that, e.g., teleportation would involve change of identity.). It argues that these arguments can be evaded by adopting a four-dimensional ontology, according to which human beings, trees, etc., have temporal as well as spatial parts.
  • Richard Swinburne
    In Graham Robert Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), Medieval Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2, Oxford University Press. pp. 5. 2009.
    In tyhis book chapterI provides concise overviews of Richard Swinburne's views on topics in natural theology and also in distinctively Christian philosophical theology; changes in his views are identified. I explain Swinburne's positive, cumulative case for the existence of God, and his discussion of objections to God based on evil, and then move on to outline his views on A tonement, Revelation, the Trinity, and the Incarnation. I then sketch his case for the truth of Christianity, and and his…Read more
  •  71
    Hume, Probability, Lotteries and Miracles
    Hume Studies 16 (1): 67-74. 1990.
    Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails
  •  14
    The Classical and Maximin Versions of the Two-Envelope Paradox
    Australasian Journal of Logic 2 30-43. 2004.
    The Two-Envelope Paradox is classically presented as a problem in decision theory that turns on the use of probabilities in calculating expected utilities. I formulate a Maximin Version of the paradox, one that is decision-theoretic but omits considerations of probability. I investigate the source of the error in this new argument, and apply the insights thereby gained to the analysis of the classical version.
  • Review of "The Miracle of Theism" by J.L. Mackie (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (n/a): 195. 1984.
  •  261
    Richard M.Gale reviewed my book in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews in May 2009. The overall conclusion of my reply is that although Gale repeatedly claims that the book is defective, his review has not identified any genuine defects.
  • PENELHUM, T.: "God and Scepticism" (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (n/a): 579. 1985.
  •  15
    This paper concerns some claims by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section X Part II -- specifically, what he says on pp.121-122 of Selby-Bigge's edition. Today (in September 2021) I have re-read the paper for the first time in decades. I cannot recommend that anyone else now read it: my argument was seriously defective. I still think, however, that its conclusion is correct, and accordingly may eventually write a new paper on the topic.
  •  1
    Wiggins' Defence of Essentialism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (4): 459-469. 1975.
  •  55
    God, the Best, and Evil
    Oxford University Press. 2008.
    God, the Best, and Evil is an original treatment of notable problems about God and his actions towards human beings. Three main topics are investigated in detail. First, if God exists, is God in some sense necessarily a value-maximizer? Second, Does a serious difficulty for the existence of God arise from the apparent fact that if God exists then God could have actualized a better possible world than this one? Thirdly are there strong objections top the existence of God based on evil? In the co…Read more
  • SMART, J. J. C.: "Ethics, Persuasion and Truth" (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (n/a): 491. 1987.
  •  7
    Government and Faith-Based Organisations in a Pluralist Society
    Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 7 (1): 72-77. 2005.
    Religious outlooks are combinations of theological, moral and political principles, individuated in a medium-grained way. Distinguish between religious outlooks that are friendly to the fundamental political principles characteristic of liberal democracy, and those that are hostile to, or knowingly subversive of, them. I claim that (1) in some respects, but not all, governments are justified in discriminating against 'hostile' religious outlooks, but (2) governments should not intentionally favo…Read more
  •  19
    Can God replace the actual world by a better one?
    Philosophical Papers 20 (3): 183-192. 1991.
    This paper has been superseded by Chapter 5 (especially section 5.4) of my book "God, the Best, and Evil" (OUP 2008). The chapter, like the journal article, is concerned with objections to the existence of God that are based on the apparent improvability of the world, yet are independent of the problem of evil.
  •  15
    Reply to Chrzan’s comments
    Sophia 34 (1): 74-78. 1995.
    This paper is the second of two in which I address Keith Chrzan's criticisms of what Alvin Plantinga says, in Chapter 9 Section 11 of The Nature of Necessity, about probabilistic arguments from evil. l clarify the issues and defend Plantinga and myself from Chrzan's criticisms.
  • MORRIS, T. V.: "The Logic of God Incarnate" (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (n/a): 372. 1987.
  •  38
    The maximin rule argument for Rawls's principles of justice
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1). 1985.
    John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, sometimes asserts each of the two premises of the following argument, and also the conclusion: (1) The parties in the original position would adopt the maximin rule. (2) The maximin rule, when applied to the task pof the parties in the original position, enjoins the choice of Rawls's two principles of justice in preference to the lother listed alternative. (3) Therefore the parties would choose Rawls's two principles. In this paper I argue against premise…Read more
  •  30
    Guest Editor’s Introduction
    Business and Professional Ethics Journal 21 (3-4): 2-4. 2002.