•  31
    Functional resemblance and the internalization of rules
    with Jon Opie
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4): 695-696. 2001.
    Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human visual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a criterion for internal representation. [Kubovy & Epstein].
  •  30
    The last rites of the dynamic unconscious
    with Jon Jureidini
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 161-166. 2002.
    © 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
  •  23
    This issue brings together papers by Australasian philosophers on language, thought, and their relationship. Contributors were given complete freedom to treat these topics in any way they saw fit. The results reflect the diverse interests of Australasian philosophers, and, perhaps even more strikingly, the diversity of philosophical methods they employ to pursue these interests.
  •  22
    Vehicles of consciousness
    with Jon Opie
    In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  21
    A Defense of Cartesian Materialism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 939-963. 1999.
    One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently wor…Read more
  •  10
    The connectionist vindication of folk psychology
    In Scott M. Christensen & Dale R. Turner (eds.), Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, L. Erlbaum. pp. 368--87. 1993.
  • Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to S…Read more