Tom Rockmore

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading Hegel’s PhenomenologyTom RockmoreJohn Russon. Reading Hegel’s Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Pp. xi + 299. Cloth, $50.00. Paper, $27.95.Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has been increasingly studied in ever-greater detail in recent years. In John Russon's interpretive study of Hegel's theories in this book, explanation is tightly constrained by the core argument of its various sections. The text is divided into an introduction and fifteen chapters concerning different aspects of Hegel's great treatise.Russon describes and justifies his strategy in a detailed introduction. Unlike other commentators, Russon focuses on the methods, premises, evidence, reasons and conclusions of Hegel's argument without consideration of the language, allusions and cultural context in which the book was composed. Russon further proceeds through separate studies of the separate sections of Hegel's treatise, which he treats as independent arguments about various aspects of human experience, as opposed to a continuous commentary on the work as a whole.These methodological innovations give Russon's discussion a distinctive character. Hegel stresses the intrinsically historical character of all thought. According to Hegel, all philosophical positions, including his own, belong to the history of philosophy. Treating Hegel's argument without reference to the specific context in which it was formulated makes it more difficult to grasp Hegel's claims. It further creates the illusion that Hegel's theories do not belong to their time and place, or historical moment. Russon's strategy of discussing each section of the Phenomenology as if it stood alone suggests that each is independent of the other and that the overall argument, which other commentators often strive to bring out, is non-existent. Russon emphasizes precisely this point in suggesting that a good reader of the Phenomenology must learn to treat each chapter autonomously. That is a useful hint if it means that Hegel's readers need to take each part of the book seriously and on its own terms. But if it also means that his readers should not be attempting to discern a deep but often elusive structure in the work as a whole, then for many this suggestion would appear to be seriously misleading.Since Hegel is one of most difficult authors in the Western tradition, it is hardly surprising that there is little agreement and much controversy about even basic moves in his arguments in the Phenomenology. Yet one of the more surprising traits of Russon's discussion [End Page 493] is that he simply does not mention well-known accounts of the Phenomenology by such authors as Q. Lauer, H. S. Harris, T. Pinkard, A. Kojève and J. Hyppolite. Russon insists that his intention in writing this book is pedagogical. He suggests that his study is intended to serve as a companion volume in a one-semester course on Hegel's Phenomenology. Each chapter intends to provide a lesson for someone concerned to grasp the argument of the book. Yet the lack of any reference to other such studies makes it not easier but more difficult for the student to evaluate the specific utility of Russon's approach with respect to available alternatives.Russon says that the basic themes of his approach are stated in chapter 11, and his distinctive approach is best brought out in chapter 5. Chapter 11 considers the existential drama of the "Struggle to the Death" as the foundation of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and intersubjectivity are rooted in the lived body, which Russon regards as central to the development of spirit. According to Russon, unlike many later thinkers, for Hegel, the fact that the themes of language and embodiment are paired, not separable, is central to his position. Russon goes on to argue that the famous discussion of master and slave turns on the problem of communication. He extends this approach to Hegel's treatment of Antigone, which he interprets as depicting the way a social system takes the place of the individual ego in pointing to what he calls an absolute, or dialectical, reading.Chapters 9–11 analyse the argument of Hegel's chapter on spirit. Chapter 9 focuses on "Spirit and Skepticism"; chapter 10...

At the present time, Europe, particularly eastern Europe, is still immersed in a major political transformation, the most significant such change since the Second World War, arising out of the rejection of official Marxism. This unforeseen rejection requires meditation by all those concerned with the relation of philosophy to the historical context. Marxism, that follows Marx’s insistence on the link between a theory and the context in which it arises, cannot be indifferent to the rejection of Marxist theory in practice. In respect to the usual tendency to pass rapidly over practice for a theoretical analysis of social theory, Merleau-Ponty stands out for his concern to evaluate the theoretical claims of Marx and Marxism against practice.

It is hardly surprising, since for Hegel philosophers are children of their times, that French Hegelianism differs from Hegelianism in other languages and literatures. At least the following aspects typify the French approach to Hegel's theory. To begin with, Hegel, like a few others, is a master thinker in the French discussion, one of the few intellectual figures around whom the discussion tends to take shape. Second, in the wake of the major impetus provided to French Hegel studies by Kojève's work, there has long been a tendency to conflate the views of Hegel, the great philosopher, and Kojève, one of his most brilliant expositors. Third, since the 1940s when Hyppolite emerged as a major Hegel interpreter, French Hegelianism has been the theater of an ongoing struggle between the two, Hegelian unorthodoxy, represented by Kojève, and Hegelian orthodoxy, represented by Hyppolite, that now seems to have been resolved in favor of the latter. The French Hegel discussion, which was once highly unorthodox by virtue of Kojève's influence, seems now to have become more orthodox but perhaps less interesting. Fourth, as a result of Kojève's influence, there is a link, peculiar to the French discussion, between Hegel and Heidegger that has further led to the tendency, also peculiar to the French debate, to see Husserl and Hegel as sharing the same method.

The recent concern with hermeneutics, which stems above all from Truth and Method, should not be allowed to obscure the fact, to which Gadamer certainly is sensitive, that this topic has a long philosophical lineage, extending back into the tradition at least to Aristotle. In particular, it seems rarely to have been noticed that although their thought is notoriously difficult, the major members of the German idealist tradition provided not only the positions themselves, but a theory of their interpretation. The latter point is important since, if evaluation is to be fair, positions must be measured against standards which are their own and not against extrinsic criteria. Yet for idealism this has rarely been done, in part because little attention has so far been directed to the idealist view of how theory is to be interpreted. Accordingly, my task in this paper will be twofold: to discuss the idealist theory of hermeneutics, and to test that theory in the interpretation of one of the major idealist positions. In consequence, the paper will come full circle, since the idealist theory of hermeneutics will be both expounded and put to the test provided by the hermeneutics of idealism.

It makes sense to ask from time to time where we are in the philosophical discussion. This article reviews the debate in the twentieth century. Michael Friedman has recently argued that the split between Continental and analytic philosophy is due to the inability, because of war, to carry forward a genuine debate begun by Heidegger and Carnap around the time of Heidegger's public controversy with Cassirer at Davos in 1929. I, however, argue that there was not even the beginning of a genuine debate between Heidegger and Carnap. I argue further that the split between analytic and Continental philosophy originated earlier, in the analytic attack on idealism at the beginning of the century. And finally, I argue that the differences among analytic philosophy, Continental philosophy, and pragmatism, the third main current of twentieth-century philosophy, can be traced to differing reactions to Kant

Fichte is one of the small handful of philosophers on the highest level. But he is still relatively unknown, even in Germany, for a variety of reasons. These include the difficulty of his thought and its expression, which impedes even native Germans; the relatively greater attention paid to Kant and Hegel, and perhaps even to Schelling; and the lack of a critical edition of his writings. In English-language philosophical circles, beyond these handicaps, knowledge of Fichte is further impeded by the persistent paucity of good, or even any, translations of important items in his bibliography.