Marcel Verweij

ABSTRACT If we have a duty not to infect others, how far does it go? This question is often discussed with respect to HIV transmission, but reflection on other diseases like influenza raises a number of interesting theoretical issues. I argue that a duty to avoid infection not only yields requirements for persons who know they carry a disease, but also for persons who know they are at increased risk, and even for those who definitely know they are completely healthy. Given the numerous ways in which human interaction facilitates the spread of communicable diseases, a maximum level of precaution would be very demanding – possibly unreasonably demanding. The ‘over‐demandingness problem’ is mostly invoked as a criticism of utilitarianism, as this theory requires moral agents to always maximise general welfare, even at significant cost for themselves. However, I argue that, with respect to precautions against infectious diseases like influenza, utilitarianism is able to avoid the over‐demandingness problem. A contractualist account, on the other hand, whilst able to explain how one's obligations to avoid infection can be limited, given that other persons have opportunities and responsibilities to protect themselves, in the end requires precautions that raise the over‐demandingness problem.

The futility debate may be considered as an effort to provide a clear and justified borderline between physician and patient decision–making authority. In this paper we argue that the search for a definition of futility that provides physicians with a final argument in discussions about life–prolonging treatment, is misplaced. An acceptable and meaningful criterion of futility that satisfies this effort seems impossible. As a consequence, we reject a dichotomous domain of decision–making power as the starting point for definitions of futility. A good decision about withholding life–sustaining treatment should be justified from the perspectives of both physician and patient. In this light, a range of definitions of futility is still useful as it can clarify intuitions that a treatment is inappropriate.

BACKGROUND: The availability of costly safety measures against transfusion-transmissible infections forces Western countries to confront difficult ethical questions. How to decide about implementing such measures? When are such decisions justified? As a preliminary to addressing these questions, we assessed which concerns shape actual donor blood safety policymaking in five Western countries. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: Our qualitative study involved determining which issues had been discussed in advisory committee meetings and capturing these issues in general categories. Appropriate documents were identified in collaboration with local decision-making experts in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The introduction of hepatitis B virus nucleic acid testing and selected measures against variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, West Nile virus, and Q-fever were chosen as cases representing decision-making on safety measures with high costs and low or uncertain added safety. RESULTS: A broad inventory of concerns was established, including: 1) nine categories of advantages and disadvantages of candidate safety policies; 2) six kinds of difficulties in assessing risks and forecasting the effects of safety policies; 3) 13 decision-making principles; and 4) six kinds of practical barriers hampering the translation of candidate policies into decisions. CONCLUSION: Blood safety policymaking involves a wide variety of competing concerns, and approaches to reconcile these considerations are themselves contested. Developing a systematic decision-making approach requires ethical reflection on, among others, reasonable costs of safety and the value of transparency in public policy.

The prescription of growth hormone therapy for children who are not growth hormone deficient is one of the controversies in contemporary paediatric endocrinology. Is it morally appropriate to enhance the growth, by means of medical treatment, of a child wish idiopathic short stature? The medical, moral, and philosophical questions in this area are many. Data on the effects of human growth hormone (hGH) treatment will not on their own provide us with answers, as these effects have to be evaluated from a normative perspective. In this article we consider hGH treatment for children of idiopathic short stature from three normative perspectives: the goals of medicine, the good of the patient, and the public good. We argue that the prevention of psychological and social problems due to short stature (and not merely the enhancement of growth) should be the ultimate goal of medical treatment and research

The rule of rescue holds that special weight should be given to protecting the lives of assignable individuals in need, implying that less weight is given to considerations of cost-effectiveness. This is sometimes invoked as an argument for funding or reimbursing life-saving treatment in public healthcare even if the costs of such treatment are extreme. At first sight one might assume that an individualist approach to ethics—such as Scanlon’s contractualism—would offer a promising route to justification of the rule of rescue. In this chapter I argue that contractualism cannot endorse the rule of rescue, whereas a collectivist approach that appeals to group solidarity would offer support for rescue cases. The argument, however, has its limitations, and though solidarity is of central concern in shaping public healthcare, there are good reasons for not endorsing the rule of rescue as a moral basis for allocating scarce resources in clinical care.

Thanks to developments in genomics,dietary recommendations adapted to genetic riskprofiles of individual persons are no longerscience fiction. But what are the consequencesof these diets? An examination of possibleimpacts of genetically tailor-made diets raisesmorally relevant concerns that are analogous to(medical-ethical) considerations aboutscreening and testing. These concerns oftengive rise to applying norms for informedconsent and for the weighing of burdens andbenefits. These diets also have a broaderimpact, especially because food patterns arefull of personal, social and cultural meanings.Diets will change one's food patterns and one'sattitude towards food, and this may implychanges in one's identity. We argue that suchan impact does not necessarily raise moralproblems. Moral concerns are, however, relevantif collective values and shared meanings infood practices are at issue. Therefore, thedevelopment of genetically tailor-made dietsdoes not merely require emphasis on weighingpersonal benefits and burdens and on informedconsent. It also asks for attention to andmoral reflection on the collective valuesinvolved in food practices.

Emerging infectious diseases such as Ebola, Hendra, SARS, West Nile, Hepatitis E and avian influenza have led to a renewed recognition of how diseases in human beings, wildlife and livestock are interlinked. The changing prevalence and spread of such infections are largely determined by human activities and changes in environment and climate—where the latter are often also caused by human activities. Since the beginning of the 21st century, these insights have been brought together under the heading of OneHealth—a concept that calls for interdisciplinary collaboration between various sciences as well as professional practices to promote and protect the health of human and non-human animals and the natural environment. Just as insights from public health have led to a broadened focus for health policy and medical care, from treating individual patients to protecting and promoting population health, OneHealth calls for an even broader perspective, including a concern for the environment and animals, and for social-cultural factors that affect human, animal and environmental health. OneHealth not only covers collaborative work to understand and control zoonotic diseases, but also other ways in which interactions between animals, plants and humans may positively or negatively impact on each other’s health. Thus, studies in veterinary medicine and environmental sciences may lead to new insights in human medicine, and vice versa. Acknowledgment of the links between environmental, animal and social health is of course not a novel insight. Hippocrates already pointed to the importance of a clean environment as a requirement for good health; the early public health movements emphasized hygienic living conditions including good-quality housing, sewage systems and clean air and water; and the founders of modern medicine such as William Osler and Rudolf Virchow promoted …

One of the societal problems in a new influenza pandemic will be how to use the scarce medical resources that are available for prevention and treatment, and what medical, epidemiological and ethical justifications can be given for the choices that have to be made. Many things may become scarce: personal protective equipment, antiviral drugs, hospital beds, mechanical ventilation, vaccination, etc. In this paper I discuss two general ethical principles for priority setting (utility and equity) and explain how these principles will often point in diverging directions. Moreover, each of these principles can be understood in different, again often competing, ways. Notwithstanding these controversies and conflicts, in the context of pandemic response there are at least some points of convergence: several policies can be justified by appeal to different ethical principles and theories. Convergence may be found with respect to a focus on saving the most lives (instead of other aggregative accounts); giving priority antiviral prophylaxis and therapy for life-saving pandemic responders; and, partly depending on epidemiology of the pandemic, to prioritise vaccination of children. Although decision-making about access to intensive care will involve choices with immediate tragic implications, the ethical complexity of these choices is relatively modest (although decisions will not be easy): there are persuasive moral reasons for giving priority to patients who are expected to benefit most within the shortest time. Finally, in the last section I tentatively argue that constraints on people’s freedom, as necessary for an effective public health approach, may support giving somewhat more weight to saving the most lives, than to concerns of equity.

Vaccination involves priming the immune system with an antigenic agent that mimics a virus or bacterium, which results in immunity against the “real” microorganism. Collective vaccination policies have played an important role in the control of infectious disease worldwide. They can serve the utilitarian aim to protect public health – hence welfare – and also promote fairness: making essential vaccines accessible to all members of the public. Yet as more and more vaccines are developed, societies face the question of how far to go in expanding public programs. Decisions about adopting new vaccines in the program will require combining scientific evidence about the disease and the vaccine, with value judgments about, for example, the extent to which a disease poses a threat to public health. It makes sense to promote transparency of such deliberations because one cannot expect that citizens simply accept every government vaccination policy

The curious philosopher often answers questions by raising further, more fundamental questions. How can this be fruitful and practical in the context of Wageningen University? Philosophy offers critical reflection on conceptual and normative assumptions in science and society, and that is necessary for responsible practices. I illustrate this by analyzing the concept of quality of life – a key value in the mission of our university – and by questioning current debates about responsibility for health

Many nursing homes have an influenza vaccination policy in which it is assumed that express (proxy) consent is not necessary. Tacit consent procedures are more efficient if one aims at high vaccination rates. In this paper I focus on incompetent residents and proxy consent. Tacit proxy consent for vaccination implies a deviance of standard proxy consent requirements. I analyse several arguments that may possibly support such a deviance. The primary reason to offer influenza vaccination is that vaccinated persons have a significantly reduced risk of getting the flu. This reason however cannot support the assumption that each nursing home resident is ‘better off ’ if she is vaccinated. Neither can it support tacit proxy consent policies. More promising are arguments that take the collective nature of infectious diseases into account. A potentially strong, but ultimately insufficient, argument for non‐express consent is that vaccination contributes to prevention of harm to others. Other arguments emphasise the importance of group protection: herd immunity. I discuss three collective reasons for aiming at herd immunity: solidarity, a common interest in reducing the risk of illness, and a common interest in the prevention of an influenza outbreak. The latter argument appears to be most important. An outbreak is not just detrimental to the health of residents; it is detrimental to their everyday social life as well. Outbreaks can be seen as a collective evil. My analysis shows that there are valid (though not necessarily sufficient) moral arguments for a tacit proxy consent policy.