Marcel Verweij

Objectives: Efficient procedures for obtaining informed (proxy) consent may contribute to high influenza vaccination rates in nursing homes. Yet are such procedures justified? This study’s objective was to gain insight in informed consent policies in Dutch nursing homes; to assess how these may affect influenza vaccination rates and to answer the question whether deviating from standard informed consent procedures could be morally justified. Design: A survey among nursing home physicians. Setting & Participants: We sent a questionnaire to all (356) nursing homes in the Netherlands, to be completed by one of the physicians. Results: We received 245 completed questionnaires. As 21 institutions appeared to be closed or merged into other institutions, the response was 73.1% (245/335). Of all respondents 81.9% reported a vaccination rate above 80%. Almost 50% reported a vaccination rate above 90%. Most respondents considered herd immunity to be an important consideration for institutional policy. Freedom of choice for residents was considered important by almost all. Nevertheless, 106 out of 245 respondents follow a tacit consent procedure, according to which vaccination will be administered unless the resident or her proxy refuses. These institutions show significantly higher vaccination rates (p < 0.03). Conclusions: In our discussion we focus on the question whether tacit consent procedures can be morally justifiable. Such procedures assume that vaccination is good for residents either as individuals or as a group. Even though this assumption may be true for most residents, there are good reasons for preferring express consent procedures.

Tolerance for blood transfusion risks is very low, as evidenced by the implementation of expensive blood tests and the rejection of gay men as blood donors. Is this low risk tolerance supported by the precautionary principle, as defenders of such policies claim? We discuss three constraints on applying the precautionary principle and show that respecting these implies tolerating certain risks. Consistency means that the precautionary principle cannot prescribe precautions that it must simultaneously forbid taking, considering the harms they might cause. Avoiding counterproductivity requires rejecting precautions that cause more harm than they prevent. Proportionality forbids taking precautions that are more harmful than adequate alternatives. When applying these constraints, we argue, attention should not be restricted to harms that are human caused or that affect human health or the environment. Tolerating transfusion risks can be justified if available precautions have serious side effects, such as high social or economic costs.

There has been increased interest in the potential of maternal immunisation to protect maternal, fetal, and infant health. Maternal tetanus vaccination is part of routine antenatal care and immunisation campaigns in many countries, and it has played an important part in the reduction of maternal and neonatal tetanus. Additional vaccines that have been recommended for routine maternal immunisation include those for influenza and pertussis, and other vaccines are being developed. Maternal immunisation is controversial since regulators, professionals, and the public are often reluctant to accept pharmaceutical interventions during pregnancy. So far, little attention has been given to the ethics of vaccination during pregnancy. In this Personal View we argue that maternal immunisation should be offered in response to concrete, severe risks of disease for mother and child, and we explain how this requirement of serious risk can be used to guide ethical decision-making about maternal immunisation.

The idea of the rule of rescue is that special weight should be given to protecting lives of assignable individuals in need now even if protecting others in the future would be more cost-effective. How can this be justified? One way to cast the problem is to see it as a conflict between a collectivist approach that emphasizes protecting groups or populations versus an approach that boils down to protecting individuals. This chapter argues that one individual-oriented approach to ethics, namely contractualism, will not succeed in justifying the rule of rescue. A more promising route would instead be to focus on collectivistic values like solidarity. It argues that values like solidarity and community may render support for rescue cases. Yet such arguments are not without problems. Moreover, they have limited relevance to discussions about resource allocation in health care.

The curious philosopher often answers questions by raising further, more fundamental questions. How can this be fruitful and practical in the context of Wageningen University? Philosophy offers critical reflection on conceptual and normative assumptions in science and society, and that is necessary for responsible practices. I illustrate this by analyzing the concept of quality of life – a key value in the mission of our university – and by questioning current debates about responsibility for health.

In spite of the fact that in recent years many steps have been taken in the control of zoonotic diseases, we are still confronted with recent outbreaks of, for example Ebola and Avian Flu and with public debates on the preferred way to deal with zoonoses. Such debates can easily get polarised. Therefore, we argue that a more integrated approach is needed. In this paper we propose an integration on three levels. First, the One Health initiative could serve a fruitful approach to take the interrelatedness of human and animal health into account. Second, we argue that it might be fruitful to approach societal controversies about how societies should respond to zoonotic risks not by focusing on conflicting interests, but as conflicts between broadly shared values. Finally, an effective approach of and a discussion on zoonoses require a more sophisticated view on moral responsibilities, which goes beyond the level of the question ‘who is to blame?’ for a specific outbreak. In this paper we claim that although finding acceptable and well-justified policies will remain a difficult task, these three steps towards a pluralistic approach to thinking about prevention of and response to zoonosis outbreaks may create possibilities to overcome conflicts.

Due to its emphasis on experiential interests, animal ethics tends to focus on individuals as the sole unit of moral concern. Many issues in animal ethics can be fruitfully analysed in terms of obligations towards individual animals, but some problems require reflection about collective dimensions of animal life in ways that individualist approaches can’t offer. Criticism of the individualist focus in animal ethics is not new; it has been put forward in particular by environmental ethics approaches. However, the latter tend to be so far removed from the concerns of animal ethicists that both groups talk at cross purposes. We think the gap between environmental and animal ethics could be bridged by focusing more on the collective dimensions of our concerns with animals. In our paper we explore various ways of conceptualising the moral relevance of collectiveness in animal life. We draw on insights from public health ethics, as this field of inquiry has also developed – at least partly – in response to individualist approaches in human bioethics, creating more room for recognizing the value of population health, interpersonal relations, solidarity, and ways in which a collective is constituted.

Current thinking on the development of molecular microbial characterisation techniques in public health focuses mainly on operational issues that need to be resolved before incorporation into daily practice can take place. Notwithstanding the importance of these operational challenges, it is also essential to formulate conditions under which such microbial characterisation methods can be used from an ethical perspective. The potential ability of molecular techniques to show relational patterns between individuals with more certainty brings a new sense of urgency to already difficult ethical issues associated with privacy, consent and a moral obligation to avoid spreading a disease. It is therefore important that professionals reflect on the ethical implications of using these techniques in outbreak management, in order to be able to formulate the conditions under which they may be applied in public health practice

The growing prevalence of obesity and related conditions such as Type II diabetes is held by many to be a major public health problem in developed countries, and increasingly in developing countries as well. If we wish to tackle this problem, it will be a major task. Individuals will have to change their consumption and exercise patterns, companies will have to improve the products they make and how they market them, nutrition experts and communities will have to redefine what is acceptable and desirable in food practices and governments will have to lead and promote such societal-level changes in many different fields, including food policy, urban design, educational policies, agricultural subsidies and tax breaks, etc. This is all very difficult to achieve. In many people’s view, government action aiming at social change will be especially controversial and meet some resistance. New York …

Given the ethical aspects of vaccination policies and current threats to public trust in vaccination, it is important that governments follow clear criteria for including new vaccines in a national programme. The Health Council of the Netherlands developed such a framework of criteria in 2007, and has been using this as basis for advisory reports about several vaccinations. However, general criteria alone offer insufficient ground and direction for thinking about what the state ought to do. In this paper, we present and defend two basic ethical principles that explain why certain vaccinations are the state's moral-political responsibility, and that may further guide decision-making about the content and character of immunisation programmes. First and foremost, the state is responsible for protecting the basic conditions for public health and societal life. Secondly, states are responsible for promoting and securing equal access to basic health care, which may also include certain vaccinations. We argue how these principles can find reasonable support from a broad variety of ethical and political views, and discuss several implications for vaccination policies

Some screening tests for donor blood that are used by blood services to prevent transfusion-transmission of infectious diseases offer relatively few health benefits for the resources spent on them. Can good ethical arguments be provided for employing these tests nonetheless? This paper discusses—and ultimately rejects—three such arguments. According to the ‘rule of rescue’ argument, general standards for cost-effectiveness in healthcare may be ignored when rescuing identifiable individuals. The argument fails in this context, however, because we cannot identify beforehand who will benefit from additional blood screening tests. On the ‘imposed risk’ argument, general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply when healthcare interventions impose risks on patients. This argument ignores the fact that imposing risks on patients is inevitable in healthcare and that these risks can be countered only within reasonable limits. Finally, the ‘manufacturing standard’ argument premises that general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply to procedures preventing the contamination of manufactured medical products. We contend that while this argument seems reasonable insofar as commercially manufactured medical products are concerned, publicly funded blood screening tests should respect the standards for general healthcare. We conclude that these particular arguments are unpersuasive, and we offer directions to advance the debate.

ABSTRACT If we have a duty not to infect others, how far does it go? This question is often discussed with respect to HIV transmission, but reflection on other diseases like influenza raises a number of interesting theoretical issues. I argue that a duty to avoid infection not only yields requirements for persons who know they carry a disease, but also for persons who know they are at increased risk, and even for those who definitely know they are completely healthy. Given the numerous ways in which human interaction facilitates the spread of communicable diseases, a maximum level of precaution would be very demanding – possibly unreasonably demanding. The ‘over‐demandingness problem’ is mostly invoked as a criticism of utilitarianism, as this theory requires moral agents to always maximise general welfare, even at significant cost for themselves. However, I argue that, with respect to precautions against infectious diseases like influenza, utilitarianism is able to avoid the over‐demandingness problem. A contractualist account, on the other hand, whilst able to explain how one's obligations to avoid infection can be limited, given that other persons have opportunities and responsibilities to protect themselves, in the end requires precautions that raise the over‐demandingness problem.

The futility debate may be considered as an effort to provide a clear and justified borderline between physician and patient decision–making authority. In this paper we argue that the search for a definition of futility that provides physicians with a final argument in discussions about life–prolonging treatment, is misplaced. An acceptable and meaningful criterion of futility that satisfies this effort seems impossible. As a consequence, we reject a dichotomous domain of decision–making power as the starting point for definitions of futility. A good decision about withholding life–sustaining treatment should be justified from the perspectives of both physician and patient. In this light, a range of definitions of futility is still useful as it can clarify intuitions that a treatment is inappropriate.

BACKGROUND: The availability of costly safety measures against transfusion-transmissible infections forces Western countries to confront difficult ethical questions. How to decide about implementing such measures? When are such decisions justified? As a preliminary to addressing these questions, we assessed which concerns shape actual donor blood safety policymaking in five Western countries. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: Our qualitative study involved determining which issues had been discussed in advisory committee meetings and capturing these issues in general categories. Appropriate documents were identified in collaboration with local decision-making experts in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The introduction of hepatitis B virus nucleic acid testing and selected measures against variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, West Nile virus, and Q-fever were chosen as cases representing decision-making on safety measures with high costs and low or uncertain added safety. RESULTS: A broad inventory of concerns was established, including: 1) nine categories of advantages and disadvantages of candidate safety policies; 2) six kinds of difficulties in assessing risks and forecasting the effects of safety policies; 3) 13 decision-making principles; and 4) six kinds of practical barriers hampering the translation of candidate policies into decisions. CONCLUSION: Blood safety policymaking involves a wide variety of competing concerns, and approaches to reconcile these considerations are themselves contested. Developing a systematic decision-making approach requires ethical reflection on, among others, reasonable costs of safety and the value of transparency in public policy.

The prescription of growth hormone therapy for children who are not growth hormone deficient is one of the controversies in contemporary paediatric endocrinology. Is it morally appropriate to enhance the growth, by means of medical treatment, of a child wish idiopathic short stature? The medical, moral, and philosophical questions in this area are many. Data on the effects of human growth hormone (hGH) treatment will not on their own provide us with answers, as these effects have to be evaluated from a normative perspective. In this article we consider hGH treatment for children of idiopathic short stature from three normative perspectives: the goals of medicine, the good of the patient, and the public good. We argue that the prevention of psychological and social problems due to short stature (and not merely the enhancement of growth) should be the ultimate goal of medical treatment and research