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145Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational BeliefsNeuroethics 5 (1): 1-4. 2012.Here I summarise the main arguments in Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.
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36Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of LifeThe Monist 93 (1): 38-56. 2010.According to the agency objection to life extension, being constrained as an agent adds to the meaningfulness of human life. Life extension removes constraints, and thus it deprives life of meaning. In the paper, I concede that constrained agency contributes to the mean- ingfulness of human life, but reject the agency objection to life extension in its current form. Even in an extended life, decision-making remains constrained, and many obstacles to the fulfilment of an agent’s goals are preserv…Read more
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53If you did not care, you would not notice: recognition and estrangement in psychopathologyPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1): 39-42. 2007.Paper discussing the Capgras delusions
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830The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about DelusionsAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3): 30-50. 2014.
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1203Do We Have an Obligation to Make Smarter Babies?In T. Takala, P. Herrisone-Kelly & S. Holm (eds.), Cutting Through the Surface. Philosophical Approaches to Bioethics, Rodopi. 2009.In this paper I consider some issues concerning cognitive enhancements and the ethics of enhancing in reproduction and parenting. I argue that there are moral reasons to enhance the cognitive capacities of the children one has, or of the children one is going to have, and that these enhancements should not be seen as an alternative to pursuing important changes in society that might also improve one’s own and one’s children’s life. It has been argued that an emphasis on enhancing cognitive capac…Read more
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139Recent Work on the Nature and Development of DelusionsPhilosophy Compass 10 (9): 636-645. 2015.In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions …Read more
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107Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik CaseNeuroethics 7 (3): 377-382. 2014.What factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determi…Read more
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866Psychiatric classification and diagnosis. Delusions and confabulationsParadigmi (1): 99-112. 2011.In psychiatry some disorders of cognition are distinguished from instances of normal cognitive functioning and from other disorders in virtue of their surface features rather than in virtue of the underlying mechanisms responsible for their occurrence. Aetiological considerations often cannot play a significant classificatory and diagnostic role, because there is no sufficient knowledge or consensus about the causal history of many psychiatric disorders. Moreover, it is not always possible to un…Read more
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26The relative importance of undesirable truthsMedicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4): 683-690. 2013.The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic information undermines the capacity for a…Read more
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302Philosophy and Happiness (edited book)Palgrave MacMillan. 2009.Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortali…Read more
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109Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in DelusionsEmotion Review 4 (2): 187-191. 2012.It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to main…Read more
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1206In Defence of Modest Doxasticism about DelusionsNeuroethics 5 (1): 39-53. 2012.Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwi…Read more
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214The right not to know: the case of psychiatric disordersJournal of Medical Ethics 37 (11): 673-676. 2011.This paper will consider the right not to know in the context of psychiatric disorders. It will outline the arguments for and against acquiring knowledge about the results of genetic testing for conditions such as breast cancer and Huntington’s disease, and examine whether similar considerations apply to disclosing to clients the results of genetic testing for psychiatric disorders such as depression and Alzheimer’s disease. The right not to know will also be examined in the context of the diagn…Read more
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227Deception in psychology : Moral costs and benefits of unsought self-knowledgeAccountability in Research 13 259-275. 2006.Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous deci…Read more
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33Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs?Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1): 134-148. 2015.Thought insertion is a common delusion in schizophrenia. People affected by it report that there are thoughts in their heads that have been inserted by a third party. These thoughts are self-generated but subjec-tively experienced as alien (hereafter, we shall call them alien thoughts for convenience). In chapter 5 of Transparent Minds, Jordi Fernández convincingly argues that the phenomenon of thought insertion can be accounted for as a pathology of self-knowledge. In particular, he argues that…Read more
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2What's wrong with 'mental' disorders?Psychological Medicine. 2010.Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V".
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152Rationality and sanity: The role of rationality judgments in understanding psychiatric disordersIn K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 480. 2012.The main objective in this chapter is to examine the role of judgments of rationality in the current understanding of psychiatric disorders. To what extent are the criteria for classification and diagnosis independent of judgments of rationality? The typical symptoms of many psychiatric disorders are described as instances of epistemic, procedural, or emotional irrationality, and references to such forms of irrationality are frequently made in the current classificatory and diagnostic criteria f…Read more
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293A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2): 205-224. 2009.Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’…Read more
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94Moral Rights and Human CultureEthical Perspectives 13 (4): 603-620. 2006.In this paper I argue that there is no moral justification for the conviction that rights should be reserved to humans. In particular, I reject James Griffin’s view on the moral relevance of the cultural dimension of humanity. Drawing from the original notion of individual right introduced in the Middle Ages and the development of this notion in the eighteenth century, I emphasise that the practice of according rights is justified by the interest in safeguarding the powers of reason and autonomy…Read more
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587Depressive DelusionsFilosofia Unisinos 17 (2): 192-201. 2016.In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an i…Read more
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170Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in SchizophreniaBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 879-900. 2016.In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are una…Read more
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The concept of scientific researchIn Carlos Maria Romeo Casabona (ed.), Los Nuevos Horizontes de la Investigacion Genetica, Comares. 2011.Chapter discussing what it takes for an activity to be an instance of scientific research
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314Delusions and the background of rationalityMind and Language 20 (2): 189-208. 2005.I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to b…Read more
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31Review of Evnine, Simon J., Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. viii + 176, £32.50 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 349-352. 2009.
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62Continuing Commentary: Shaking the BedrockPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1): 77-87. 2011.This feature in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP) is intended to provide ongoing commentary on main articles previously published in PPP. The essay by Bortolotti below is a response to John Rhodes and Richard Gipps's paper in PPP (15, no. 4:295-310).Can we understand people who report delusional beliefs? In their thought-provoking paper, "Delusions, Certainty, and the Background", John Rhodes and Richard Gipps (2008) present a novel account of delusions which has two main purposes: (1) …Read more
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150What does Fido believe?Think 7 (19): 7-15. 2008.Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs
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75Philip Gerrans The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and delusional thought (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3). 2015.Review of Phil Gerrans' book on delusions, The Measure of Madness.
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178An introduction to the philosophy of sciencePolity. 2008.An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science provides a lively and accessible introduction to current key issues and debates in this area. The classic philosophical questions about methodology, progress, rationality and reality are addressed by reference to examples from the full range of natural and social sciences. Lisa Bortolotti uses a historically-informed perspective on the evolution of science and includes a thorough discussion of the ethical implications of scientific research. Special a…Read more
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