-
40Agency Without a Substantive SelfThe Monist 49 (2): 273-289. 1965.A typical dispute between a libertarian and a determinist will usually involve some reference to ‘self-determination’. The libertarian will perhaps claim that I am free when I am not determined in my choices by anything outside myself but instead determine my choices ‘myself’. To this the determinist is likely to reply that ‘self-determination’ is determination all the same and that he cannot see how the freedom of choice defended by the libertarian is an exception to determinism. This is where …Read more
-
218A criticism of Ross's hypothetical 'I can'Mind 69 (273): 80-83. 1960.This article argues that the hypothetical 'I Can' position of Sir David Ross is incompatible with his determinism.
Emory University
PhD, 1962
APA Eastern Division
Knoxville, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
2 more
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |